After Alaska. A New Stage in International Relations

The summit between the leaders of Russia and the United States in Alaska brought to a new reality the situation in relations between the world’s centres of power. In itself, it is unstable. One of the signs of such instability is the openness of the question of the parameters for settling the conflict in Ukraine.

However, the very fact that relations are transitioning to a new framework, and the prospect of entering the next stage, already represent a break in the pattern, given what has transpired over the last three and a half years. What will characterise the next transition in international relations, and what trump cards do its key participants hold?

The meeting in Alaska only outlined the direction of movement. It recorded a break in the old pattern, but has not yet formed a new one. The meaning of diplomacy in the near future concerning the Ukrainian issue and a wider range of topics will consist of an attempt to define more rigid and stable parameters of relations. Ukraine is an important, but not an exhaustive problem. Each player approaches the new parameters with their own sets of strengths and weaknesses.

The United States retains significant military-political and economic potential. The accumulated margin of safety still allows Washington to make mistakes without serious consequences for itself, at least here and now. It is the United States that largely determines the degree of Kiev’s readiness to accept certain concessions. Washington retains the ability to discipline its allies, and cooperation with the United States is still of considerable value for a wide range of countries. American diplomacy has experience in exiting unprofitable foreign policy assets.

Strictly speaking, the Ukrainian issue is not critical for the domestic political stability of the United States either. America’s problem is the limits of pressure on both Russia and the leaders of the world majority. They will still have to be spoken to on equal terms, even taking into account the US leadership in many areas.

The European Union retains decent financial, industrial, infrastructural and human capabilities. But their conversion into political weight remains unclear. Brussels is actively developing skills in the field of common security policy. This experience cannot be discounted. Attempts to strengthen its role in international relations will continue. But the Union will have to simultaneously work on its cohesion. The Ukrainian issue, as well as European security, are more sensitive for the domestic audience, including in the context of the turn to the right.

China has gained colossal potential, but is in no hurry to actively use it outside the zone of its immediate interests. Its role in the Ukrainian conflict is a rare example of balancing act. China’s strength is one of the factors behind the US desire to withdraw from “non-core assets” in order to focus on the main thing. And the main thing is China. However, economic cooperation with the US remains important for China’s development, despite impressive successes. This factor will determine Beijing’s caution.

India is developing rapidly. Its long-term prospects seem promising. New Delhi’s approach to the Ukrainian issue is also balanced, although somewhat more distant. India has both the capabilities and the will to defend its core interests. However, cooperation with the West also remains highly significant for its development prospects.

Russia has demonstrated the highest resistance to stress of various levels and natures, from high-intensity military confrontation to resistance to sanctions, information warfare and many other challenges. The country will have to concentrate significant resources on security issues in the long term. However, it has such resources. Moreover, the past three years have shown that it has the ability to develop a development model, even under such conditions. Russia is entering a stage where it is defining new rules, not as the most dynamic player, but with extensive experience in testing its capabilities and vulnerabilities, and, most importantly, with increased confidence in its capabilities.

The summit between the leaders of Russia and the United States in Alaska brought to a new reality the situation in relations between the world’s centres of power. In itself, it is unstable. One of the signs of such instability is the openness of the question of the parameters for settling the conflict in Ukraine.

However, the very fact that relations are transitioning to a new framework, and the prospect of entering the next stage, already represent a break in the pattern, given what has transpired over the last three and a half years. What will characterise the next transition in international relations, and what trump cards do its key participants hold?

Ivan Timofeev:
Russia and China in the Era of Trade Wars and Sanctions

The Putin-Trump summit drew a line under the reality that emerged after the start of Russia’s special military operation in February 2022. It had a number of features. First, a high level of consolidation of the United States and its allies on the issue of counteracting Russia and supporting Ukraine. Second, a categorical denial of the very possibility of any compromises and mutual concessions on Ukraine; Russia’s capitulation in one form or another as the best option for solving the problem. Third, a steady escalation of economic sanctions, including those against third-country participants in trade with Russia. Fourth, a cautious position among the key countries of the world majority: their cooperation with Russia while maintaining constructive relations with the West. Fifth, a relatively slow change in the front line, in which the individual successes of the respected parties fail to lead to decisive military and political results.

After Donald Trump came to power in the United States, signs of change emerged. First of all, the new administration proposed a different approach to the Ukrainian issue: huge investments have failed to provide a clear political return. Russia has demonstrated high resilience, its capitulation amid the current conditions is simply impossible. However, victory is quite possible. The further it goes, the more chances Moscow has to maximise its results. It is reasonable to come to terms with the losses and stop the leakage of scarce funds into a hopeless project. If Russia cannot be defeated, then it is necessary to negotiate with it, even if such negotiations are unpleasant to someone or seemed impossible in the past.

Based on the new approach, the Trump administration has, on the one hand, stopped escalating sanctions. Previously imposed restrictions were not lifted, but new ones were not introduced. A rift emerged in relations with allies, who remained in the old paradigm, continued to impose sanctions and took a belligerent position. On the other hand, Washington tried to use the stick along with the carrot in the form of the threat of secondary sanctions against Russia’s partners. But here, too, the reality began to change. Despite all the caution in the Ukrainian issue and the reluctance to get involved in the “Russian rebellion”, the key powers of the world majority responded to the threats of the stick with polite but cold firmness. China and India continue to cooperate with Russia. Moreover, there are rudimentary signs of rapprochement between Beijing and New Delhi. Their relations are too burdened with problems and contradictions to expect quick breakthroughs. However, even such small steps go beyond the expectations that the US and India will jointly contain China. In addition, the large-scale trade war launched by Trump against almost a hundred countries has caused general irritation. So far, no one wants to openly challenge the United States. Only Russia has dared to do so in recent history. But grumbling is heard both in the ranks of the allies and the world majority.

The Ukrainian front seems to remain stable. But here too, the number of small changes has the potential to yield quality. Ukrainian forces were driven out of the Kursk region, and units of Russia’s ally, North Korea, participated in the fighting. Numerous drone and missile strikes on Russian territory resulted in losses, but had zero effect on the political situation and Moscow’s resolve. Similar actions by the Russian army, apparently, are only increasing. As are the skills of conducting combat amid new technological conditions. The absence of WWII-style breakthroughs hardly excludes the cumulative effect of many local operations, many of which have obviously proved to be effective.

The most serious resistance to the transition to a new reality has come from Ukraine. It faced the threat of the conflict being resolved without its active participation. Ukraine’s vulnerability, which had been accumulating for more than three years, became apparent. The country is weakened and critically dependent on the United States for military supplies, financial aid, and intelligence. The stability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is largely determined by US support. In addition to starting consultations with Moscow, Donald Trump has also tried to capitalise on Kiev’s dependence on American aid. From a relationship of almost brothers in arms during the time of Joe Biden, the interaction between the United States and Ukraine has turned into a cynical demand to pay the bills. This transformation has presented much more serious trauma in ideological and moral terms than it has materially. The European allies of the United States have also pursued their line of resistance. Their role in the Ukrainian issue was becoming much more marginal. The contribution of NATO’s European wing to Ukraine is significant, but without the active role of the United States, it is devalued. Neither individual European powers nor the EU as a whole can have a decisive influence on the course of events.

However, the meeting in Alaska only outlined the direction of movement. It recorded a break in the old pattern, but has not yet formed a new one. The meaning of diplomacy in the near future concerning the Ukrainian issue and a wider range of topics will consist of an attempt to define more rigid and stable parameters of relations. Ukraine is an important, but not an exhaustive problem. Each player approaches the new parameters with their own sets of strengths and weaknesses.

The United States retains significant military-political and economic potential. The accumulated margin of safety still allows Washington to make mistakes without serious consequences for itself, at least here and now. It is the United States that largely determines the degree of Kiev’s readiness to accept certain concessions. Washington retains the ability to discipline its allies, and cooperation with the United States is still of considerable value for a wide range of countries. American diplomacy has experience in exiting unprofitable foreign policy assets. 

Ivan Timofeev:
Three Years of Stress Test: Interim Results for Russia

Strictly speaking, the Ukrainian issue is not critical for the domestic political stability of the United States either. America’s problem is the limits of pressure on both Russia and the leaders of the world majority. They will still have to be spoken to on equal terms, even taking into account the US leadership in many areas.

The European Union retains decent financial, industrial, infrastructural and human capabilities. But their conversion into political weight remains unclear. Brussels is actively developing skills in the field of common security policy. This experience cannot be discounted. Attempts to strengthen its role in international relations will continue. But the Union will have to simultaneously work on its cohesion. The Ukrainian issue, as well as European security, are more sensitive for the domestic audience, including in the context of the turn to the right.

China has gained colossal potential, but is in no hurry to actively use it outside the zone of its immediate interests. Its role in the Ukrainian conflict is a rare example of balancing act. China’s strength is one of the factors behind the US desire to withdraw from “non-core assets” in order to focus on the main thing. And the main thing is China. However, economic cooperation with the US remains important for China’s development, despite impressive successes. This factor will determine Beijing’s caution.

India is developing rapidly. Its long-term prospects seem promising. New Delhi’s approach to the Ukrainian issue is also balanced, although somewhat more distant. India has both the capabilities and the will to defend its core interests. However, cooperation with the West also remains highly significant for its development prospects.

Russia has demonstrated the highest resistance to stress of various levels and natures, from high-intensity military confrontation to resistance to sanctions, information warfare and many other challenges. The country will have to concentrate significant resources on security issues in the long term. However, it has such resources. Moreover, the past three years have shown that it has the ability to develop a development model, even under such conditions. Russia is entering a stage where it is defining new rules, not as the most dynamic player, but with extensive experience in testing its capabilities and vulnerabilities, and, most importantly, with increased confidence in its capabilities.

First published in the Valdai Discussion Club.