... acquired following the victory of incumbent President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Judging by the leadership’s recent steps, Turkey wants to maintain continuity with its previous policies, as demonstrated by Turkey’s efforts to strengthen and expand ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE; in 2022, Riyadh and Ankara agreed to start a new phase of bilateral cooperation. Turkey has also expressed its intention to restore diplomatic relations with Egypt, Syria and Israel. Interestingly, Ankara had already taken some actions in this regard even before the May 2023 elections.
Therefore, potential improvements in the relations between Turkey and Syria would fall well in line with the “relations harmonization” ...
... the immediate withdrawal of the forces of Lebanese Hezbollah or Iran’s IRGC from Syria, taking into account the strong ties between the SAR and the IRI. In Damascus, too, there is certain wariness towards Arab states, and they remember too well that Saudi Arabia, along with Qatar, had been among the main sponsors of the Syrian opposition at least until 2014. It is unlikely that Assad will sacrifice good relations with his proven partner to a phantom idea of Arab unity.
We cannot rule out a scenario when the issue of Syria’s return to the LAS would be postponed, but ...
... the region. The UAE foreign minister was among the first to visit Damascus, the foreign ministers of Jordan and Egypt visited Syria for the first time in the years of conflict, and the Egyptian president had his first telephone conversation with his Syrian peer. Saudi Arabia, for the first time sent, several planes with humanitarian aid to Syria, whereas Bashar Assad visited Oman for the first time since the inception of the civil war.
Also worth mentioning are the March 13 agreements between Iran and Saudi Arabia,...
... international and regional transformations” at a meeting with journalists from his pool. Syria’s high-level political contacts and economic exchange with a number of Arab states, primarily neighboring Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, have intensified. Syrian authorities have lifted restrictions on trade with Saudi Arabia and toned down their anti-Saudi rhetoric. Tellingly, with a belated and politicized Western response, 74% of urgent humanitarian
aid
to Syria from February 6th to 13th was provided by Arab states. Assad, for his part, has opened two additional ...
... Council established in Damascus; projects discussed in the food and pharmaceutical sectors
Qatar
Zero contacts
Zero contacts, embassies closed
No data in public domain
B2B relations; Islamic banking in Syria (2020: 1
st
in the GCC/2
nd
among Arab states)
Saudi Arabia
Rare contacts; May 2021: Syrian Minister of Tourism visited Riyadh for the 47
th
meeting of the World Tourism Organization Committee for the Middle East
Sporadic contacts, embassies closed
Limited data in public domain; May 2021: General Khaled al-Humaidan, Saudi Intelligence ...
... that resulted in their declaration that they would respect the 2003 cease-fire accord. Earlier in 2018 the UAE together with Saudi Arabia played a key role in mediating the 2018 peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia. In 2020 Abu Dhabi’s Crown ... ... accords between Israel and several Arab states. The UAE is also seeking diplomatic solutions to tensions around countries such as Syria, Libya and Yemen.
Small countries do possess important advantages in conflict mediation compared to large economies – ...
... regional and tribal identities. This might lead to a new wave of the Arab Spring, similar to what was witnessed in the cases of Syria and Libya, as well as Yemen. In the cases mentioned above, regional powers supported by global forces acted to instigate ... ... bringing about other Islamic camps in the Far East and Central Asia, as well as Africa, to compete with the Islamic camp led by Saudi Arabia. Thus, the competition will not be limited to a confrontation between Shiites and Sunnis, but we will also see the ...
... recognition of the Syrian government. In turn, this would not only impact the regional diplomatic landscape but also bring about partial international recognition. Riyadh’s willingness to meet Moscow and Damascus halfway could make it possible for Saudi Arabia and Syria to re-establish ties and, more importantly, strengthen the regional standing of both nations. The Saudis once showed themselves capable of pragmatism, and Bahrain, which resumed diplomatic work with Syria, can be regarded as a litmus test of the ...
... that Syrians themselves support it. And yet the official
response
of Damascus to Doha is plain and simple: “Qatar could help Syria get out of its crisis … by stopping its financing of armed groups and the trafficking of weapons.”
Readmitting Syria while it is still led by Bashar al-Assad would only mean that Saudi Arabia acknowledges its inability to put somebody else at the helm there.
Saudi Arabia’s position is yet another obstacle to Damascus’s return to the Arab League. Riyadh has still not decided whether to let this process run its course, i.e. ...
... power projection, it is practical to start with area where Saudi Arabia is located, that is, the “South.”
The South
We speak here of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain and Qatar. With possible implications into the “North”: Iran, Iraq, and Syria.
Saudi Arabia
is pivotal for the whole region and is unstable at the same time. The current path is pointing to an ever more oppressive system, concentrating power and stagnant wealth into the hands of a very small group. Such system will become ever more ...
