... begun to play a significant role in international relations
Autumn is usually a busy season in the nuclear sphere, and 2025 was no exception. In October, NATO held its Steadfast Noon nuclear exercises, followed by the U.S. Global Thunder drills and Russia’s strategic nuclear forces exercises. Developments did not end there: against the backdrop of these exercises, Russia
announced
tests of the
Burevestnik
nuclear-powered cruise missile and the
Poseidon
nuclear-powered torpedo, as well as the ...
... conventional operations despite potential defeat; continue tactical nuclear exchanges; or eliminate the adversary by employing strategic nuclear weapons, something that guarantees annihilation by a retaliatory strike.
Aleksey Arbatov:
Nuclear Doctrine and Strategic Stability
This paradigm's inherent danger lies in fostering NATO's illusion of impunity—the conviction that Russia would refrain from nuclear weapons use due to fears of inevitable retaliation. Such perceptions render gradual conventional escalation feasible, potentially expanding from Ukrainian war theatre to a broader regional conflict, necessitating the ...
... recently
unfolded
in Germany, Japan and South Korea, as well as in Taiwan and Ukraine, about the costs and benefits of acquiring their own nuclear weapons.
Regardless of the progress of the peace process in the Ukrainian conflict, resuming the U.S.–Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue will be a daunting challenge. In any case, the U.S. will likely make China’s involvement in arms limitation efforts a mandatory condition. Furthermore, one cannot rule out the possibility of Washington leaving the New START ...
... compartmentalization and to renew the dialogue on strategic arms control. Yet under a proxy conflict between Russia and the West, the constant probing of the enemy’s “red lines” and creeping escalation below the nuclear threshold, compartmentalization of strategic stability issues in the narrow interpretation of this concept is unacceptable for Russia, as the Russian Foreign Ministry has repeatedly stated.
The protracted, destructive and bloody character of the SMO is primarily due to the actions of the West, which unleashed an indirect conflict against Russia in Ukraine. Russia must neutralize ...
... (1989). War and peace in the nuclear age. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Schelling, T., & Halperin, M. (1961). Strategy and arms control. New York: Twentieth Century Fund.
Tuchman, B.W. (1962). The guns of August. New York: Macmillan.
Wilkening, D. (2014). Strategic stability between the United States and Russia. In D. Ochmanek, & M. Sulmeyer (Ed.), Challenges in U.S. National Security Policy: A Festschrift Honoring Edward L. (Ted) Warner (pp. 123-140). Washington, D.C.
Arbatov A.G. (2019). Doomsday dialectics: the arms race with arms limitations. Polis....
... of this important commodity.
Ivan Timofeev:
Eurasian Security Structure: From Idea to Practice
Trilateral consultations on strategic stability would not only contribute to world peace and security, but also build trust and mutual confidence between ... ... trilateral format could include the challenge of international terrorism rooted in religious fundamentalism.
Needless to say, Russia is not the only country that would gain a lot from an improved China-India relationship. Therefore, the geometry of multilateralism ...
... managing future escalation risks, which have been exacerbated by the ongoing conflict and are only likely to increase in its aftermath, both Russia and the U.S. may want, at some point, to return to some forms of recurrent bilateral interactions. Although Russia has rejected the recent U.S. proposal to
resum
e systematic dialogue on strategic stability and arms control, both states should continue to seek other opportunities—whether as a track-1.5 format or a less formalized dialogue between officials—to begin bridging the gap between conceptual understandings of military capabilities,...
... 2022: 355-368]. However, until recently, tactical nuclear weapons did not feature in Russia’s official documents and declarations.
There is another paradox of nuclear deterrence associated with the phenomenon of limited nuclear war. The enhancement of strategic stability [
37
] through the START treaties and some weapons programs of Russia and the United States since the early 1990s has made a first nuclear strike at the strategic level impossible, as both sides have lost the ability to launch a disarming attack and avoid unacceptable damage from retaliation. In addition, at the ...
... yet, it materialized. Maybe it is time to break down the habitual scheme of things?
Aleksey Arbatov:
The Ukrainian Crisis and Strategic Stability
Regardless of the motives behind this proposal, it requires rational reflection, considering the fundamental ... ... possible end of everything for everyone. It seems that the preemptive use of nuclear weapons will not solve the issues between Russia and the West. It will significantly aggravate Russia’s international position, not to mention the risks of escalation ...
... dialogue between the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ISCRAN) and CISAC was held
On May 16, 2023, a regular meeting of the bilateral expert Russian-American dialogue between the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ISCRAN) and CISAC was held.
The discussion focused on the impact of missile defense systems development on strategic stability, as well as possible coordinated actions of the member states of the "Nuclear Club" (P5) to reduce the risks of nuclear war. The event was hosted by Sergey Rogov, Academic Director of RAS Institute for the U.S. and Canadian ...
