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Mark Entin

Doctor of Science, Professor, Head of the Department of European law, MGIMO-University, RIAC Expert

Ekaterina Entina

Doctor of Science, Deputy Vice Rector, Professor, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Senior Researcher, Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, RIAC Expert

The United States of America is the principal military and political actor in Europe. Its influence determines the domestic and foreign policy of the EU and its member states. Who will occupy the White House in 2021-2024? That was a momentous question for Europe. Consequently, Europeans closely followed the entire course of the presidential race between Donald Trump and his challenger Joe Biden, a race that had been essentially transformed into a vote of confidence for the incumbent president.

Europeans were dying to see Donald Trump lose. They found his claims that there is no alternative to him rather vain, as well as the course he steers and his statements about having a mega-powerful popular support base of dedicated followers. Europeans dreamed of Joe Biden emerging victorious, so much so they appeared to have outwitted themselves. They lost their ability to perceive their own circumstances objectively and realistically. Ultimately, they invented the myth of the Democrats taking the world back to its “pre-Trump” state and of a Democrat victory equalling a triumph of democracy far beyond the U.S. itself. In so doing, Europeans made a huge mistake in their assessment of their own circumstances, one that will, most likely, cost them dearly.

Yet this mistake is far from accidental. Its roots go far back into that dubious strategic choice the EU’s major powers made in the 1990s and continued adhering to later.

Social networks and America’s most popular media did not wait for the official results of the vote count and announced the Democratic candidate’s presidential victory; the moment they did so, heads of state and government of the Euro-Atlantic space and the heads of the EU and NATO heaved a sigh of relief and hastened to offer Joe Biden their pompous congratulations. Both they and millions of ordinary Europeans had a feeling that “the nightmare is over”. French President Emmanuel Macron and Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel, President of the European Council Charles Michel, and NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg were among the first to do so.

They spoke in unison about the arrival of a new era in U.S.-European understanding and cooperation and called on the new U.S. President to take his country back to the old, trust-based relations with its allies, i.e., with the Europeans, and to support multilateralism, free trade, the climate agenda, and the system of international organizations, including NATO, the WHO and the WTO. For instance, Angela Merkel’s spokesperson said that “the Chancellor and President-elect agreed that transatlantic cooperation is of great importance in view of the multitude of global challenges”. Joe Biden promised the French President to "endow bilateral and transatlantic relations with a new dynamics" mostly "via NATO and the EU."

Naturally, no one in political, expert and media circles close to the EU or working for it puts the question quite that way. Yet it is telling that, immediately after Joe Biden was proclaimed U.S. President-elect, the U.S. was swept by a wave of very typical comments that explain some obvious points Europeans had not previously taken for granted. They emphasize that:

(1) the ideas of the EU’s strategic autonomy have always been pure idealism and theories detached from political and military-strategic reality;

(2) the EU has never had either the power or the political will to transform those theories into a practical policy;

(3) with the USA’s impending return to the heart of the Euro-Atlantic solidarity, these theories will lose their relevance to some degree. In any case, their current “urgency and relevance” are once again up for debate and more consideration;

(4) it should not now be a matter of autonomy of the EU and its member states; it should now be a matter of bolstering their power and solidarity. “The worst that can happen for the European Union is that the outcome of the U.S. election allows us to slip back into that state of apathy, complacency and resignation that has characterized us for too long,” urges Guy Verhofstadt, one of the best-known European politicians and the European Parliament Brexit Coordinator.

Now, therefore, it is time “to prove itself as a true ally, not a liability,” an ally strong enough for the transatlantic solidarity to be meaningful. That requires proposing “a more constructive relationship” in trade; rallying “the world’s democracies around common threats and values” under the auspices of Biden’s America; acting together in “forcing China to play by the rules or countering Russia when it blatantly breaks them” and thereby writing “new rules for tech giants, against tax avoidance or to boost the carbon transition.”

(5) Donald Trump is leaving, but "Trumpism" remains. It has already been integrated into the political reality. In any case, Donald Trump has already played his part in transforming the U.S., and global politics and economics.

The United States of America is the principal military and political actor in Europe. Its influence determines the domestic and foreign policy of the EU and its member states. Who will occupy the White House in 2021-2024? That was a momentous question for Europe. Consequently, Europeans closely followed the entire course of the presidential race between Donald Trump and his challenger Joe Biden, a race that had been essentially transformed into a vote of confidence for the incumbent president.

Europeans were dying to see Donald Trump lose. They found his claims that there is no alternative to him rather vain, as well as the course he steers and his statements about having a mega-powerful popular support base of dedicated followers. Europeans dreamed of Joe Biden emerging victorious, so much so they appeared to have outwitted themselves. They lost their ability to perceive their own circumstances objectively and realistically. Ultimately, they invented the myth of the Democrats taking the world back to its “pre-Trump” state and of a Democrat victory equalling a triumph of democracy far beyond the U.S. itself. In so doing, Europeans made a huge mistake in their assessment of their own circumstances, one that will, most likely, cost them dearly.

Yet this mistake is far from accidental. Its roots go far back into that dubious strategic choice the EU’s major powers made in the 1990s and continued adhering to later.

A Historical Miscalculation

When Moscow put a spontaneous, chaotic, irrational and unilateral end to the Cold War, the socialist bloc and the Soviet Union both collapsed. Yet, this development “played a mean trick” on the European Union too, even though the Union’s contribution to the end of the Cold War consisted mostly of encouraging the Baltic states and Eastern and South-Eastern Europe to make as clean a break with the USSR as possible.

The EU’s foreign policy aim has shifted. When the confrontation between the two world orders came to an end, Brussels’s opportunities for independent maneuvering in global politics and the global economy increased by order of magnitude. Unfortunately, Brussels failed to take advantage of this opening to develop qualitatively new policies toward both the U.S. and Russia, policies that would bring long-term dividends. As a result, Brussels found itself in a confrontation with Russia, on the one hand, and being viewed by the U.S. with profound suspicion, on the other. The U.S. ultimately concluded that it needed to take Europe under more solid geopolitical control.

Conditions were now conducive for Brussels to develop an inclusive and sustainable world order that would suit all parties and would comply with the standards of equality, true multilateralism and comprehensive international cooperation, including in the security sphere, the cornerstone of which could have become collective governance in international affairs and joint solutions to common problems. Instead of taking that attractive road everyone needed, the EU’s major powers chose to enlarge their union into the area of the USSR’s former vital interests. They steered a course of taking unilateral actions that served their own misconstrued national interests solely and of undermining the USA’s unquestionable leadership on the global financial market, in international trade and in setting the global agenda.

From the very outset, the political élites of the EU and its leading member states made a huge strategic mistake in their assessment of the new international situation. They convinced themselves that they were now living in a new era of a unipolar world that benefited them greatly and no longer allowed them to take into account the traditions, identities and interests of other states, including even permanent members of the UN Security Council.

They acted as if a unipolar world meant that the responsibility for maintaining their own and international stability and security and the attendant financial cost could be shifted on to the U.S., while the EU, taking advantage of the American umbrella, would build up its own influence and competitive edge to the detriment of the U.S. itself. As a consequence, Americans began, quite rightly, to perceive Europeans as ungrateful cadgers and freeloaders (as Donald Trump said plainly). Trump’s America was never going to abolish NATO or the collective defense the Alliance symbolized, no matter how hard some members of the EU government and expert circles attempted to paint it that way. This was even if they did refer to the actual statements the U.S. President made calling NATO “obsolete” and claiming that it had been created to counteract threats that no longer existed. All Washington’s grievances had nothing to do with NATO itself and everything to do with the conduct of the USA’s NATO allies, their activity or, rather, inactivity within NATO, their attitude to the U.S. and their allied commitments.

They acted as if a unipolar world meant being able to manipulate the Eurozone's common currency with impunity to give a foreign and domestic competitive edge to all goods produced by the EU's core, primarily Germany, as Joseph E. Stiglitz, a Nobel prize winner in economics, tirelessly emphasized [1]. As if a unipolar world meant encouraging inequality in international trade in defiance of GATT/WTO instructions. Such conduct led Americans to suspect that their allies were stealing their jobs and were generally cheating them all the time and in everything (additionally, Trump claimed Europe was even more shameless in doing so than China). That is the conduct of adversaries, not “friends,” and this is where Josep Borrell, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, was absolutely correct when he quoted Donald Trump. This is exactly what the latter meant when harshly criticizing Brussels and Berlin and threatening them with sanctions.

They acted as if a unipolar world meant they could spearhead any foreign political and foreign economic initiatives without Washington's approval, push them through and "hog the blanket," as was the case with the climate problem, while continuously and shamelessly criticizing the U.S. leadership. The EU’s scathing criticism was heaped on America’s adventurism in starting regional wars and meddling in other states’ domestic affairs, on America being too soft on the political regimes Brussels would like to have toppled or subjugated to its influence, said toppling and subjugating being done by the Americans, and on many other things. Europeans got into the habit of unleashing such criticism during Barack Obama's tenure when those judgments had been more or less politically correct. During Donald Trump's presidency, all rules of politeness were discarded.

The Donald Trump phenomenon in the U.S. was, therefore, far from unfounded, as was its manifestation, among other things, in the USA's displeasure with its European NATO allies, disregard for them, and suspicions entertained in relation to them. Such a phenomenon could not but have developed within a certain section of the American public and establishment. Trump’s specific personality made him express these sentiments in an arrogant form. Yet, that arrogance pertained only to the mode of expression and to the impulsive nature and inconsistent changes introduced into the USA’s foreign political strategy and practice.

Even so, the EU and its leading member states perceived “Trumpism” precisely as an aberration stemming from Donald Trump’s chance arrival in the White House. They took “Trumpism” to be something temporary and unnatural, something that would vanish from American politics together with the unconventional, non-trivial, flamboyant politician who had never learned to conduct himself properly as the head of a superpower, had never learned what proper political course he should steer. And that, naturally, was the course approved by the Europeans.

They never realized that the outward appearance of arbitrary behavior, self-will, inconsistency and arrogance disguised a very consistent paradigm for changing the status quo in the USA’s relations with its European allies, as those relations no longer suited the U.S. An expert at Euronews, Europe’s round-the-clock news channel, quipped that “four years of the Trump presidency has challenged transatlantic norms with trade wars, a questioning of the military alliance and a view that the EU is a threat rather than an ally.” Yet, the Europeans never understood that those four years were no mere glitch. That paradigm includes several principal demands, though it is not limited to them. They are as follows:

First, the allies should recognize the USA’s leading and guiding role everywhere and in everything; this should be done both in deed and in word, and they should prove their loyalty through their actions.

Second, they must follow strictly in the wake of America's foreign policy, respond to Washington's requests and proposals in a constructive and timely manner, and cease any kind of pushback.

Third, they are mandated to obey the hierarchy strictly and propose their own initiatives only if these enable them to discharge better their duties as a subcontractor, which is the role the U.S. has assigned them.

Fourth, they should, within the shortest possible time, open up their markets for American goods and services, take steps to balance out their mutual trade, put an end to practices that are detrimental to American exporters and give up on any plans to levy additional fees on American corporations, particularly high-tech ones.

Fifth, it is taken for granted that Europeans will make a due contribution to handling common tasks, including development of military capabilities and discharging their allies' obligations within NATO; it means that their current material and financial contributions should be increased by order of magnitude.

Sixth, their sacred duty is to unconditionally join the united front the U.S. is forming to counteract all states Washington intends to contain. No doubts or hesitations are allowed.

Seventh, EU strategic independence is a big no-no and it does not matter whether this means creating its own European army or pushing the U.S. Dollar out of global markets as the principal reserve currency in order to counterbalance the U.S.

The belief that this paradigm is connected exclusively with Donald Trump is pure idealism. In fact, it has become deeply rooted during his presidency. There is a bi-partisan consensus concerning this paradigm. Josep Borrell, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, was absolutely right in explaining to the EU member states’ foreign ministers that the American public had changed profoundly and that these changes “will not go away with Donald Trump.”

Careless Political Shortsightedness

Social networks and America’s most popular media did not wait for the official results of the vote count and announced the Democratic candidate’s presidential victory; the moment they did so, heads of state and government of the Euro-Atlantic space and the heads of the EU and NATO heaved a sigh of relief and hastened to offer Joe Biden their pompous congratulations. Both they and millions of ordinary Europeans had a feeling that “the nightmare is over”. French President Emmanuel Macron and Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel, President of the European Council Charles Michel, and NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg were among the first to do so.

They spoke in unison about the arrival of a new era in U.S.-European understanding and cooperation and called on the new U.S. President to take his country back to the old, trust-based relations with its allies, i.e., with the Europeans, and to support multilateralism, free trade, the climate agenda, and the system of international organizations, including NATO, the WHO and the WTO. For instance, Angela Merkel’s spokesperson said that “the Chancellor and President-elect agreed that transatlantic cooperation is of great importance in view of the multitude of global challenges.” Joe Biden promised the French President to "endow bilateral and transatlantic relations with a new dynamics" mostly "via NATO and the EU."

Experts and columnists rushed to lavish all kinds of praise on Joe Biden for things he has not yet done but is certain to do in order to restore Euro-Atlantic solidarity; they also hastened to explain that he is a charming and decent person, an outstanding politician and Europe’s friend. Sober voices saying he is no friend of Europe were drowned out by the general chorus. José Manuel Barroso, former President of the European Commission, expressed that general euphoria best, saying, “It’s not going to be exactly like before, because the world has changed. But it's good to know that we have someone we know and someone we like leading the United States of America.”

The opinion that Trump’s replacement in the office of U.S. President would also replace his foreign policy was not unfounded in 2016. Yet, claiming the same before the years 2021–2024 is thoughtless. It is unsurprising that Director of the Institute of International Affairs Nathalie Tocci, a fierce proponent of EU independence in global affairs, energetically cautions European élites against self-deception. She warns, “It would be a terrible mistake for Europeans to believe that President Trump was an aberration, however, and that the good old days of the transatlantic relationship are back.”

First, as we have already stressed, Donald Trump expressed in plain language those sentiments that had long been brewing amongst the American public but had not been publicly articulated. On behalf of the American majority, the country's political and business élites, he condemned the former type of globalization that benefited the EU and its member states more than it did the U.S. Predictions of the outcome of the 2020 elections, exit polls and the opinions of experts who had carefully analyzed what motivated American voters testify to those sentiments being widespread among them. In particular, experts of the Royal Institute of International Affairs noted, "whoever occupies the White House after the election, it is evident the emphasis will be on ‘America First’ and that only the characteristics and approaches will differ.”

Donald Trump set about to destroy the world order where the U.S. was but a nominal dominant force without any real ability to “crack the whip” over other powers, including the EU heavyweights, in matters of both global economics and global politics. Trump’s goal was to ensure the USA’s actual dominance in international relations and unconditional subjugation of China, Russia, Iran and several other states to America’s interests. The same goal also extended to the USA’s NATO allies, the latter being America’s first order of business in this. Sometimes Trump’s actions were crude, grotesque and inconsistent, but he made major progress in handling the tasks of laying the foundations for new domestic and foreign policies associated with the “America First” manifesto.

The key thing is not so much that he enshrined the USA’s real global dominance but that he forced American élites to revise their values and showed them how to achieve the set goal. And the goal that entails ensuring the USA’s hegemony is the kind of goal that American élites share wholeheartedly. They will do their best to achieve it at any cost, even after Trump leaves the White House, even if their speaking style is more politically correct and more acceptable to both adversaries and partners.

The tools he used proved reliable and effective. Here are some of the most telling examples. Extra-territorial sanctions and secondary sanctions forced major European companies to withdraw from Iran. A snowballing economic crisis ensued, followed by political instability. The U.S. also made sure that China’s biggest banks invested virtually no real capital in Russia’s economy, with real sector companies following suit, although they had generally abstained from such investment in any case. The construction of Nord Stream II, which Russia’s leadership deems very important, has been virtually frozen. However, believing loopholes still remained, Washington expanded the number of companies to which these restrictions applied and slated new steps to be taken in the same areas.

Trump put open pressure on Brussels and Berlin, which sometimes looked like blackmail when he threatened to introduce prohibitive import duties on German cars; at the same time, he also encouraged the USA’s more loyal allies to become engaged first; this combination of means forced EU states to reconsider, in part, their energy policy. In economic terms, other options were more advantageous, but they agreed to dot the entire EU coastline with LNG terminals to receive American gas and gradually switch to American shale oil and gas. Today, the terminals are working at 20% of capacity, tops. But that does not matter. What matters is the energy solutions forced on the EU create the conditions America’s industry needs for long-term strategic planning.

Trump launched several other trends or they were launched during his presidency, and these are changing the global status quo. The U.S. embarked on qualitatively revamping the country’s weapons. Previously, the international legal regime of non-appropriation of outer space and celestial bodies seemed solid, yet the U.S. demolished it, thereby clearing the way for commercial exploitation of outer space by American companies. The U.S. has become the global leader in developing electric cars driven by artificial intelligence. The capitalization of America’s leading high-tech companies is through the roof. The U.S. mandated that their allies sever cooperation with China's biggest high-tech firms on several large-scale projects, such as introducing 5G networks. The U.S. broke the impasse at least on Israel's legitimization in the Arab and Muslim world, if not on the Middle East settlement as such. The U.S. has sidelined the EU in the Balkans by bringing the region's NATOisation to the forefront. The U.S. established even closer strategic relations with Eastern Europe, thereby gaining a group of states willing energetically to advocate America’s interests even in contravention of the priorities of the EU’s core. The U.S. ranked China among the principal adversaries of the collective West and western values and applied progressively greater pressure on Beijing across the azimuth. The U.S. has breathed life into the anti-China Quad military and political bloc established along China’s perimeter. The list goes on and on.

Generally, the new U.S. Administration will abolish no items from that list. It will abolish “Trumpism” as a type of conduct, as a manner of communicating with America’s allies, as a style of doing business, but it will not abolish Trump’s achievements, principles and goals. There are several reasons for this, primarily that this kind of continuity benefits American élites.

Alternative Futures of EU-Russia Relations in 2030. EUREN Report

It is also because nearly 72 million Americans voted for Trump in the recent elections. He was just a little short of the votes he needed to stay in the White House for a second term. He was the only candidate to enjoy such loyal, energetic and enthusiastic support from people of all persuasions and from all walks of life. A significant chunk of voters consider Trump and his politics to be the sole embodiment of America and they were not going to compromise with the Democrats. There was no “blue wave,” as predicted in the clearly disorientating polls and in the leading media’s forecasts. In the long run, the Republicans gained more seats in the House of Representatives than before. It does not look much like a Republican party failure, defeat, debacle. If the Democrats intend to work to unify the nation and consolidate the élites, they must take this into account. The well-known American political scientist George Friedman stresses that Biden should not forget that “almost half the country voted against him”; the Democrats no longer have a solid majority in the House of Representatives as they used to and they do not control the Senate either; additionally, there is intensifying strife within the Democratic camp between leftwing radicals, centrists and conservatives.

This means the new administration will distance itself from the excesses of “Trumpism,” from its twists and gaffes, but not from its underlying ideology, not from achieving the “America first” goal. The new administration will distance itself from everything that made Europeans feel that their deepest-held values “integral to the European DNA” were being violated. A voluminous report by the Royal Institute of International Affairs published shortly before U.S. election day claims that many parameters of the foreign political course set by Donald Trump will remain in place. The U.S. will, once again, want the EU and its member states to comply fully with the above-outlined relations paradigm, which will remain unchanged. In particular, the U.S. will continue to squeeze economic concessions from the EU and its member states, engage in trade talks, and involve them in steering a common course of containing China. Joe Biden has already made the first step in this direction by confirming to Japan's Prime Minister that their defense alliance extends to the islands disputed by China.

The ensuing policies will, however, be implemented in a more cynical, civilized, politically correct and professional manner. The new administration’s vocabulary used for communicating with the leadership of the EU and its member states will once again feature all the requisite and important words about common values, unity of the Western world, the importance of the Euro-Atlantic solidarity. Washington will go back to friendly, polite, courteous relations; it will make a nice gesture, re-accede to the Paris Accords and join the international lobby combating climate change, since this does not, in fact, put the U.S. under any obligations. It will not, however, change the essence of the USA’s politics. George Friedman explains, “What will matter to Biden will be what mattered to Obama and Trump.” Jean-Dominique Giuliani, a well-known French public figure, President of the Robert Schuman Foundation, adds, “Nonetheless, Joe Biden will refrain from putting a question mark over the strategic pivot” America made under his predecessors. Its essence is “primarily ensuring America’s leadership toward Europe and in the face of China’s rapidly growing power.”

All American government bodies will no longer be staffed with random appointees; instead, they will employ consummate professionals who know how to do a professional and comprehensive job. They will “crack the whip” over the EU and its member states; this will be done consistently. The U.S. will not be easily satisfied, and instead, it will create a subjugation system that works without any glitches. That will be America’s only possible attitude to their partners’ dreams of no longer “counteracting one another” but, on the contrary, of working in “close coordination” on the entire current political agenda, including “the Balkans, Ukraine, Belarus, the Caucasus, Russia and Turkey,” of the U.S. “gratefully accepting the EU’s good offices” in order to re-accede to the Iranian deal.

At that point, the shortsightedness of the anti-Trump statements made in Brussels, Paris and Berlin, of their expectations and policies will become obvious.

In fact, Donald Trump had been playing into their hands. His policy and his manners were considered unacceptable by most Germans, French and EU citizens in general. His arrogant and provocative actions and statements humiliated European élites and the EU's leadership. He was openly disliked. People were offended and did not conceal it.

In such a situation, the EU could steer a course toward greater sovereignty, independent policies, distancing from the U.S. Such a policy would have no insurmountable obstacles. As Euronews remarked, “four years of Donald J. Trump have proven to be a cold, hard slap in the face for much of Europe, but it is a reality that has been coming for a long time and maybe an opportunity, too, for the EU to define and assert its own united foreign policy position more.” Brussels, Paris, and Berlin missed their opportune moment.

When Washington restores the friendly relations, returns to the bosom of Euro-Atlantic solidarity, swears loyalty to its allies, praises and encourages them (as it grabs them by the throat), such tricks will no longer cut it. It will not look appropriate. At the very least, it will look disloyal and ill-timed.

Such political shortsightedness is surprising yet easy to explain. Donald Trump was convenient for the EU’s heavyweights. They needed him. If Donald Trump had not appeared, he would have needed to be invented. Donald Trump gave the EU a unique chance. The analysts of the Royal Institute of International Affairs believe that, had Trump been reelected, Brussels would most likely have seized its chance. How successful Brussels would have been is another matter. American experts think similarly. “A Trump re-election might, of course, accelerate the trend toward autonomy,” noted New York Times analysts.

When Joe Biden moves into the White House, the U.S. will not give Europeans a second chance. Neither in the Pacific Partnership, nor in the Transatlantic Partnership, nor in other equal partnerships, no matter how successful they are. It does not matter how hard Europeans try to convince themselves that the opposite is true. No matter how many calls for autonomy are voiced. They will receive “a new partnership [that] would come with demands for new obligations and commitments, especially on China.”

Europe will no longer be able to break free of the USA’s amiable stranglehold, with all its ensuing geostrategic consequences for Russia, for China, for a new game on the great geostrategic chessboard with the pieces soon to be put in entirely new places.

Naturally, no one in political, expert and media circles close to the EU or working for it puts the question quite that way. Yet it is telling that, immediately after Joe Biden was proclaimed U.S. President-elect, the U.S. was swept by a wave of very typical comments that explain some obvious points Europeans had not previously taken for granted. They emphasize that:

(1) the ideas of the EU’s strategic autonomy have always been pure idealism and theories detached from political and military-strategic reality;

(2) the EU has never had either the power or the political will to transform those theories into a practical policy;

(3) with the USA’s impending return to the heart of the Euro-Atlantic solidarity, these theories will lose their relevance to some degree. In any case, their current “urgency and relevance” are once again up for debate and more consideration;

(4) it should not now be a matter of autonomy of the EU and its member states; it should now be a matter of bolstering their power and solidarity. “The worst that can happen for the European Union is that the outcome of the U.S. election allows us to slip back into that state of apathy, complacency and resignation that has characterized us for too long,” urges Guy Verhofstadt, one of the best-known European politicians and the European Parliament Brexit Coordinator.

Now, therefore, it is time “to prove itself as a true ally, not a liability,” an ally strong enough for the transatlantic solidarity to be meaningful. That requires proposing “a more constructive relationship” in trade; rallying “the world’s democracies around common threats and values” under the auspices of Biden’s America; acting together in “forcing China to play by the rules or countering Russia when it blatantly breaks them” and thereby writing “new rules for tech giants, against tax avoidance or to boost the carbon transition.”

(5) Donald Trump is leaving, but "Trumpism" remains. It has already been integrated into the political reality. In any case, Donald Trump has already played his part in transforming the U.S., and global politics and economics.


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Haquet Charles. Élection de Biden : “Les Européens doivent plus que jamais se penser en puissance." Il serait illusoire de penser que notre relation avec les États-Unis va revenir "comme avant Trump," explique Jean-Dominique Giuliani, président de la fondation Robert Schuman // L’Express. 11.11.2020. https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/europe/election-de-biden-les-europeens-doivent-plus-que-jamais-se-penser-en-puissance_2138415.html

Johnson Keith. While Trump Builds Tariff Walls, Asia Bets on Free Trade. It’s crunch time for the biggest trade deal you’ve never heard of // Foreign Policy. 01.11.2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/01/trump-tariffs-free-trade-rcep-asean-india-china-bangkok/

Lush Tamara, Geller Adam & Price Michelle. Grief, anger, disbelief: Trump voters face Biden’s victory // AP. 11.11.2020. https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-elections-coronavirus-pandemic-ced7bebdfebdeb63e545704d652daf85

McCaffrey Darren. Barroso: after Biden's election, it would be 'absurd' if there is no EU-UK Brexit Deal // Eurones. 12.11.2020. https://www.euronews.com/2020/11/12/barroso-after-biden-s-election-it-would-be-absurd-if-there-is-no-eu-uk-brexit-deal

McCaffrey Darren. U.S. election: What will a Biden or Trump win mean for the European Union? // Euronews. 03.11.2020. 03/11/2020. https://www.euronews.com/2020/11/03/us-election-what-will-a-biden-or-trump-win-mean-for-the-european-union

Orchard Phillip. For the U.S. and China, There’s No Going Back. Even under a Biden administration, the rivalry will only intensify from here // Geopolitical Futures. 09.11.2020. https://geopoliticalfutures.com/for-the-us-and-china-theres-no-going-back/

Paris Gilles. Election américaine 2020 : Joe Biden, la victoire d’un rescapé voué à devenir pacificateur en chef // Le Monde. 07.11.2020. https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2020/11/07/joe-biden-la-victoire-d-un-rescape_6058924_3210.html

Paris Gilles. Elections américaines 2020: le trumpisme fait la preuve de sa resilience. Mercredi soir 4 novembre, Donald Trump a ajouté 5 millions de voix à son total de 2016. Sa capacité à additionner divers courants idéologiques et à faire fructifier ce capital semble intact // Le Monde. 06.11.2020. https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2020/11/05/elections-americaines-2020-le-trumpisme-fait-la-preuve-de-sa-resilience_6058554_3210.html

Premier appel entre Emmanuel Macron et Joe Biden mardi // Le Point. 11.11.2020. https://www.lepoint.fr/monde/premier-appel-entre-emmanuel-macron-et-joe-biden-prevu-mardi-10-11-2020-2400488_24.php

Prospects dim for early U.S. return to TPP despite Biden win // The Japan Times. 09.11.2020. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/11/09/business/us-return-tpp-joe-biden/

Rovan Anne. Josep Borrell: “La victoire de Biden ne permettra pas aux Européens de remonter le temps.” Entretien - Le chef de la diplomatie de l’UE invite les Vingt-Sept à ne plus rêver du «parapluie protecteur des États-Unis» // Le Figaro. 12.11.2020. https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/joseph-borrell-la-victoire-de-biden-ne-permettra-pas-aux-europeens-de-remonter-le-temps-20201111

Stiglitz Joseph E. The Euro. How a Common Currency Threatens the Future of Europe. N.Y.: W.W.Norton, 2016. 512 p.

Stokes Bruce. U.S. Electorate Shows Distrust of the Realities of Foreign Policy // Chatham House. 04.09.2020. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/09/us-electorate-shows-distrust-realities-foreign-policy

Tocci Nathalie. Europe and Biden’s America: Making European Autonomy and a Revamped Transatlantic Bond Two Sides of the Same Coin // Istituto Affari Internazionali. 08.11.2020. https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/europe-and-bidens-america

Tocci Nathalie. L’Europa e l’America di Biden // Affarinternazionali. 09.11.2020. https://www.affarinternazionali.it/2020/11/leuropa-e-lamerica-di-biden/

Undercurrents: U.S. Election Special. Episode 65. Early reaction on the lessons and foreign policy implications of the 2020 U.S. presidential election // Chatham House. 06.11.2020. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/11/undercurrents-us-election-special

U.S. foreign policy priorities. What difference can an election make? // Chatham House Research Paper. U.S. and the Americas Programme. October 2020. 86 p. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-10/2020-10-15-us-foreign-policy-priorities-vinjamuri-et-al_1_0.pdf

Verhofstadt Guy. Biden presidency no quick fix, just chance for EU to fix itself // EU Observer. 10.11.2020. https://euobserver.com/opinion/150023

Vissière Hélène. Joe Biden, anti-Trump et “réconciliateur en chef.” Le 46e président des États-Unis est l'exact opposé du 45e: consensuel et rassembleur. Suffisant pour apaiser un pays plus divisé que jamais? // Le Point. 07.11.2020. https://www.lepoint.fr/monde/joe-biden-anti-trump-et-reconciliateur-en-chef-07-11-2020-2399911_24.php

Yukio Tajima. Biden affirms security treaty applies to Senkaku Islands in Suga call. China calls U.S.-Japan arrangement a 'product of the Cold War' // Nikkei Asia. 12.11.2020. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Indo-Pacific/Biden-affirms-security-treaty-applies-to-Senkaku-Islands-in-Suga-call


1. Stiglitz Joseph E. The Euro. How a Common Currency Threatens the Future of Europe. N.Y.: W.W.Norton, 2016. 512 p.


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  1. In your opinion, what are the US long-term goals for Russia?
    U.S. wants to establish partnership relations with Russia on condition that it meets the U.S. requirements  
     33 (31%)
    U.S. wants to deter Russia’s military and political activity  
     30 (28%)
    U.S. wants to dissolve Russia  
     24 (22%)
    U.S. wants to establish alliance relations with Russia under the US conditions to rival China  
     21 (19%)
 
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