... difference. The mechanisms ... to manage the risks of escalation that existed in the past no longer seem to be present” (pp. 188-189) [
3
]. Cohen cautions that the new Cold War is “more fraught with the possibility of a hot war”—on three fronts: Ukraine, Syria, and the Baltics (p. 67)—and that the only way to avert a hot war or “another prolonged Cold War” is through a new U.S.-Russia “détente,” i.e. the expansion of cooperation and radical reduction in the possibility of violent and potentially ...
... would no doubt support (and perhaps even encourage). This could result in a direct clash between Damascus and Ankara in Northern Syria, with all the negative consequences this would entail for Russia–Turkey relations.
An aggravation of the confrontation ... ... makes Moscow uneasy), could trigger a new crisis in Russia–Turkey relations.
Expansion of military-technical cooperation with Ukraine
. Russia and Turkey have always had fundamentally different views on Ukraine and Crimea, especially since the outbreak ...
... was attended by several experts and students who got the opportunity to hear about the former experiences of the Dutch diplomat in the sphere of conflict management on behalf of NATO, as UN Envoy on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and as mediator in Ukraine.
The event was the occasion for an extensive discussion on the evolution of the role of the United Nations in conflict resolution, from its origins until the current crisis of confidence it experiences.
Robert H. Serry proposed a few reflections ...
... order. The Soviet Union used to march around the world spending huge resources on a lost ideological cause and an outsize geopolitical ambition. The Russian Federation has learned from this. When it travels abroad, it goes for security buffers as in Ukraine, status as in Syria and mostly money elsewhere. There is no grand design, but a lot of opportunity-seeking, based on the merits of each potential engagement. Russia imposes no models on others and in its present state, hardly serves as a model for anyone.
And there ...
... discontent over U.S. position is on its rise.
If one looks at U.S. bilateral relations with other countries, the overall picture seems the same. The United States is very inconsistent in its policies towards North Korea, the Middle East (predominantly Syria, Turkey and Iran), China, Venezuela, and Ukraine. And this inconsistency doesn’t seem to be a part of a grand strategy defined within the laws of “realpolitik”, where actions change and fluctuate in accordance with the situation at hand, but more a proof of cluelessness about how to act ...
... Belgium and, for the time being, the United Kingdom) are currently on the UN Security Council, Europe’s stance on nuclear matters is barely audible.
As far as we can tell, the tentative steps taken by Paris and Berlin to open a dialogue with Moscow on Syria have not led to any practical actions. Also, it would seem that the “selective engagement” between Europe and Russia on Libya is equally doomed.
The European Union and Russia have still not got around to coordinating their positions with regard ...
... 2019 in Moscow, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) together with Institut Montaigne (France) and with the assistance of the Embassy of the French Republic in the Russian Federation held an international seminar "Conflict Resolution in Syria and Ukraine: Russian and French Approaches". The event was held in the framework of cooperation between the two organizations in a series of seminars.
The meeting included two sessions, one devoted to the settlement of the Syrian crisis, and the other ...
... emphasis on gradual technological modernization — including a continued buildup of forces stationed along the border with Ukraine in order to give Moscow more instruments for intervening in the course of the Ukrainian conflict. At the same time, Moscow ... ... and expensive aerospace and naval weapons programs have effectively been pushed back to the mid-2020s or even beyond 2027.
In Syria, Putin will keep trying to convert the military success of the Russian intervention into political and diplomatic gains,...
... create acceptable and attractive foundations for a new start in Syria. Also, some politicians in the EU will like to see Russia fail in Syria. And also, the EU will have problems working fully with Russia, until the security-situation in the Baltics and Ukraine is solved (ref above). All the EU’s hesitations about Russia in Syria can be overcome, but this will take more time, and Russian results in Syria must be demonstrated first.
Russia and Iran in Syria are now confronted with a hen-and-egg situation: “
if you have no hens, you will get no eggs – if you have no eggs,...
... anything but a last gasp for the half-century old nonproliferation regime, Presidents Trump and Putin will have to offer some hope that Washington and Moscow take their own responsibilities to reduce and disarm under the treaty seriously.
The wars in Syria and Ukraine have cost hundreds of thousands of lives, and displaced millions of people across the Middle East, Europe and beyond. Washington and Moscow each control resources and levers of influence vital for managing and ultimately resolving these conflicts....