... Report
The idea of new security architecture in Eurasia is becoming a key concept in Russia’s foreign policy. It was first outlined in the Presidential Address to the... ... was included in the agenda of the Russian President’s summits with the leaders of China and India, discussed by CIS foreign ministers, and further developed within the... ... principle of equal and indivisible security. An institutional platform for a Russia-NATO dialogue emerged in the form of the Russia-NATO Council. Another factor in normalising...
... members but to pursue functional expansion. Its relationships with various countries vary in depth, with the closest and most substantive ties being those with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. Its direction is unambiguous:
targeting
China, Russia, and North Korea—a fact NATO does not hide. NATO's penetration and expansion into the Asia-Pacific region introduce new security risks to the area.
Aleksey Arbatov:
Nuclear Boomerang
Donald Trump's return to power in January 2025 delivered a seismic shock to international politics....
The ICE alliance has more geopolitical and geostrategic rationale than economic
On July 11, 2024, on the margins of the NATO Summit in Washington, the US, Canada and Finland announced a new trilateral consortium—the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort, or ICE Pact—with an explicit intention to challenge Russia and China in icebreaker construction and deployment. It is expected that by the end of 2024 the three nations will turn ICE into a ...
... on a protracted conflict in which they know they have more resources.
Nuclear polycentricity reflects the world’s growing multipolarity
During the Cold War there were five nuclear powers, but then the only real poles were the US and the USSR, plus China with its then small nuclear arsenal. Now Beijing is moving towards (at least) parity with America and Russia, while India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel remain independent players (unlike NATO members Britain and France).
The classic Cold War notion of strategic stability – i.e. the absence of incentives for the parties to launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike – is not only inadequate but sometimes inapplicable when characterising relations ...
... Ukraine. The rhetoric in this regard that we heard at the beginning of the armed conflict in Ukraine came from the West. On the Russian side, at an expert and unofficial political level, there were talks about the possibility of nuclear weapons strikes against the targets on the territory of NATO countries, not Ukraine. Such strikes, as it was discussed, could be launched against the airfields based on modern Western ... ... transferred to Ukraine and against logistics hubs and military facilities.
Elena Karnaukhova: The USSR and the People’s Republic of China had a border armed conflict on Damansky Island in 1969. Of course, it is difficult to draw an analogy with the situation ...
... was intent to develop deeper strategic partnership
[11]
. While Chinese diplomats in Europe tend to talk about complex nature of the Ukrainian crisis and while speaking of the record they can even criticize Russia
[12]
, their colleagues working in Russia directly blame NATO for the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis
[13]
. Such Chinese position allows China to continue playing the role of a potential mediator or peacemaker in the conflict and at the same time leads to repeated calls coming from some Western leaders
to step up pressure on Russia
[14]
.
The development of bilateral partnership during ...
.... Belgrade, for its part, cannot accept a monoethnic Kosovo.
The administration of U.S. President Joe Biden is a champion of NATO’s aggression against Yugoslavia in 1999 and the course that led Kosovo to proclaim independence in 2008. Belgrade expects ... ... divisions in the European camp.
At the same time, this move is unlikely to bring Vucic any political dividends, so he will turn to Russia and China and look for support within the European camp.
As regards the new government, Milos Vucevic is a compromise candidate for ...
... project determines the need to create a new structure with different principles and foundations. First of all, the new structure should be based on the interaction of several players and not be reduced to the dominance of one of them, like the US role in NATO. In this sense, it is symbolic that consultations on the Eurasian security issues began precisely between Russia and China—two major powers and permanent members of the UN Security Council. Thus, the very first steps in creating a new structure are already taking place on the principles of dialogue and the distribution of responsibility, rather than in accordance ...
... state after Russia to integrate the secessionist territory, although the mode of how Karabakh and Chechnya got incorporated significantly
differ
.
The change in the status quo also contributed to Iran’s notable invigoration. Two Eurasian giants, China and India, have also adopted a higher profile in the Caucasus. With the start of Russia’s military operation in Ukraine in February 2022, the U.S., the EU (and France in particular) along with NATO shifted from “competitive cooperation” with Moscow to its “containment,” now also
in the Caucasus
.
Third, the formats of alliance and partnership that had existed unchanged for decades are currently modified before our eyes. The post-Karabakh ...
... on. In response to France’s President Emmanuel Macron floating the idea of sending NATO troops to Ukraine, there has been a storm of indignation and a wave of disavowals... ... Many politicians and academics are concerned that the adversarial relations between Russia and the U.S. may drive up the risks of a further escalation of the conflict.... ... crisis that has an impact on global strategic security? In early March 2024, during the China-Russia Dialogue 2024 in the city of Sanya, the Beijing Club for International...
