... 2017. In this sense, Russia will have to work patiently with the Syrian leadership as well, which so far has tended to equate any autonomous status with separatism.
Third.
The Biden administration’s response to the triple-format talks between Syria, Turkey, and Russia was quite revealing. In this particular situation, the U.S. has openly shown itself to be a “spoiler” of multilateral efforts to unblock a Syrian settlement. The State Department’s spokesman made it
clear
that the U.S. does not support the ...
... President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan is trying to solve the problem posed by Syrian Kurds by combining force with the possibility of normalizing relations with Syria. Back in December of last year, he proposed to hold a meeting between the presidents of Russia, Turkey, and Syria. According to Erdogan, this meeting should be after negotiations take place between head Defense Ministers, head Foreign Affairs Ministers, as well as heads of intelligence services of the three countries.
Ivan Bocharov:
Syria: A Chess ...
The Turkish military operation in Syria does not meet Russia’s interests
Turkey's forthcoming ground operation in Syria, which Ankara regularly warns about, has become a top concern for the international community. In November 2022, Turkish armed forces launched air strikes on parts of northern Syria with Operation Claw-Sword....
... keep Ankara from another invasion of northeastern Syria. Now Erdogan has a serious trump card that is not easy to beat, and any attempt to press Turkey on this issue can only lead to a worsening of relations. This would be extremely undesirable for Russia, since Turkey remains its leading economic partner and logistics hub after cutting ties with the West.
In addition, one should not discount the very desire to foot on both camps and the provocative actions of Kurdish formations in the SAR, which did not stop ...
...
and it is seen as a concession on the part of the U.S. By the same token, Moscow will try to get something in exchange for a CBM prolongation, although this looks less likely in the current circumstances. What can it potentially be?
On Apr. 23 2022, Turkey closed its sky for Russia’s military and civilian aircraft heading for Syria. It did not seriously affect Moscow’s ability to deliver staff and equipment to Syria but Russia might seek to get things back to normal;
Moscow might seek the U.S. to turn a blind eye on ...
... Recep Tayyip Erdogan, despite claims from both sides, can hardly be underestimated.
2
. Already now, Ankara has provided lists of persons whose extradition it demands from Stockholm and Helsinki, and made it clear that in case of a refusal to cooperate, Turkey’s consent to their entry into the alliance may be disavowed.
3
. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, in accordance with the text of the document, although Russia cannot be a NATO partner, as it was announced in 2010, channels of communication with Moscow remain open. In practice, of course, the prospects for restoring an institutionalised or even ad hoc dialogue between the parties seem illusory, but such ...
... never taken these areas under its security umbrella. If Ankara advances against them, it will hardly exacerbate its relations with Washington, which means Ankara may not need to coordinate its operation with the U.S. That, however, will require that Turkey convince Russia to change its mind, which is not a simple task since Manbij and Tell Rifaat transitioning under Turkey’s “protectorate” may be more sensitive for both Damascus and Moscow than larger territories in Syria’s northeast being under the “American ...
... among allies. However, this is unlikely to reduce the appetites of the business. At the same time, Turkey has demonstrated flexibility in financial relations with Moscow. The key conditions for successful trading in the new conditions have been created. Turkey accepts Mir cards (Russia’s version of Visa or MasterCard). Most likely, bilateral financial transactions and trade will not be a problem.
At the same time, Ankara is trying to play a mediating role in resolving the conflict. So far, these efforts have not been successful....
... activities in Northern and Saharan Africa and a shared Muslim identity with modern African states, such as Mali, Somalia, and Libya. The former political, economic, and diplomatic ties cover much of the same bases as Russia’s activities across Africa. Like Russia, Turkey employs strategic partnership agreements – for example, with the GNA in
Libya
and the authorities in
Somalia
. However, Turkey has also achieved sizeable public opinion successes in Africa as it expands its development aid presence in Africa....
... as in Syria, Libya, and the South Caucasus. The change in Russia’s priorities opens ways for strengthening Turkey’s positions in these crises and for changing the local balances of power.
Second, in the context of a sharp confrontation between Russia and the West, the latter needs Turkey on its side more than even before. Therefore, the Ukraine conflict strengthens Turkey’s bargaining positions in dealing with the US, with NATO, and arguably even with the EU.
At the same time, it is unlikely that President Erdoğan can play ...
