... 79). The Crimean secession and rejoining with Russia, in turn, seems to have heightened NATO’s ambitions of expanding its membership to the borders of Russia. In its April 2018 Bucharest Declaration, members concurred that the alliance “welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership ... [and] these countries will become members of NATO.” [
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On war in Syria, regime change in Libya, and Kosovo’s independence
Cohen writes that a U.S.-Russia détente also died in Syria, where the two largely failed to cooperate to defeat Islamist extremist forces. And while some American politicians (such as Hillary Clinton) were promoting ...
... would no doubt support (and perhaps even encourage). This could result in a direct clash between Damascus and Ankara in Northern Syria, with all the negative consequences this would entail for Russia–Turkey relations.
An aggravation of the confrontation ... ... Russia's partners and friends in the Eastern Mediterranean. The "Greek issue," compounded by Turkey's activity in Libya (which makes Moscow uneasy), could trigger a new crisis in Russia–Turkey relations.
Expansion of military-technical cooperation with Ukraine
. Russia and Turkey have always had fundamentally different views on Ukraine and Crimea, especially since the outbreak ...
... Belgium and, for the time being, the United Kingdom) are currently on the UN Security Council, Europe’s stance on nuclear matters is barely audible.
As far as we can tell, the tentative steps taken by Paris and Berlin to open a dialogue with Moscow on Syria have not led to any practical actions. Also, it would seem that the “selective engagement” between Europe and Russia on Libya is equally doomed.
The European Union and Russia have still not got around to coordinating their positions with regard to the Iranian nuclear issue and to relations with Iran as a whole. And while the stances of the two sides on the settlement ...
