Learning from the Past to Shape a Better Future: What Prospects for Russia–South Korea Cooperation?

After the start of the special military operation in Ukraine, the Republic of Korea aligned itself with the “collective West” and, under then-President Yoon Suk Yeol, took steps to erode bilateral relations with Russia. Although Moscow and Seoul had no direct disputes or disagreements, cooperation that had been quite successful up until 2022 was scaled back in nearly all areas. For three years now, there has been no direct air service between the two countries, and significant obstacles remain in bilateral settlements and movement of goods, with around 1,500 product categories subject to South Korean export restrictions. Yet, as Russian Ambassador to Seoul Georgy Zinoviev has observed, “the Republic of Korea is one of the friendliest among the unfriendly states.” Ties between Russia and South Korea have significant potential for growth, even amid the current geopolitical headwinds.

The contribution of regular economic forums in St. Petersburg, Sochi and Vladivostok to promoting dialogue between Russian and South Korean business entities of various sizes deserves recognition. However, efforts to explore ways of increasing the share of Russian enterprises in the South Korean market, lifting tariff and non-tariff restrictions and reversing what began as “silent” and later became overt sanctions have not materialized yet. On the other hand, the mismatch between actual steps and the vast potential for cooperation leaves room for dialogue at various levels. References to Seoul’s alignment with U.S., EU and other sanctions not only run counter to South Korea’s own interests but also seem illogical in light of the new tariffs imposed by the Trump administration on the Asian ally.

Pragmatism is the cornerstone of President Lee Jae Myung’s foreign policy. The new administration believes diplomacy should serve to advance Seoul’s interests as fully as possible, namely ensuring economic security and achieving peace on the Korean Peninsula. Democratic forces have thrown their weight behind the New Asia initiative, aimed at broadening partnerships through cooperation with the Global South, which is largely in tune with Russia’s priorities. There is also renewed hope for reconciliation with North Korea, even as Pyongyang publicly rejects the idea of unification and dialogue.

Considering the current South Korean administration’s orientation toward delivering economic results and steering clear of great-power competition, it is reasonable to expect that the upcoming APEC summit in Gyeongju, scheduled to open on October 31, will sketch the outlines of engagement. Notably, an invitation has already been extended to Russian President Vladimir Putin, and North Korea’s participation is formally not ruled out.

The outlook for trans-Korean initiatives appears dim at present, but the practical benefit of these initiatives for all of Northeast Asia could be immense. Creating the necessary political, economic and technical conditions will require gradual, practical steps toward normalization of Russia–South Korea relations, revival of inter-Korean dialogue and revision of sanctions on Pyongyang. Russia proceeds from the principle of indivisible security and therefore views the neighboring Korean Peninsula as no less important than the Arctic or the post-Soviet space. In this context, the course toward strategic partnership with North Korea could be complemented by the development of good-neighborly, mutually beneficial relations with the Republic of Korea.

After the start of the special military operation in Ukraine, the Republic of Korea aligned itself with the “collective West” and, under then-President Yoon Suk Yeol, took steps to erode bilateral relations with Russia. Although Moscow and Seoul had no direct disputes or disagreements, cooperation that had been quite successful up until 2022 was scaled back in nearly all areas. For three years now, there has been no direct air service between the two countries, and significant obstacles remain in bilateral settlements and movement of goods, with around 1,500 product categories subject to South Korean export restrictions. Yet, as Russian Ambassador to Seoul Georgy Zinoviev has observed, “the Republic of Korea is one of the friendliest among the unfriendly states.” Ties between Russia and South Korea have significant potential for growth, even amid the current geopolitical headwinds. In the year marking the 35th anniversary of diplomatic relations, it seems especially valuable to recall the strong record of mutually beneficial partnership built to date.

Integration as a path to peace

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From the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1990 until the sharp downturn in cooperation in 2022, the Republic of Korea invested around $3.5 billion in the Russian economy—less than 1% of South Korea’s total outbound foreign investment over that period. After 2014, when Crimea joined Russia, Seoul deliberately slowed the pace of foreign trade operations, yet from 2017 to 2022 business activity grew steadily. In 2022, bilateral trade in goods and services stood at around $21 billion. At the time, a prospective free trade agreement between the Republic of Korea and the Eurasian Economic Union was under preliminary discussion, with the aim of reducing tariff barriers and enabling free exchange of goods. To put this into perspective, bilateral trade between Russia and South Korea in 2024 barely reached $11.4 billion.

In 2017, South Korean President Moon Jae In outlined the New Northern Policy, which emphasized the development of multidimensional cooperation with China, North Korea and Russia in parallel. For this purpose, Seoul set up a special presidential committee on northern economic cooperation, responsible for implementing specific projects. In his keynote address at the plenary session of the 2017 Eastern Economic Forum, the South Korean leader unveiled the Nine Bridges initiative to deepen engagement with Russia. The plan involved creating joint working groups that would prepare and carry out projects in shipbuilding, port development, the Northern Sea Route, oil and gas, railway modernization, the electric power industry, agriculture and fisheries. As Moon put it, “a new reality for the East is emerging in the Russian Far East, which is a platform for dynamic cooperation that opens the era of the Pacific Rim.”

One of the key areas of Russia–South Korea cooperation identified at the time—and one that remains relevant today—is the construction of a “gas bridge.” In 2018, the Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS) expressed interest in increasing imports of Russian liquefied natural gas well beyond the 1.5 million tonnes it was already buying and continues to seek ways to diversify supply. Notably, Russia shipped 2.1 million tonnes of LNG to South Korea in 2024, making it the country’s seventh-largest supplier. Gas cooperation also involved plans to build a pipeline network from Russia to the South Korean city of Busan via North Korea. The project was valued at no less than $2.5 billion, with no serious technical hurdles to implementation, but the UN Security Council sanctions regime on Pyongyang stood in the way.

A trilateral project to link South Korea, North Korea and Russia by rail was also considered a particularly promising avenue for cooperation. Because of North Korea’s underdeveloped and outdated transport infrastructure, the scale of required work and financing was enormous. The Rajin Port (North Korea)—Khasan (Russia) section was intended as the pilot route, especially since this project was not directly affected by the UNSC sanctions regime. Russia is now building a road bridge over the Tumen River, which, along with a new border crossing and a revised concept for the Primorye-2 international transport corridor, will facilitate North Korea’s possible integration into Northeast Asia’s transport system in the foreseeable future.

The Republic of Korea has consistently expressed interest in modernizing ports in Russia’s Far East, particularly Zarubino in Primorsky Krai, located near North Korea’s Rajin and linked by rail to Russia’s borders with North Korea and China. South Korean companies signaled willingness to participate in the construction of new terminals and port infrastructure in Primorsky Krai as part of international transport corridor projects. In 2018, Korean shippers tested sending cargo from Sakaiminato, Japan, to Changchun in China’s Jilin province through Zarubino. With the recent resumption of ferry service between Vladivostok and South Korean ports (mainly for freight), these developments pave the way for further optimization of transport and logistics schemes.

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Seoul also showed interest in jointly developing the Northern Sea Route with Russia. However, South Korea was not ready to invest in the necessary transport infrastructure along the route, choosing instead to cooperate in shipbuilding. DSME built ice-class LNG carriers for the Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG projects, but that work stopped in 2022. There were also plans to assemble Aframax tankers at the Zvezda shipyard in the town of Bolshoy Kamen in Primorsky Krai using components made by South Korea’s Hyundai Samho Heavy Industries. Seoul’s efforts in this area were undercut by competition from Chinese producers and its own inconsistent approach, though not all is lost.

Energy cooperation between Russia and South Korea could have been directed toward building the Asian Super Grid by linking power transmission lines across Northeast Asia, including Russia, South Korea, North Korea, China and Mongolia. At the 2018 Eastern Economic Forum, then-Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak said Moscow was ready to join the project, highlighting electricity supply to the Korean Peninsula as a priority.

At the time, South Korean investors presented plans for investing in the construction of a cluster that would include a fishing port, warehouses, deep-freeze refrigerators, a container terminal and a fish plant in Vladivostok. Hyundai also planned to build by 2022 a plant near Nakhodka producing mineral and methanol fertilizers. South Korean companies, including Lotte, showed interest in making organic food products from plant and animal raw materials in Russia’s Far East. LH Corporation intended to build an industrial park in the Nadezhdinskaya Advanced Development Territory. Korean firms also launched food production in the Mikhaylovskaya ADT, which remains operational today.

Pressure or engagement?

At the same time, the trajectory of Russia–South Korea ties was closely bound to broader dynamics on the Korean Peninsula. Under the administrations of Park Geun Hye and Moon Jae In, Seoul pinned its hopes on progressively bringing Pyongyang into joint economic ventures to help pave the way for possible reunification. But the objective need for a partial easing of sanctions on North Korea was never matched by real political will from Washington. Donald Trump’s statement following his meeting with Kim Jong Un in Hanoi in February 2019, in which he expressed readiness to facilitate North Korea’s economic development, was never acted on due to unrealistic demands to Pyongyang. Meanwhile, Russia and China proposed to the U.S. administration a roadmap for a step-by-step settlement of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, centered on a “double-freeze” approach—suspension of North Korea’s nuclear program alongside a halt to U.S.–South Korean joint military drills. The next step could have involved lifting restrictions on economic activity to assist development in the North. But the COVID-19 pandemic, the Biden administration’s policies that stirred tensions across a number of regions, and President Yoon Suk-Yeol’s open provocations of Pyongyang pushed prospects for a resolution of the peninsula crisis further out of reach.

Seoul repeatedly attempted to use economic mechanisms as a means of pressuring Moscow to adopt a “more assertive stance” on North Korea. Major South Korean firms effectively sabotaged the implementation of projects in Russia, pointing to the country’s bureaucracy or U.S. and EU sanctions. That left Moon Jae In’s administration seeking compromises not only with Russian counterparts but also with domestic business circles, where many favored a conservative and nationalist course.

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Until 2022, Seoul showed strong interest in expanding ties with Moscow, viewing Russia’s Far East as a priority area for its business and investment activity. The revival of inter-Korean dialogue under the Moon Jae In administration laid the groundwork for Russia’s participation in trans-Korean projects. The question of easing international and unilateral sanctions on North Korea still lacks a clear solution. Russia and China advocate a broad interpretation tied to specific needs, but is Seoul prepared for that? Current President Lee Jae Myung has so far spoken positively only about the potential for cooperation with Russia in transport and logistics, offering no details. It will likely take more time and a look back at past experience before firm plans emerge.

The contribution of regular economic forums in St. Petersburg, Sochi and Vladivostok to promoting dialogue between Russian and South Korean business entities of various sizes deserves recognition. However, efforts to explore ways of increasing the share of Russian enterprises in the South Korean market, lifting tariff and non-tariff restrictions and reversing what began as “silent” and later became overt sanctions have not materialized yet. On the other hand, the mismatch between actual steps and the vast potential for cooperation leaves room for dialogue at various levels. References to Seoul’s alignment with U.S., EU and other sanctions not only run counter to South Korea’s own interests but also seem illogical in light of the new tariffs imposed by the Trump administration on the Asian ally.

Pragmatism is the cornerstone of President Lee Jae Myung’s foreign policy. The new administration believes diplomacy should serve to advance Seoul’s interests as fully as possible, namely ensuring economic security and achieving peace on the Korean Peninsula. Democratic forces have thrown their weight behind the New Asia initiative, aimed at broadening partnerships through cooperation with the Global South, which is largely in tune with Russia’s priorities. There is also renewed hope for reconciliation with North Korea, even as Pyongyang publicly rejects the idea of unification and dialogue.

Considering the current South Korean administration’s orientation toward delivering economic results and steering clear of great-power competition, it is reasonable to expect that the upcoming APEC summit in Gyeongju, scheduled to open on October 31, will sketch the outlines of engagement. Notably, an invitation has already been extended to Russian President Vladimir Putin, and North Korea’s participation is formally not ruled out.

The outlook for trans-Korean initiatives appears dim at present, but the practical benefit of these initiatives for all of Northeast Asia could be immense. Creating the necessary political, economic and technical conditions will require gradual, practical steps toward normalization of Russia–South Korea relations, revival of inter-Korean dialogue and revision of sanctions on Pyongyang. Russia proceeds from the principle of indivisible security and therefore views the neighboring Korean Peninsula as no less important than the Arctic or the post-Soviet space. In this context, the course toward strategic partnership with North Korea could be complemented by the development of good-neighborly, mutually beneficial relations with the Republic of Korea.