Nuclear Boomerang

It has become a platitude that the world is going through the deepest crisis of the nuclear arms control system built over the last sixty years. In February 2026, the term of the New START expires and it is impossible to extend it once again; there is no chance of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty entering full legal force; and without these pillars the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will be deeply undercut. Moreover, there is a growing pressure of some vested interests in favor of resuming explosive nuclear tests and transferring nuclear arms to foreign allies and partners. Meanwhile history has provided a number of examples of how the states’ political relations change while the military nuclear technologies stay and turn from “friendly” to “hostile” (China, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and South Africa). Whatever the forthcoming world order becomes because of its ongoing transformation, nuclear weapons will stay as one of the main elements of international relations as well as the peaceful atomic energy intertwined with the dual-purpose technologies. The future polycentric world will require a much better quality nuclear arms control system than previously, when security problems were the concern of the two superpowers. Donald Trump’s return to power is increasing the uncertainty of the future world order, creating both new opportunities and big risks. In view of the forthcoming renovations, the present comprehensive nuclear arms control crisis must be contained and overcome.

There Are Neither Eternal Allies, Nor Perpetual Enemies, But Only Nuclear Arms Are Eternal and Perpetual

It is not hard to figure out that the subtitle of this article is a paraphrase of Lord Palmerston’s famous dictum [1]. This particular adaptation may draw objections from advocates of ideological immutability in foreign policy, such as the notion of an enduring Anglo-Saxon hostility toward Russia (although chronologically speaking, it would be more precise to speak of the Polians and Drevlians). Nor will it sit comfortably with proponents of general and complete nuclear disarmament. Yet the record of the past several decades has provided substantial validation for this postulate, a factor that warrants consideration in current policymaking and planning over at least the foreseeable future.

This is all the more so given that the world is going through the deepest crisis of the nuclear arms control and disarmament system built over the last 65 years [2]. However imperfect, that system was an essential part of the previous world order, which is now transforming under the pressure of profound economic, political and technological change.

The system, comprising dozens of international treaties and agreements, neither rid the world of nuclear weapons nor removed the nuclear threat (as an instrument of deterrence) from international relations. Nonetheless, it significantly reduced the likelihood of nuclear use, imparted a measure of stability and predictability to strategic relations among major powers, and helped cut global nuclear arsenals by nearly an order of magnitude [Cochran, Arkin, Hoeing 1984: 30–35; Arbatov 2024]. As a result, by the 1990s and 2000s, the risk of nuclear war between East and West had been effectively reduced to zero.

Unfortunately, these positive trends have gone into reverse in the past decade. The process began earlier, with the United States’ withdrawal in 2002 from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. In 2018, Washington pulled out of the multilateral nuclear deal with Iran, then denounced the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 and the Treaty on Open Skies the following year. In response to Western pursuit of Russia’s “strategic defeat” amid the Ukraine conflict, Moscow in 2023 suspended its participation in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and left the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). In 2023, Russia also revoked ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Today, the three main pillars of the nuclear arms control system are under threat. First, the extended term of New START expires in February 2026, and it is next to impossible to conclude a successor agreement within the remaining timeframe. Second, domestic pressure is mounting in the U.S. and Russia to abandon the CTBT. Third, the collapse of these two central pillars of the arms control architecture will bring down the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) [3].

The Main Bastion

Aleksey Arbatov:
Nuclear Doctrine and Strategic Stability

The NPT and its regimes form the global bulwark of treaty-based limitations on nuclear arms. Work on the agreement began in 1958; it was signed a decade later and entered into force in 1970. It became the most universal international instrument after the Charter of the United Nations, with 191 of the 193 UN member states parties to the NPT [4].

One of the “founding fathers” of the Treaty, Ambassador Roland M. Timerbaev offered an impartial assessment of its significance: “Despite the many difficulties facing full implementation of the NPT provisions, due to the discriminatory nature of the treaty itself (which legally divided the world into two categories of state: nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states), and despite the difficulty in drawing a clear and straight line between military and peaceful uses of atomic energy and the presence of nuclear ambitions in some states, the treaty was and remains the most important starting point for collective action aimed at diminishing the nuclear threat and ensuring the use of atomic energy for exclusively peaceful purposes” [Timerbaev 2023: 222].

All nuclear arms control agreements signed since 1968, including the most recent New START, have contained references to commitment to the NPT. Negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms began one year after the NPT was signed, following a clear logic: the superpowers would not have taken this path—eventually signing about a dozen treaties and agreements between 1972 and 2010—without assurances that other states would not substantially expand their arsenals. The NPT is closely associated with a set of agreements restricting and banning nuclear tests (in 1974–1996). It also serves as the foundation for six nuclear-weapon-free zones [5] established between 1968 and 2009, which cover either fully or partially every continent except Europe and include 177 countries. The NPT relies on the vast administrative, technical and expert capacities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Nuclear Disarmament on the Horizon

Attacks on the NPT are coming from several directions. Reflecting on the situation, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi observed that the global non-proliferation regime was “under greater pressure than at any time since the end of the Cold War” [6].

The first line of criticism of the NPT, which comes from many non-nuclear-weapon states and the peace-loving public, concerns the failure to implement Article VI. As is well known, the Treaty drew a sharp line between five “legitimate” nuclear-weapon states and the remaining 186 countries that pledged never to acquire such arms. To mitigate this glaring imbalance, nuclear powers made two commitments: to facilitate access to peaceful nuclear energy under IAEA safeguards and soon bring this “segregation” to an end.

The famous Article VI says, “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” [7]. Citing this article, the NPT non-nuclear-weapon states persistently snipe at nuclear powers for neglecting their principal obligation, as neither “cessation of the nuclear arms race” nor “disarmament” has materialized.

In no small measure, this contradiction can be explained by the fact that the 1960s understanding of how an arms race unfolds has fallen out of step with the military-technical reality. These years saw a quantitative arms race of unprecedented pace and scale: the U.S. expanded its strategic missile capabilities, while the Soviet Union responded by starting its own programs [Chernyshev 2021: 131]. Clearly, according to the strategic logic of that era, it was necessary first to “cease the nuclear arms race,” then proceed to reduce stockpiles, i.e., “nuclear disarmament.”

Indeed, strategic arms control agreements succeeded in halting the U.S. and Soviet nuclear buildup, and with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) in the early 1990s, deep reductions began. Yet the arms race did not end, there was qualitative modernization of arsenals, though on a lesser scale than before. Since the late 1990s, the nuclear arms race has broken decisively with the paradigm of the preceding four decades, when the U.S. set the pace and direction, and the Soviet Union rapidly closed the gap and occasionally pulled ahead. The two countries have pursued distinct and desynchronized modernization tracks and are out of lockstep in adopting new types of nuclear weapons, dual-use systems, high-precision conventional missiles and introducing breakthrough military technologies of wide application.

So reality has long departed from the path foreseen in Article VI of the NPT. Rather than first stopping the arms race and only then moving toward disarmament, over the past three decades, the two superpowers have made enormous progress in reducing their strategic forces—by threefold in delivery vehicles and sevenfold in warheads [Arbatov 2024] (meaning disarmament), but the “arms race” has not ended, though it has qualitatively changed its nature.

If dialogue on these issues resumes, future negotiations will need to address limitations on not only nuclear but also conventional strategic weapons (including missile defense systems), space-based strike systems, stockpiled nuclear warheads and the forces of third states (including those outside the NPT [8]). This will take the process even further away from Article VI. After many years of disarmament efforts, it may appear that this goal, much like the horizon, retreats as one advances toward it.

In One Fell Swoop?

Aleksey Arbatov:
Disarmament in History and at Present: Theory vs. Practice

Stagnation and contradictions in disarmament spurred efforts to tackle the problem outside the NPT framework and established negotiation formats—through something of a “cavalry charge.” The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons and like-minded UN member states drafted and, in 2017, pushed through the UN General Assembly the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) [9]. Under the Treaty, each state party “undertakes never under any circumstances” to develop, acquire or stockpile nuclear weapons. It also bans the transfer to any recipient whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such arms directly or indirectly, as well as using or threatening to use them. In addition, the agreement bars its parties from stationing, installing or deploying any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in their territory or at any place under their jurisdiction or control. The Treaty is of unlimited duration.

The TPNW was designed to enter into force once 50 states became parties. To avoid repeating the unfortunate fate of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (signed almost 30 years ago but still not in force, which will be addressed below), TPNW architects chose to “cut corners” in a way. Specifically, it did not require mandatory ratification by any particular group of countries with existing nuclear arsenals or the capacity to develop such weapons. This approach made it far easier for the TPNW to enter into force in 2021 (to date, it has been signed by 95 states, and 74 out of them have ratified it).

However, this success came at a considerable cost. None of the nine countries with nuclear weapons—the ones that the Treaty was primarily intended to bind—took part in drafting the Treaty or signed it. On top of that, the U.S., Russia and several other nuclear powers sharply criticized the TPNW, arguing that it would invite chaos into the existing nuclear disarmament system and undermine the NPT [10]. No amount of criticism or condemnation from the new Treaty’s advocates could shake the nuclear powers’ unwavering stance. As a result, although the TPNW was signed and entered into force under the UN framework, it has had no practical effect and remains merely a political and legal symbol of the international community’s aspiration for nuclear disarmament.

The Treaty’s fundamental flaw lies in its complete concentration on technicalities: practical measures for nuclear disarmament and safeguards against violation or circumvention. However, it overlooks the national security considerations that motivate existing or prospective nuclear-weapon states.

The point is that existing nuclear arsenals, whatever one’s view of them, are not a “toxic waste dump” inherited from the Cold War that humanity can safely dispose of through joint effort. Nuclear capabilities are functioning deadly “assets” of some countries, deeply woven into the fabric of contemporary international relations. They are seen as safeguards against nuclear aggression or attack by overwhelming conventional forces, as tangible assurances of protection for allies, and as symbols of national standing in a hostile world. The nuclear dimension of security cannot simply be abolished without creating alternative systems and means to ensure it—a process that has been moving forward partially and incrementally through arms control agreements. Ultimately, a world without nuclear weapons is not today’s world minus nuclear weapons, but a world built on fundamentally different norms and institutions.

Consideration of these matters through patient negotiations and rational unilateral steps helped over the past six decades to achieve dramatic reductions in global nuclear arsenals, based on strategic parity, and significantly lower the likelihood of their use. This accomplishment has endured for more than three years even during an intense military conflict in the heart of Europe—despite all the dangers of nuclear escalation—something that would have been unimaginable half a century ago. The pause and reversal in arms control that began in the past decade stem from clear political and military reasons. With all due respect to the good intentions of TPNW advocates, these reasons cannot be simply wished away.

To make progress, the political and military-technical factors behind today’s deadlock and setbacks in disarmament must be squarely addressed. Decades of negotiation have shown that even the most daunting problems can be resolved through persistent and professional pursuit of compromise. Naturally, this requires a willingness to overcome the difficulties, rather than exploiting them as an excuse to walk away from arms control out of ignorance or ideological backwardness. In the latter case, disapproval and criticism from the global anti-nuclear movement are quite justified.

Undermining From Within

The Stabilizing “Basic Principles”: Moscow Reduces Options for Pre-Nuclear Escalation. Russia’s leading experts on the new Russia’s nuclear doctrine

The second line of pressure on the NPT comes from outside the Treaty itself and is linked to the unraveling of another global nuclear arms control regime—the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty [11]. The CTBT was signed by 187 states, but Article XIV stipulates that it can only enter into force after ratification by 44 states possessing nuclear power facilities, that is, those with legal access to nuclear fissile materials. However, nine of these countries have yet to ratify the Treaty [12], leaving it in limbo. Despite this, a dedicated international institution—the CTBT Organization—continues to operate alongside an extensive technical monitoring infrastructure, including 337 seismic stations and specialized laboratories worldwide (32 of which are located in Russia).

The Treaty imposes certain constraints on qualitative improvements to nuclear explosive device designs and materials, though it does not prohibit reliability testing of deployed nuclear warheads through subcritical experiments (those that fall short of triggering a nuclear chain reaction). In a sense, the CTBT was ahead of its time, as it limited opportunities for improving nuclear weapons while the development of delivery systems continued (including hypersonic glide vehicles, drones, loitering cruise missiles, autonomous underwater and aerial vehicles and other platforms). This, along with questions over the verification of subcritical experiments, added to the difficulties of bringing the CTBT into force.

The Treaty’s restraining effect frustrates research institutes, nuclear manufacturers, certain defense agencies in the U.S., Russia and elsewhere that work on warhead development. Such sentiment was present during the first administration of Donald Trump, and President Putin once spoke out about the pressure from vested interests in Russia [13]. In the United States, there are now open calls to resume live testing. For example, Trump’s former national security advisor Robert C. O’Brien claimed that “Washington must test new nuclear weapons for reliability and safety” [O’Brien 2024: 35]. Similar views are now being publicly conveyed to Russian leadership: “It is necessary to speed up a major revision of the outdated … nuclear doctrine. To consider the option of seceding from the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty that prohibits nuclear tests in the atmosphere, underwater and in outer space, and from the underground nuclear test moratorium” [Trenin, Avakyants, Karaganov 2024: 14]. The call to speed up the doctrine’s modernization aims to lower the threshold for nuclear weapon use and is broadly intended to “reinvigorate the nuclear factor in world politics.” [14]

After halting testing in 1992 and signing the Treaty in 1996, the U.S. Senate has never ratified it, despite pressure from successive administrations, numerous allies, Russia, China and global public opinion. Due to Washington’s obstructionist stance, China has also refrained from ratifying the CTBT, while Russia ratified it in 2000 but withdrew its ratification in 2023. U.S. policy has become the primary obstacle to the Treaty’s entry into force and has ultimately brought it to the brink of collapse.

Meanwhile, the organic interconnection between this Treaty and nuclear non-proliferation stems not only from the standard reference to the NPT in the CTBT preamble but also from an explicit passage in the NPT preamble expressing the parties’ intention to “seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,” [15] as well as from the historical correlation between these two key multilateral arms control instruments. Originally, the NPT was to be extended every five years through a special Review Conference. However, in 1995, the Conference decided to extend the NPT indefinitely. Non-nuclear-weapon states made their support conditional on assurances from the five nuclear powers of their commitment to the core Article VI. Since it was clear that the “nuclear disarmament” referenced in that article remained a distant prospect, this pledge was effectively confirmed by the conclusion of the CTBT the following year, in 1996.

Now, almost 30 years later, the Joint Statement issued following the Russia–China summit on May 8, 2025, says, “Arms control is an important means for strengthening international security and stability, while actions that undermine them simultaneously undercut arms control efforts… The Sides will continue to uphold the authority of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention and other international legal instruments.” [16] The fact that the CTBT is not mentioned among the principal multilateral agreements gives much food for thought.

From a practical standpoint, resuming nuclear tests would allow interested organizations to conduct full-scale experiments with qualitatively new warheads, though this would hardly have a perceptible impact on the military balance given the quantity and destructive power of existing arsenals. The main technological beneficiaries would be those countries that carried out fewer live tests before the last moratorium [17]. However, these isolated technical improvements would come at a steep cost to overall international security, as they would be perceived worldwide as steps undermining “arms control efforts.” [18]

This would destroy not only the CTBT but also fundamentally undermine the NPT by demonstrating the nuclear powers’ disregard for Article VI and their intention to continue relying on nuclear weapons for their security. Nuclear states can, from a legal standpoint, denounce the CTBT and resume nuclear explosions without leaving the NPT. However, non-nuclear-weapon states could legally follow their lead and acquire nuclear status only by withdrawing from the NPT under Article X.1 (with three months’ notice). Among countries with substantial “groundwork” in nuclear technologies are Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Brazil and Ukraine [New nine nuclear powers… 2023]. Most of these states have unstable or outright hostile relations with Russia.

The first, and so far only, state to openly denounce the NPT was North Korea in 2003. It conducted six live nuclear tests between 2006 and 2017, demonstrating its nuclear status to the world while developing delivery systems of increasing range. Without delving into Pyongyang’s policy motivations, it should be noted that in 2003, the U.S. displayed uncharacteristic tolerance toward this development. This was largely because, just a year earlier, Washington itself had abandoned the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty—the cornerstone of strategic stability and SALT/START negotiations since 1972—without any convincing justification. Following North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, neither UN sanctions, great power pressure, nor President Trump’s personal visit and meeting with President Kim Jong Un in June 2019 helped reverse course and achieve “denuclearization” of the Korean Peninsula.

Dmitry Stefanovich:
On the Enduring Value of Nuclear Non-Proliferation

However, the problem extends far beyond the three areas of pressure on the NPT mentioned above. The second Trump administration’s dismissive approach toward NATO, amid the ongoing hostilities in Ukraine and rising tensions around Taiwan, has fueled doubts among American allies about the reliability of U.S. security guarantees. Since the early 1950s, the strategy of so-called extended nuclear deterrence has been rooted in the U.S. commitment to use nuclear weapons in the event of an attack on allies, whether with nuclear or conventional forces.

“Nuclear options” have been debated within NATO before, but the issue has now galvanized political elites stronger than ever in such countries as Germany, Poland, Sweden and Norway. In Asia, similar processes are underway in South Korea, Japan [Fitzpatrick 2016] and Taiwan. Prominent British expert James Cameron notes, “Anxieties over U.S. nuclear credibility are manifest in French President Emmanuel Macron’s call for a debate on European deterrence, incoming German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s suggestion that France and Britain could ‘share’ nuclear weapons with Berlin, and Tusk’s discussion of Poland’s nuclear options… At present, the debate in Europe has turned to whether more countries should develop nuclear weapons” [19]. In South Korea, this topic is also raised more frequently through characteristically Eastern allegory: “We cannot borrow an umbrella from a neighbor every time it rains. We need to have a raincoat and wear it ourselves,” [20] Won Yoo Chul, the leader of the Saenuri party’s parliamentary faction, said.

Finally, a crucial handicap for non-proliferation is the fact that the traditional cooperation between Moscow and Washington on nuclear non-proliferation has now withered away and turned into rivalry. This collaboration was always the decisive factor in strengthening the NPT, and it was no accident that Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko once called it the “silk thread” [Timerbaev 2023: 103] binding the interests of the two superpowers despite all their contradictions.

However, the unraveling of the nuclear arms control system clearly does not trouble certain political and expert circles in either the U.S. or Russia. As John Bolton—former advisor and now critic of the Trump administration—put it, expressing the position of radical conservatives: “…Given the growing strength of the Russia–China entente… U.S.–Russia arms agreements are not merely inadvisable but dangerous…” [21] At the same time, alongside critics of nuclear arms limitation, it is difficult to find outspoken opponents of nuclear non-proliferation policy among established specialists in the U.S.

The situation is different in Russia, where part of the political science community has outpaced their overseas counterparts and has been advancing unconventional ideas for several years now—for example, that a polycentric and stable future world order cannot emerge without nuclear multilateralism. To bring about this “restructuring,” they propose taking nuclear proliferation into their own hands and helping Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, as well as Brazil and Mexico acquire such weapons. The caveat is that not all countries would receive an invitation to the privileged club: if Germany or Poland attempted to acquire such weapons, they should be destroyed by a “preemptive strike, and the same applies to Japan” [Karaganov 2024: 51].

In light of such bold ideas, it is worth recalling the cautionary tale of how the role of nuclear weapons in relations between states has changed over time.

Nuclear Weapons Between Allies and Adversaries

The development and buildup of nuclear weapons, which transformed the fate of humanity, often did not correlate with the dynamics of relations among leading powers. To begin with, from 1942 the U.S. developed the weapon under the Manhattan Project against the principal European adversary in World War II—Germany—fearing it would gain an advantage in the “uranium project.” However, the first (and fortunately still the last) combat use of the atomic bomb was against the main Pacific enemy—Japan—with the aim of definitively breaking its resistance and demonstrating American military might to the world. Both of these states became Washington’s principal allies in Europe and Asia after the war and recipients of U.S. security guarantees. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union and China—key American allies during World War II—became primary adversaries for the U.S. and targets of its doctrine of nuclear “massive retaliation.”

During the Cold War, nuclear weapons moved to the forefront of military-political relations between hostile states and their security guarantees to allies. There are no cases in recorded history where nuclear weapons were directly transferred between allied countries, though providing non-nuclear-weapon allies with delivery systems, training them in handling nuclear warheads and conducting military exercises simulating nuclear strikes became routine. This includes NATO’s botched Multilateral Force proposal of 1961–1964; the alliance’s subsequent nuclear sharing missions; similar arrangements among Warsaw Pact countries; Russia’s recent stationing of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Belarus and joint exercises involving the two countries to practice their possible use [22].

At the same time, technical and economic assistance to friendly states in developing civilian (and even military) nuclear energy and science was widespread. However, the technical overlap between “peaceful” and “military” atom (primarily in uranium enrichment and plutonium separation from spent reactor fuel), combined with the volatility of international politics, often gave such technologies a boomerang effect, turning them against the very sponsors of cooperation in this field.

Over several weeks of August 1945, the Soviet Union crushed the Kwantung Army, liberated China from Japanese occupation and provided comprehensive military assistance to the Communist Party for victory in the civil war in 1949. Building on a broad package of industrial and military support from 1954 (including the transfer of the Port Arthur naval base), an agreement was concluded in 1957 on Soviet assistance to China in developing nuclear weapons. This included sharing important weapons manufacturing technologies, constructing a test site at Lop Nur, building and commissioning the first heavy-water reactor (for plutonium production) and an experimental cyclotron. Around 11,000 Chinese specialists received training in the Soviet Union, while Soviet nuclear scientists worked in China.

Many years later, Russian officials at the highest level described that period of military-nuclear cooperation as “evidence of the highest degree of trust in Soviet–Chinese relations.” [23] Soviet policy was underpinned by confidence in the enduring truth of the refrain “…Russians and Chinese are brothers forever” from a popular song of that era. Apparently, Moscow hoped that together with Beijing it would be better positioned to counter U.S. nuclear superiority, which at the time outnumbered Soviet warheads by 10 to 1 and more [Chernyshev 2021: 132].

As early as 1958, Moscow began to have doubts on this matter [Timerbaev 2023: 77], and they proved to be well-founded over the next 30 years. The worsening of Soviet–Chinese relations came to the fore, caused by the 20_th Congress of the CPSU, which denounced Stalin’s personality cult, and competition for leadership in the global communist movement. In 1960, around 1,600 Soviet specialists were abruptly recalled from China, trade dropped by two-thirds, and deliveries of Soviet industrial equipment shrank to just one-fortieth of previous levels—greatly damaging China’s economic Great Leap Forward.

Maoists’ frenzied campaign inside China was combined with a course toward escalating external tensions to consolidate Mao’s power. Over time, ideological disputes evolved into international-political and then military confrontation. In March 1969, there were armed border clashes along the Ussuri River and in Central Asia, which resulted in significant personnel losses on both sides. Relations reached a new low with the Sino–Vietnamese War of 1979, in which the Soviet Union provided political and military assistance to Vietnam (just as it had supported India in its 1971 war with Pakistan, then backed by China). In the 1980s, the Soviet Union and China fought each other indirectly through local formations in Afghanistan, Angola and other conflict zones worldwide.

Meanwhile, China built its own nuclear weapon in 1964 and prioritized the development of intermediate-range missiles for strikes against neighboring Asian countries, above all the Soviet Union [Shunin 2009]. Soviet intermediate- and shorter-range missiles were targeted not only at NATO but also at China (by 1987, the majority of those systems, 370 out of 680, were deployed east of the Urals [Grinevskii 2004: 591]). There is reason to believe that from the mid-1970s, when the U.S. mothballed its sole ABM deployment area permitted under the 1972 Treaty, the Soviet Union maintained the Moscow ABM complex due to the missile threat from China (since the system was ineffective against U.S. multiple-warhead missiles). In the Far East, Moscow positioned a large grouping of armed forces, comparable in scale to that deployed against NATO in Central Europe [24].

In the 1970s and first half of the 1980s, both powers prepared in earnest for major war. Official CPSU documents indicated that China’s policy was “aimed at aggravating the international situation and [was] aligned with the policy of the imperialist powers.” [25] Only after the change of leadership in China in 1976 and the Soviet Union in 1982 did relations between the two powers begin to gradually recover, and thanks to Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy, they normalized after 1989.

Fortunately, Russian–Chinese relations have steadily improved since then and today are closer than at any point in history, with the exception of the early 1950s (although the balance of power in this tandem has now substantially changed). In line with the classic logic of realpolitik, this rapprochement has been facilitated by the deterioration of Russia’s relations with the U.S. and the “collective West” over Ukraine, as well as by frictions between the U.S. and China (primarily over Taiwan). Washington sees China as its primary global rival in the 21st century in economic, political-ideological and military terms.

China is consistently increasing its military might across the full spectrum of armed forces and weapon systems, and since 2021 has launched a targeted effort to expand its strategic nuclear capabilities, which could reach parity with those of the U.S. within a decade [26]. In the past, such a shift in the strategic balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union led to détente and arms control agreements. It is difficult to predict whether the same logic will prevail under new conditions in U.S.–China relations and how a radical transformation of the balance of power will affect Russia–China cooperation.

Ivan Timofeev:
Nuclear Disarmament. The End of History?

The Soviet–Chinese case is not the only instructive example of the political twists and turns surrounding nuclear weapons. In Iraq, which had embarked on a path of “non-capitalist development,” a nuclear program began with a 1959 agreement with the Soviet Union, which helped build a small research reactor. But in 1975, the Soviet Union refused to supply another, more powerful reactor without IAEA guarantees—a condition rejected by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, who apparently harbored plans to pursue nuclear weapons. France proved less scrupulous and in the same year concluded an agreement with Baghdad to supply the large Osirak reactor and a year’s worth of reactor fuel—all without IAEA oversight (especially since France was not yet party to the NPT at the time). Italy promised to provide “hot cell” technology for plutonium separation from spent fuel. It also pledged, along with West Germany, to sell enriched uranium for two Osirak-type reactors. But in 1979, the first one was blown up by an Israeli sabotage group before shipment from a French port to Basra, and the second, located in the desert near Tuwaitha, was destroyed by an Israeli air strike in 1981. This effectively halted Iraq’s nuclear program, especially as the country’s aggression against Iran escalated into the devastating 1980–1988 war. Had Iraq obtained nuclear weapons in advance, there is little doubt they might have been used: in that war, both sides carried out indiscriminate missile strikes on cities and deployed chemical weapons.

East of this region, the U.S. sought to turn Iran under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1941–1979) into an outpost of American influence. It received substantial technical and economic assistance in nuclear energy development and in 1959 was provided with a small research reactor for Tehran University’s research center. In 1974, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) unveiled plans to build 23 reactors and, most tellingly, create a closed fuel cycle, including facilities for natural uranium enrichment and plutonium separation.

Such facilities directly pave the way toward nuclear weapons, but this raised few concerns among the donors—after all, Iran was a trusted Western ally and had signed the NPT in 1968 and ratified it in 1970. U.S., German, and French specialists led reactor construction, while Iranian scientists and engineers were trained in the U.S. and many European countries. The AEOI received generous state funding, uranium exploration programs were launched, nuclear research centers were established, and contracts for fuel supplies for future reactors were signed. The German company Kraftwerk Union began construction of the first nuclear power plant near Bushehr in 1975.

But in 1979, the Islamic Revolution toppled the pro-Western shah, and ayatollahs with radical anti-Israeli and anti-Western ideology came to power. The nuclear program came to a halt, but not for long. In 1985, China supplied Iran with a research reactor for the nuclear center in Isfahan. In 1992, Iran and Russia signed a cooperation agreement on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and in 1995, Russia secured a contract to complete the construction of the first unit of the Bushehr NPP, begun by the German company. Iran’s nuclear program expanded to include the construction of a uranium enrichment facility and a heavy-water production plant in Arak (necessary for natural-uranium reactors with high plutonium content in spent fuel).

Then in 2003–2004, the discovery of sites and facilities that had not been reported to the IAEA fueled suspicions that Iran’s nuclear program had a secret military dimension. After long, exhausting negotiations, a multilateral agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) was signed in 2015 on physical limitation, reduction and broad transparency of the Iranian program. Yet, unlike Washington’s muted reaction to North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, the Trump administration took an actively disruptive approach: in 2018, it declared the JCPOA insufficient and abandoned it, effectively destroying the agreement. Since then, Iran’s program, including uranium enrichment cascades, had developed practically without restrictions and with very superficial IAEA control, bringing the country, in the view of many experts, to the threshold of nuclear weapons capability [27].

In June 2025, this served as justification for Israel and the U.S. to start a war against Iran, involving massive missile strikes and bombardments. Paradoxically, the stated goal of the war was to halt Iran’s nuclear activities (high enrichment and uranium accumulation), which had previously been radically limited by the JCPOA, dismantled by Washington in 2018 with the backing of Israeli leadership. The effectiveness of attacks on Iranian nuclear infrastructure is contested, but it is telling that virtually nobody argues this war will help strengthen the NPT. On the contrary, the nuclear non-proliferation regime has never been in greater jeopardy than it is today, including Tehran’s break with the IAEA, the possibility of the country’s withdrawal from the NPT, the resumption of its nuclear program and new armed conflicts in the region involving third states.

Even further east, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission also specialized in nuclear research. The country’s defeat in the 1971 war with India and New Delhi’s peaceful nuclear test in 1974 strengthened Pakistan’s drive for a nuclear option. Initially, Islamabad relied on U.S. support, which supplied reactor fuel. The first reactor was launched in 1965 by the same company that provided reactors to Israel and Iran [28]. Washington’s backing was motivated in part by political grievances against India, which led the Non-Aligned Movement and was deepening economic and military-technical ties with the Soviet Union.

An extraordinary role in Pakistan’s program was played by the now-notorious scientist and engineer Abdul Qadeer Khan, who earned his doctorate in West Germany, worked in a physics laboratory in Amsterdam, and later participated in uranium enrichment research for the European uranium consortium URENCO, from which he secretly stole a vast collection of classified documents to his homeland. Returning to Pakistan in 1975, Khan took charge of the national nuclear program, receiving the position of director of the research laboratory for industrial uranium enrichment that was later named in his honor.

The bomb was built at a research laboratory in Kahuta in northern Pakistan. The first series of live nuclear tests, in the wake of India’s detonations, was conducted in May 1998 at a test site in Baluchistan province on the border with Afghanistan. This was followed by a not very intensive but steady nuclear and missile arms race between Pakistan and India, which is now bringing their arsenals close to those of the UK and France and is unfolding amid recurring territorial and terrorist crises in South Asia. Alongside Europe and the Middle and Far East, the region has become quite a dangerous potential flashpoint for nuclear war.

However, this was not the end of the story. As it turned out, having fulfilled his patriotic duty to defend his country, Khan sought a commercial windfall as well. He created an entire global network for the illicit sale of nuclear weapons materials and technologies, uranium enrichment centrifuges and plutonium separation equipment to various countries and organizations (recipients included Iran, North Korea and Libya). In February 2004, Khan confessed his guilt on national television and was placed under house arrest. His later fate remains a matter of speculation, but it is undeniable that he dealt a severe blow to the nuclear non-proliferation system and to efforts aimed at preventing nuclear technologies from falling into the hands of international terrorism.

There is another example that should not be left unmentioned of how “volatile” nuclear weapons may be in the face of political change. In 1965, an American company [29] supplied South Africa with a research reactor and weapons-grade enriched uranium fuel for what later became the Pelindaba nuclear center [30]. In 1971, South Africa announced plans for “peaceful nuclear explosions for the mining industry,” citing similar programs in other countries. Two shafts were dug in the Kalahari Desert for testing. Pakistan’s centrifuge know-how was tapped for uranium enrichment, but Israel’s assistance played the main role. By the late 1960s, Israel had already mastered nuclear technologies and built its nuclear weapons but faced difficulties with uranium supplies and lacked test range.

South Africa had both (uranium was mined in Namibia), and cooperation between the two countries was established in 1975. In September 1979, the American satellite Vela 6911, designed to detect nuclear detonations, recorded a flash consistent with an atmospheric nuclear test near uninhabited Bouvet Island in the desolate South Atlantic, between Africa and Antarctica [31]. The fact of nuclear cooperation between the two countries was acknowledged at the most authoritative level [Newhouse 1989: 276]. The widely accepted version is that this was a joint test by the two states. It is now known that South Africa produced six nuclear bombs (a seventh was partially assembled) using highly enriched uranium. Old Canberra-type bombers served as delivery systems, and later, according to some assessments, export versions of Israel’s Jericho and Shavit intermediate-range missiles. Nuclear weapons were intended for use if the South African state faced serious threats from militant groups from Angola and Namibia. The tacit Israeli–South African nuclear alliance was likely meant to “clamp” the continent from north and south against adversaries of the two countries in the Arab world and sub-Saharan Africa.

However, internal resistance, international sanctions and defeat in Angola and Namibia ultimately brought down the apartheid regime. A real possibility emerged that, contrary to the calculations of foreign sponsors of Pretoria’s nuclear program, the weapons might pass into the hands of a black-majority government. To prevent this, the last white-minority government shut down the program in 1989. The atomic bombs were dismantled under the supervision of U.S. specialists, and in 1991 South Africa signed the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. In 1994, the IAEA confirmed there were no nuclear arms left in the country, and in 1996 the entire African continent was declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

That said, the highly enriched weapons-grade uranium recovered from the nuclear bombs remained at the secure Pelindaba facility, along with technical infrastructure originally built for military purposes (two nuclear reactors and 25 plants for uranium conversion, enrichment and uranium fuel production). Paradoxically, the NPT does not even define the term “nuclear weapon,” though it is the Treaty’s central subject. Can some quantity of weapons-grade nuclear material sufficient for assembling a warhead be considered the minimal unit of a nuclear weapon? This question remains open.

The obvious lesson from these stories is that political relations of countries may change, but nuclear technologies, production and even weapons, once created, remain. Of the 10 states that acquired such weapons, only South Africa became an exception—not because it sought to contribute to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, but because of radical change in the country’s political regime. Otherwise, it would undoubtedly have retained nuclear status, even if secretly as Israel has.

Depending on fluctuations in world politics, nuclear weapons, once acquired, can transform from “friendly” to “hostile,” as they get retargeted from some adversaries to others. This characteristic of this weapons class must be kept in mind when helping countries develop nuclear energy and especially its dual-use elements. This point is worth recalling for advocates of NPT withdrawal and of handing nuclear weapons to current allies and partners.

Trump Is Coming Back

Ivan Timofeev:
Can Nuclear Weapons Help Avert a Russia-NATO War?

Donald Trump’s return to power in the U.S. has injected even greater uncertainty into the shaky arms control system. On one hand, the “track record” of the first Trump administration offers little reason for optimism. As noted above, it included withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, the INF Treaty and the Treaty on Open Skies, a failure to extend New START, and threats to exit the CTBT. No president in American history has done as much damage to arms control as Trump.

The Republican administration inherited from the Democrats a program to modernize all three legs of the strategic triad and the nuclear warhead stockpile at a total cost of over $1.7 trillion over the next quarter-century [Kristensen, Korda 2023]. If the caps imposed by the New START collapse, the modernization program for the U.S. strategic forces could be substantially expanded (including additional measures to counter China’s capabilities), and its costs would increase by $440 billion or more [32].

The new administration’s policy in this area has yet to take shape, and clarity will follow with the release of official strategy documents. So far, there is a long “menu” of proposals from military and civilian experts close to the Republican leadership [33]. Within Trump’s first 100 days in office, the resumption of a layered missile defense system to protect the entire U.S. territory was officially announced (executive order dated January 27, 2025 [34]), i.e., some incarnation of President Ronald Reagan’s 1980s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

As is well known, nothing came of Reagan’s dream to make nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete,” although it did catalyze funding and spur a broad range of scientific and technological advances. The administration justifies Trump’s idea to create an Iron Dome-style system (modeled after Israel’s missile defense system but quickly rebranded as the Golden Dome) by pointing to breakthroughs in science and technology over the past 40 years: development of artificial intelligence and space and sensor technologies. The first stage envisions improving the effectiveness and scale of the existing strategic missile defense system in Alaska and California. For the more distant future, a plan is under discussion to deploy a constellation of thousands of satellites flying in 20 orbital planes some 300 to 600 kilometers up. These devices (weighing 40–80 kg) should be able to autonomously detect, track, select and intercept enemy ballistic missiles during boost and midcourse phases using artificial intelligence [35].

It is clear that not all the proposals will be implemented in practice for economic and technical reasons. This applies above all to the Golden Dome program. Much like SDI, this initiative immediately triggered a wave of criticism, including detailed technical objections, from the Western scientific community [36]. Trump’s grand project does not look realistic yet, but, as in the past, such a program could seriously complicate U.S. dialogue with Russia (and eventually with China) on nuclear arms control.

At the same time, it is noteworthy that the second Trump administration, unlike its Democratic predecessors, has attempted to facilitate peaceful settlement of conflict in Ukraine and abandoned the goal of inflicting “strategic defeat” on Russia. It is telling that, in contrast to his admiration for U.S. nuclear might during his first term, Trump, upon returning to the White House, told the public that too many nuclear weapons had been accumulated during the Cold War and that instead of building new ones, they should be decisively reduced. This is fundamentally correct, although over recent decades (excluding Trump’s first administration), a whole series of agreements on deep nuclear arms reductions has been concluded, a fact that the president appears not to have been briefed on. In any case, he declared, “We’d like to see denuclearization… And I will tell you that President Putin really liked the idea of cutting way back on nuclear… We had a good conversation with China. They would have been involved, and that would have been an unbelievable thing for the planet.” [37]

True, the term “denuclearization” has never been used in the context of Russian–American strategic arms negotiations. The new president appears to have borrowed it from his experience of diplomatic resolution of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue in 2019 (incidentally, completely unsuccessful). Later, Trump sought to clarify his position (at least in his own view) by invoking New START: “It’s a problem for the world. You know, we have restrictions, and they have restrictions, as you know, on nuclear… But that is a big problem for the world. When you take off nuclear restrictions, that’s a big problem for the world.” [38] Repeating endlessly that the future of New START is a “problem” does nothing to resolve the issue in the absence of even a basic grasp of the subject. Incidentally, the Treaty’s limitations are not “for them and for us” but are established uniformly for both sides, and their preservation or revision is a matter of cooperation between the two powers. However, abandoning these restrictions would create a major threat primarily for the two superpowers but also for the entire world, and Trump is certainly correct on this point.

Despite all the clumsiness of Trump’s off-the-cuff remarks on nuclear issues and the poor record of his first term, his current positive pathos sounds sincere and does not deserve a priori rejection. It cannot be ruled out that since his first time in office, Trump has reconsidered his views on nuclear weapons (as President Ronald Reagan did by the mid-1980s) and decided to leave a historical legacy as a champion of disarmament.

Without succumbing to the groundless optimism that initially gripped some Russian politicians, it would be reasonable to reintroduce this topic to the Russian–U.S. dialogue when the time is right in order to gauge the seriousness of the Republican administration’s new sentiment. After all, in this sphere Russia is the only country in the world capable of engaging the U.S. as peers, at least for the next several years (until China completes its strategic programs). Moreover, in interactions between the two superpowers, this represents a unique area in which Moscow can deal with Washington on an equal footing and link this engagement to other issues on the bilateral agenda to its own advantage. As recent years have shown, without this “supporting pillar,” other tracks of superpower relations lose momentum and orientation, undermining the stability of the entire international system. This practice was formalized half a century ago by Henry Kissinger through his tactic of “linkage.” The need for such an approach today is driven by the harsh reality of our time—a fifteen-year pause in arms limitation negotiations [39], the disruptive efforts of opponents of this agenda in the U.S. and elsewhere, unprecedented growth of international tensions and objective military-technical development—all this has pushed the nuclear arms control system to the brink of collapse. The NPT is beyond doubt the main component of this system, and its next Review Conference is scheduled for 2026. After two inconclusive conferences of this level (in 2015 and 2022), a new war in the Middle East and a third failed conference could deal a fatal blow to the NPT. Especially if the extended New START is allowed to expire in February of next year without any follow-on arrangement. And all the more so if pressure from vested interests leads to the resumption of live nuclear testing and denunciation of the relevant Treaty.

A Rescue Operation

Alexander Yermakov:
The Three-Body Problem

Just a few years ago, it seemed that the main task of nuclear arms control was concluding a successor treaty to New START. Without diminishing the importance of this goal in any way, it should be acknowledged that the current state of the entire arms limitation system implies thinking not so much about its development as about emergency rescue measures—at least for its basic elements.

This is why the Russian–U.S. strategic arms limitation framework is now important less as an end in itself than as a foundation for the non-proliferation and test ban Treaties. A second extension of New START is precluded by Article XIV, paragraph 2, which states: “If the Parties decide to extend this Treaty, it will be extended for a period of no more than five years…” [40] In theory, this paragraph could be amended (according to Article XV) to extend the agreement again, borrowing, for example, language from Article XVII of START I (1991): “This Treaty shall be extended for successive five-year periods, if the Parties so decide, in accordance with the procedures governing the initial extension.” [41]

This would be the best way out of the situation. Politically, however, this path is unlikely, even if the parliaments of both powers do not mount serious opposition (which after Trump’s return was the case for the U.S. Senate as well but began to change during 2025). Beyond the fact that New START’s expiration, as Trump noted, “is a big problem,” the Republican administration has shown little clarity in its position toward the Treaty negotiated and later extended by its Democratic predecessors (in 2010 and 2021, respectively). Moreover, pressure is growing in U.S. expert and political circles to abandon the agreement in order to restructure nuclear deterrence around simultaneous confrontation with two major adversaries, Russia and China [Edelman, Miller 2025]. Russian leadership has also expressed several strategic grievances against the Treaty, citing them as grounds for suspending participation in it in 2023 [42], and the Kremlin’s attitude toward extending New START remains unclear.

Reaching agreement on a successor treaty by February 5, 2026, is virtually impossible. Besides the complex international-political situation, the U.S.–Russia strategic stability consultations in the summer and fall of 2021 already revealed deep divisions that would require unprecedented efforts to find common ground [Arbatov 2022].

At best, there is hope that both countries may issue politically binding statements about their intention to observe key New START limitations until a new treaty is concluded. There is precedent for this: the U.S. and the Soviet Union pledged not to violate SALT II for a period of time [43], which was not ratified due to the Soviet military operation in Afghanistan. No less important would be a joint declaration of intent to adhere to CTBT and NPT provisions. Such measures would bolster the prospects for a successful 2026 NPT Review Conference, especially if the new Middle East war can give way to diplomatic efforts to resolve the problem. Engaging the remaining members of the P5 in strategic arms limitation should become a distinct track of strategic stability negotiations [Arbatov 2024] and simultaneously a means of strengthening the NPT.

Thus, urgent action is required to safeguard the main elements of the nuclear arms control system in order to buy time for strengthening its foundations and further adapting it to new international realities and military-technical trends. Needless to say, agreements on a ceasefire and peaceful settlement of the conflict in Ukraine would greatly facilitate these efforts.

* * *

The Trump administration’s policy accelerates the restructuring of world order that has been underway since the early 1990s: from prevailing bipolarity through unipolarity toward some form of multipolarity and potentially onward to regionalization or fragmentation of international relations. Whatever configuration ultimately prevails, and regardless of how allies and adversaries of the major powers may switch places, nuclear weapons will remain one of the central features of global politics, alongside peaceful atomic energy intertwined with dual-use nuclear technologies. Therefore, the emerging polycentric world will impose far greater demands on the nuclear arms control system than international relations of past years, when security problems were predominantly a matter between two superpowers. This does not mean that new non-nuclear weapons systems and various disruptive technologies can be ignored. However, it will become impossible to regulate them in the future if the entire nuclear security architecture built over the past six decades collapses—architecture that should serve as the foundation for any new framework of constraints. If today’s cumbersome treaty-based arms control structure, which many have grown weary of, disintegrates, it will not be replaced by some elegant and bright edifice, but only by nuclear chaos and ultimately the inevitable demise of the world as we know it, with all its problems and misfortunes.

Arbatov, A.G. (2025). Nuclear boomerang. There are neither eternal allies, nor perpetual enemies, but only nuclear arms

are eternal and perpetual. Polis. Political Studies, 5, 36-57. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2025.05.04

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1. “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow” [cited in: Vinogradov 2006: 182].

2. The starting point is the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which stipulates that the continent should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons or radioactive materials, as well as any nuclear explosions there.

3. There can be little doubt that in the wake of such erosion, the rest of the “dominoes” would fall as well—for example, the treaties prohibiting the placement of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, on the seabed and on the ocean floor, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and possibly even the conventions banning chemical and biological weapons.

4. There are three NPT parties that are not UN members—the Holy See, Palestine and Taiwan—and five UN member states remain outside the Treaty—Israel, India, North Korea, Pakistan, South Sudan. This is also a point of contention because many countries do not recognize North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state under the NPT, arguing that its 2003 withdrawal from the Treaty violated Article X, paragraph 1 (on the right of withdrawal). The paradox is that, under this interpretation, North Korea remains an NPT non-nuclear-weapon state, even though it is widely acknowledged to possess nuclear arms after six nuclear tests conducted between 2006 and 2017.

5. A total of seven such zones have been established, the first in Antarctica in 1959, nine years before the NPT was concluded.

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8. If the U.S. manages to bring China into the talks, Beijing will likely raise the issue of capping India’s nuclear forces, while New Delhi will push for Pakistan’s participation in limitation efforts. Yet both India and Pakistan stand outside the NPT and are not bound by Article VI.

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28. This company is American Machine & Foundry.

29. This company is Allis-Chalmers.

30. In Zulu, this means “end of story.”

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