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Sergey Demidenko

PhD in History, expert at the Institute of Strategic Estimates and Analysis, Assistant Professor at the Higher School of Economics, RIAC expert

Will the deal with the group of six pave the way for an overall warming in the relationship between Tehran and Western capitals? In the context of the agreements on the Iranian nuclear programme Europe will try to strengthen its relations with the Islamic Republic in the economic realm. As far as the USA is concerned, it will not change its strategy, the aim of which is to change the Iranian regime, which is outside the control of the White House and is pursuing an independent political path in the region.

The group of six international mediators (the USA, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China and Germany) and Iran reached a preliminary framework agreement on the “nuclear dossier” on 2 April 2015 in Lausanne. According to this document, the parties commit to reach a comprehensive agreement by 30 June 2015 entailing a complete lifting of the international embargo imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). It will only be signed, however, if Iran fulfils a whole range of important obligations.

First, Tehran has to make a significant reduction in the quantity (from 19,000 to 6,104) and quality (only the IR-1S type) of centrifuges it has at its disposal for enriching uranium. Second, all the “redundant” centrifuges must be handed over to IAEA control and used only for spare parts for the equipment that remains in operation. Third, Iran undertakes not to enrich uranium higher than a level of 3.67% over the next 15 years and also to reduce its stock of low-enriched uranium from 10 tonnes to 300 kg. In return, the group of six world powers confirms the Islamic Republic’s right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Javad Zarif, head of the Islamic Republic’s foreign ministry, who signed the agreement in Switzerland, was hailed as a hero in his own country. Jubilant crowds filled the streets of major Iranian cities, while officials spoke of a “huge success” for the nation’s diplomacy.

For most ordinary people the breakthrough in the talks with the group of six was a miracle. Nevertheless, if truth be told there was nothing mystical about what happened in Lausanne: the overwhelming majority of experts expected that sooner or later a breakthrough would be achieved at the talks, citing primarily economic reasons.

yeowatzup/Flickr, CC BY 2.0
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For example, according to the data for 2013, Iran’s GDP fell by 1.7%, inflation stood at 35.2% and unemployment at 13.2%, while per capita GDP was 12,264 US dollars. Meanwhile the index of economic freedom in the country is 41.8 points (ranking 171st in the world and 15th in the region).

This state of affairs required that Hassan Rouhani’s government take immediate steps to bring foreign investment into the country to revive the oil and gas sector of the national economy and provide a boost to economic development in one of the mostly densely populated countries in the Middle East (with a population of 77.1 million). Otherwise the central authorities could soon have lost control of the domestic political situation in Iran, which apart from socio-economic problems has a range of ethnic and religious disagreements (the Kurdish question, difficulties in the relationship between the Persians and the Azerbaijanis, instability in Sistan and Baluchistan province, etc). The main obstacle in the way of reviving the Islamic Republic’s economic life was its nuclear programme – a programme which was causing concern in the international community that a new nuclear power might appear on the political map of the region.

But was this concern justified? Even the most fastidious IAEA inspectors were unable to find any substantial signs of a military component in the Iranian nuclear programme. Yes, Tehran was reluctant to enter negotiations; yes, the country found it difficult to open its nuclear facilities for inspection, and yes, it continued its nuclear research despite the protests of the international supervisory agencies. But how close was Iran to producing a bomb, and was it planning to create one at all?

This remains an open question. No one in the West (primarily in the USA) was persuaded to the contrary either by the fact of the extreme poverty of Iranian uranium ore or even by the religious ban imposed on the production of nuclear weapons by the IRI’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei. The pressure on Tehran grew year by year, and the sanctions intensified, but still Iran did not give in, dragging out the negotiating process and raising more and more conditions in relation to the IAEA and the group of six with regard to signing a comprehensive agreement. At the same time the world’s media portrayed Iran’s obstinacy in terms of “there’s no smoke without fire”. If they’ve got nothing to hide, why all these diplomatic tricks? But Tehran simply could not unconditionally meet all the demands of the international community, since this would put the country’s national sovereignty – its right to scientific and technical progress – in jeopardy. The all-round pressure elevated the IRI’s nuclear programme to the level of a national cause in the eyes of Iranian society.

The current “nuclear deal”, which is an organic continuation of the first, which was done in November 2013, has forced Iran to yield a part of its national independence. But in the opinion of its authorities the country has still scored a substantial victory, since it has defended its right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

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Will the deal with the group of six pave the way for an overall warming in the relationship between Tehran and Western capitals? It’s unlikely to, at least as far as Washington is concerned. In the context of the agreements on the Iranian nuclear programme Europe will try to strengthen its relations with the Islamic Republic in the economic realm, as it regards the country as an alternative to Russia as a source of hydrocarbon resources. As far as the USA is concerned, it will not change its strategy, the aim of which is to change the Iranian regime, which is outside the control of the White House and is pursuing an independent political path in the region.

It is most likely that a new pretext for pressure on Iran will be found after a while. For the time being the American need the Iranians. They need them so they can use their capacity and influence in the fight against ISIS; they need them in order to create a counterweight in the Middle East to Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which are increasingly out of Washington’s control. However, as soon as the situation is even partially normalised the United States will start to create a new international coalition against the IRI. The existence of an independent regime in Tehran hardly fits with the long-term plans of any American administration.

For Russia the nuclear deal with the IRI means both new challenges and new opportunities. On the one hand Iran’s likely emergence from the effects of the international embargo threatens to present the Russian Federation with a competitor in the global gas market. But on the other, it creates prospects for expanding economic cooperation between the two states. With money flowing into Iran and the country escaping the sanctions, in a real sense flesh can be put on the bones of the recent agreements on space and nuclear matters, and there will be a new boost to contacts in the field of the arms trade. We must not forget that Iran is a colossal market for Russian industrial and agricultural goods.

As for the oil and gas question, this might all turn out not so gloomy. Russian companies need to make maximum efforts to make the most advantageous possible deals in this area with Iran as it breaks free from the sanctions. We could also think about providing it with Russian infrastructural and production opportunities for transporting gas to customers in Europe and Asia.

Iran is a pragmatic country, and we need to fight for it. If we succeed in interesting the IRI’s leadership in our proposals, the benefit from cooperation with a Tehran newly released from the embargo could outweigh the negative consequences of the country’s emergence on the global hydrocarbons market. As one famous film hero said, “If you organise things properly, it’s quite possible for a bristle to be turned into gold.”

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