... Russian energy sector and its partners abroad. Both London and Washington imposed blocking sanctions against two major Russian oil companies. The US took this step after a nine-month pause in sanctions against Russia. The UK, like the EU, imposed blocking sanctions against Chinese companies cooperating with Russia. Among them are China’s National Pipeline Group Beihai Liquefied Natural Gas (cooperating in the LNG sector), the aforementioned Indian Nayara Energy, and China’s Shandong Baogang International Port, Shandong Yulong Petrochemical (also blocked by the EU), Shandong ...
Behind closed doors: diplomatic protocol or a friendly conversation?
Russian–Serbian economic relations, despite their long history and strategic importance ... ... independence and military neutrality. Serbia's status as Europe's only holdout on Russian sanctions
illustrates
that Belgrade’s decisions are driven by national interests... ... the economy and culture. Yet the presence of alternative partners, namely Russia and China, gives Belgrade enough confidence for balancing between centers of power.
Beyond...
... equipment to Russia.
However, there was not a single large company among them. We were talking about small manufacturing companies or intermediary firms. At the same time, the Biden administration managed to significantly complicate payments between Russia and China through the threat of secondary sanctions.
US Presidential Executive Order 14114 of December 22, 2023
threatened blocking sanctions against foreign financial institutions carrying out transactions in favour of the Russian military-industrial complex. In practice, such sanctions against ...
... multipolar world order. Moscow and Beijing’s mutual support in the international arena, growing trade turnover in the face of sanctions, strengthening humanitarian ties, and people-to-people cooperation represent a unique example of the constructive dialogue taking place between these two truly sovereign states. Further confirming this dynamic was Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to China on May 16–17, 2024.
Moscow and Beijing relations managed to move beyond historical grievances, political differences and ...
... West remains firmly committed to disrupt this trend and the Western pressure on Beijing is constantly growing. Not surprisingly, the Chinese private sector is getting increasingly concerned about the scope of the likely negative impact that secondary sanctions might have on their business prospects. After the European Union had introduced its 12
th
package of restrictive measures against Moscow, a number of the leading China’s banks became reluctant to accept dollar payments from Russia; as a result, in March the bilateral trade suffered a mild setback of 2%. With the Chinese export to Russia going down by 14% on the yearly basis (from USD 8,9 billion to USD 7,6 billion), while the Russian export to China continued to grow and ...
... Russia, against which a significant amount of financial and trade sanctions have been imposed by the United States and its allies. It is Russia today that is most interested in diversifying global finance. Long-term stakeholders include China. So far, sanctions against China are incomparable with restrictions against Russia. In addition, we are talking mainly about American export controls in the field of high technology, and not about financial sanctions. The latter have so far been used only against a small group of Chinese officials in connection with human rights ...
... depreciate. However, in Moscow, apparently, they do not believe in the prospect of any agreements anyway, at least in the near future.
The situation with China is different. Between January 2019 and April 2023, there have been more legislative initiatives on sanctions against China than against Russia—103 versus 99 (again, only those bills that propose specific restrictive measures are counted). Four bills have reached the stage of laws—two on Hong Kong and two on ethnic minorities in the PRC. After the start of the SVO, not a single bill ...
... about the transformation of the yuan into a universal means of payment for Russia in transactions with third countries. However, given the growing Western pressure on the Russian financial sector, the yuan has every chance to strengthen its role in Russian transactions both with China itself and with other counterparties. However, Chinese banks fear secondary US sanctions or the loss of Western markets. It will not be easy for Russian individuals under Western sanctions to make settlements with third countries, even with the help of the yuan. Such caution was observed even before the onset of the SMO. The Chinese ...
...
It will be critically important for Russia to arrange payments in alternative currencies to the dollar and the euro. The Chinese yuan has become the most sought-after option. The main reason is the volume of the Chinese market and the high density of Russian-Chinese trade. In addition, China itself is increasingly the target of US sanctions. In recent years, Beijing has been energetically pursuing technological independence from foreign countries. Sanctions on major Chinese telecommunications companies are only fuelling China's efforts. The creation of channels of financial and ...
... imperial organisation in the future under certain circumstances.
Ivan Timofeev:
Closing Loopholes: Outlining the U.S. and EU Sanctions Policy Onward
The characterisation of the modern US and EU as empires gives rise to two risks at once. There is an intellectual ... ... identity are both the despotisms of the past and some modern states that rely on autocracies. First and foremost, these include Russia and China. The superiority of capitalism and the market is also part of the Western identity. It is opposed to non-free economies,...
