... This was visible even before Trump’s second term, especially after the failure to quickly destroy Russia through the war in Ukraine (thereby eliminating it as China’s main
de facto
ally, and the rising World Majority’s strategic core). And after Washington began receiving Russian signals about possible nuclear escalation. The Americans may vacillate, perhaps quite dangerously, but their course is ... ... themselves.
The EU has become a major tool for suppressing internal dissent. This, rather than confrontation with the USSR, has been NATO’s main function in the late 1940s. In the mid-1950s, NATO turned from a political alliance (with a defense component) into ...
The possibility of a return to extreme-era dynamics cannot be dismissed
The Ukraine conflict may well pave the way for a larger scale Russia-NATO confrontation. While hard to fathom and with everything suggesting that the scenario remains quite unlikely, it relies on nuclear deterrence as its main pillar. But just how effective can it be in averting a conflict?
US President Donald Trump’s ...
... everyone has recognized it yet.
For Russia, the pre-war period ended in 2014. For China, it was 2017. For Iran, 2023. Since then, war – in its modern, diffuse form – has intensified. This is not a new Cold War. Since 2022, the West’s campaign against Russia has grown more decisive. The risk of direct nuclear confrontation with NATO over the Ukraine conflict is rising. Donald Trump’s return to the White House created a temporary window in which such a clash could be avoided, but by mid-2025, hawks in the US and Western Europe had pushed us dangerously close again.
This war involves the ...
... unwilling to accept such a precedent.
As discussions have moved toward territorial issues, the central problem of military security seems to have been relegated to the background. Perhaps US President DonaldTrump’s administration – more skeptical of NATO itself – views it as less fundamental. Or perhaps it simply finds it easier to force Ukraine to cede territory than to make Western Europe recognize Russia’s security rights. Nevertheless, for Moscow, military security remains a matter of principle. Even if Washington offers major concessions – lifting sanctions, formalizing territorial changes – Russia cannot abandon this core demand.
This ...
... and Europe, if she is unable to lead a new Europe in association with America. Once Russia has finalized her objectives in the Ukraine and re-set her relations with America (already underway), the big question for Britain will be whether it can prevent ... ... mentionable is the German Green Party: it has transmogrified from a peace-loving, environment-loving movement to a warlike anti-Russian party. It is bizarre that a youngish woman, Annalena Baerbok, a Green, is German Foreign Minister, doing all she can to promote NATO’s anti-Russia agenda. Most undiplomatically, another leader, Kaja Kallas, the EU foreign policy chief, said on
X
after ...
... arguably on the global politics at large.
The mission has not been accomplished
Andrey Kortunov:
Unpacking Trump’s Proposals for Ukraine
On the eve of the journey, many in Moscow should have had not only anxieties, but also serious concerns about its possible ... ... United States and Ukraine remains unclear; the same can be said about the future of the US engagement in the settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. It is up to psychologies to conclude at what exact point in time the conversation got really out of ...
The breakdown of private Russia-NATO diplomacy increases the risks of a terrible event
The ongoing standoff over Ukraine is increasingly becoming a direct confrontation between Russia and NATO, raising serious concerns about the risk of nuclear escalation.
In this new phase, both Moscow and the bloc’s leading members have nuclear capabilities, and how these powers communicate with each other has become crucial. The question is whether ...
... and Kiev should end the hostilities. Ukraine should return to its neutral, non-bloc and non-nuclear status, protect the Russian language, and respect the rights and freedoms of its citizens.
The Istanbul Agreements initialed on 29 March 2022 by the Russian and Ukrainian delegations could serve as a basis for the settlement. They provide for Kiev's refusal to join NATO and contain security guarantees for Ukraine while recognizing the realities on the ground at that moment. Needless to say, in over two years, these realities have considerably changed, including in legal terms.
On 14 June, President Vladimir Putin listed prerequisites for the settlement ...
... this become the next theater of war?
In Western Europe and North America, a scenario has long been contemplated in which the Russian Army, after its victory in Ukraine, continues to march forward – next seeking to conquer the Baltic republics and Poland.
The purpose of this simple propaganda ... ...
It is telling that almost no one in the EU dares to publicly ask whether Moscow is interested in a direct armed conflict with NATO. What would its aims be in such a war? And what price would it be willing to pay? Obviously, even posing such questions could ...
... Ukraine conflict offers several strategic advantages. First, it reinforces US leadership within NATO and demonstrates its military capabilities. Second, the conflict creates a lucrative market for American arms manufacturers, who supply weapons to both Ukraine and NATO allies worried about Russian aggression. This military-industrial complex plays a significant role in US foreign policy, as arms sales contribute substantially to the American economy.
Moreover, a prolonged conflict weakens Russia, a major geopolitical rival. By draining ...
