Enemy.media: The Creation of Enemy Image in Russian-American Relations

An information campaign aimed at creating a negative image of one’s opponent is probably the only modus operandi in the ongoing standoff in Russia-US relations. A variety of methods of informational aggression is being used by both the American and the Russian political leadership.

An information campaign aimed at creating a negative image of one’s opponent is probably the only modus operandi in the ongoing standoff in Russia-US relations. A variety of methods of informational aggression is being used by both the American and the Russian political leadership.

Of course, agitation, propaganda and shaping public opinion are not innovations introduced by the current conflict. Such technologies and tools for exercising influence on populations have been in effect for a long time. In the 21st century, propaganda is currently being used at both the qualitative and quantitative levels and is taking advantage of existing information technologies available to almost half the world's population. The technological resources of the modern information space open up possibilities for exerting influence on every individual user on the Internet. Using Internet resources (social networks, news media and so on) to this end supplements such traditional mass media as television, radio and newspapers.

Russia on the American media scene

In 2014, during the exacerbation of the crisis in Ukraine, American congressmen discussed more than 40 different legislative initiatives that applied various forms for exerting pressure on Moscow in view of the events in Ukraine. Virtually every bill under discussion contained provisions on the use of information methods of influence. Public Law “United States International Programming to Ukraine and Neighboring Regions” [1] illustrates this perfectly well. The law was passed at a record speed and contains the following provisions:

• Emphasize investigative and analytical journalism to highlight inconsistencies and misinformation provided by Russian or pro-Russian media outlets;
• Increase the number of reporters and organizational presence in eastern Ukraine, especially in Crimea;
• Prioritize programming to areas where access to uncensored sources of information is limited or non-existent, especially populations serviced by Russian supported media outlets.

FLICKR / Damian Corrigan

The major US media distribution channels are state TV and radio channels. Under the United States International Broadcasting Act of 1994 [2], within the framework of the US Information Agency (USIA) the Broadcasting Board of Governers was established [3], of which the US Secretary of State is a member. The BBG includes dozens of television and radio stations broadcasting in 28 languages in almost all countries of the world. The Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and some others [4] are the most well-known of these.

The adoption of the legislative initiative was followed with very specific actions reflected in the budget request of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Thus, substantiating their budget request, the Broadcasting Board of Governors emphasized that the main focus for its activity in 2015 is related to "rebutting heightened Russian propaganda” disseminated by the Russia Today news agency [5].

Moreover, the Broadcasting Board of Governors asked the state to increase allocations by almost a quarter for Radio Europe broadcasting in Russian (up to 9 million dollars in 2015 from 7.3 million in 2014). The grounds for the increase include intensified propaganda activity among Russian-speaking population in the countries of the former Soviet Union (and Russia as well) with the extensive use of modern technologies of social networks and the Internet [6].

The fact that the BBG budget request for 2016 declares countering Russian informational influence across the post-Soviet space its priority for foreign policy spending [7], gives rise to profound concern. On April 15, 2015, the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing on the issue of confronting Russia’s informational influence, calling the Kremlin's policy in the information area a “weaponization of information.” [8] Moreover, the experts and members of Congress who participated in the hearing repeatedly emphasized that Russian propaganda was the main destabilizing factor in the region.

russia-direct.org
Cartoon by Khalil Rahman

The wording used by official Washington can actually be regarded as a “declaration of information warfare.” [9]

The anti-Russian rhetoric is obviously being made an aspect of the presidential campaign. Over the past six years of the Obama administration, the Republican opposition has repeatedly criticized the president for being too soft on Russia. In the upcoming presidential race in the US, Russophobe slogans are likely to become part of election campaigns of both Democratic and Republican candidates.

Russian information policy

The peculiarities of the domestic media market allow the Russian leadership to use the extensive resources of state media to fight back. According to RosBusinessConsulting, the 2015 budget of Russia Today, which is the Russian counterpart of the US Broadcasting Board of Governors, has been almost doubled [10]. Public funding for other broadcasters and news agencies has also been significantly increased amidst the ongoing economic crisis and budget cuts.

In the Russian tradition, the publishing of the substantiation for the budget request is not practiced, but judging by the rhetoric of journalists covering the current developments, the activities of Russian state media are focused primarily on providing high ratings of the current administration among the Russian population. In addition, coverage of international events by state media creates a negative image of the West in the minds of Russians. The latest version of the Russian military doctrine sets out “to create conditions for reducing the risk of the use of information and communication technologies for military-political goals related to actions against sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity.” [11]

Figure 1. State media that have increased public funding in 2015 (in billions of rubles)

Source: Budget for 2014 and draft budget for 2015

Russian authorities are taking other measures as well to counter the information challenges facing national security. As a result, legislative activity particularly intensified in 2014.

A number of legislative initiatives related to the information policy of Russia sparked a massive public outcry. Firstly, the stiffening of the Law on Mass Media [12] dealt a blow to foreign TV channels broadcasting on the territory of Russia. Therefore, due to the tightened regulation that the foreign capital share of a media outlet operating in Russia should not exceed 20 percent, the CNN television channel notified that it was stopping broadcasting on the territory of Russia [13]. In March 2015, Roskomnadzor (the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media) announced [14] the issuance of a license to CNN; however, it appears that broadcasting will resume only when numerous bureaucratic procedures are completed.

time.com

Using an analogy to the Cold War, we have to admit that in the information sphere, Russia is drawing a “Digital Iron Curtain.”

Secondly, a new version of the Federal Law on Information, Information Technologies and Information Protection that came into force in Russia on February 1, 2014, allows Roskomnadzor to block access to sites at the instance of the General Prosecutor's Office without going to court [15]. As a result of this legislative norm, certain opposition sites were closed, and in addition, the popular social networks Facebook and Vkontakte were forced to comply with dictates by blocking pages that contained information about the political activities of the Russian opposition [16].

Thirdly, the Federal Law “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation for the Clarification of the Procedure of Personal Data Processing in Information and Telecommunication Networks”, adopted in summer 2014 raises serious concerns as well [17]. The law has significantly complicated the activities of foreign companies operating in the field of information and telecommunication technologies, obliging them to provide storage and processing of data on Russian citizens on the territory of Russia [18].

One way or another, all of these and other measures are putting Russia in information isolation. Using an analogy to the Cold War, we have to admit that in the information sphere, Russia is drawing a “Digital Iron Curtain.” However, in the modern world of the Internet era, the use of resources of the global information space is vital for national security, and informational isolation may adversely affect the latter.

Informational isolation offers Russia’s adversaries more scope for information aggression. The United States of America appears to be the most dangerous opponent in this respect due to its possessing, perhaps, the most considerable potential for soft power in the world, which includes information leverage among other things.

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The information policy concerning creating the enemy image has almost instantly brought quite expected and natural results. Thus, according to opinion polls, the unfavorable opinion of Russia has surged in the United States in 2014: 70-78 percent of surveyed Americans speak negatively about Russia [19], and 49 percent of Americans see Russia as a “critical threat to the vital interests of the United States.” Russia is perceived as “the United States’ greatest enemy,” leaving behind North Korea, Iran and China [20]. However, the question formulations used by the authors of the survey do not suggest that President Putin personifies the enemy.

The American press, which has an impact on the public opinion not only in the United States, but in other countries as well, helps create the image of the enemy. And this enemy is personified in the person of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. Henry Kissinger, for example, argues that “for the West, the demonization of Vladimir Putin is not a policy; it is an alibi for the absence of one.” [21]

Similar trends in the public opinion are observed in Russia. According to surveys by the Levada Center, negative attitudes towards the United States reached historic highs in January 2015: 81 percent versus 46 percent in January 2014 [22]. 79 percent of respondents believe that the West seeks to suppress and weaken Russia [23]. At the same time, 47 percent are concerned about the impact of Western economic sanctions, 69 percent believe that Russia should not change its political course, despite the sanctions. However, only 30 percent want to weaken ties with the West, while 57 percent support the cooperation with the countries of the West [24].

Russian political experts express doubt that the wave of Jingoism will be able to support the policies of President Vladimir Putin for a long time. Nikolai Svanidze argues that a high level of support for the president is the basis of political stability in Russia, and should Russia's position on the crisis in Ukraine soften, “the rating will inevitably begin to decline.” [25] However, many experts agree that the strengthening of patriotic feelings is largely due to “anti-American, anti-Western, anti-Ukrainian sentiments,” [26] which, in turn, cannot serve as the foundation of the national idea.

The creation of the enemy image in the information space is an objective trend in present-day Russian-American relations. However, the negative consequences of such information policy may be felt for a long time, regardless of the current political controversy.

1. An Act «United States International Programming to Ukraine and Neighboring Regions”. 04/03/2014 Became Public Law No: 113-96 https://www.congress.gov/113/plaws/publ96/PLAW-113publ96.pdf

2. US International Broadcasting Act http://www.bbg.gov/wp-content/media/2012/01/BroadcastingAct.pdf

3. http://www.bbg.gov/about-the-agency/

4. U.S. International Broadcasting: Background and Issues for Reform. Matthew C. Weed. Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation. May 2, 2014. Congressional Research Service. R43521

5. The Broadcasting Board of Governors FY 2015 Budget Request. P. 6. http://www.bbg.gov/wp-content/media/2014/03/FY-2015-BBG-Congressional-Budget-Request-FINAL-21-March-2014.pdf

6. Ibid. P. 21

7. Fiscal year 2016. Congressional Budget Request. Broadcasting Board of Governors. P. 6 http://www.bbg.gov/wp-content/media/2015/03/FY2016Budget_CBJ_Final_WebVersion.pdf

8. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs Hearing: Confronting Russia’s Weaponization of Information 15 April 2015. http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/hearing-confronting-russia-s-weaponization-information

9. The term “information warfare” has nothing to do with the concept of war as adopted in international law. The mutual creation of the “enemy image” by means of the information space is an objective trend, and can rather be described by the term “information aggression” or “information attack.”

10. In 2015, Russia Today TV channel will receive 41% more subsidies [in Russian] http://top.rbc.ru/politics/23/09/2014/950629.shtml

11. Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on December 26, 2014 [in Russian]

12. The President signed the Federal Law "On Amendments to the Federal Law on mass media” [in Russian] http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/46796

13. E.Bryzgalova, K. Boletskaya, CNN stops broadcasting in Russia, The Vedomosti newspaper, November 10, 2014 http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/46796 [in Russian]

14. Roskomnadzor issued a new certificate of mass media registration to CNN. Interfax, February 26, 2015 http://www.interfax.ru/russia/426553 [in Russian]

15. Federal Law of the Russian Federation N 398-FZ of December 28, 2013 http://www.rg.ru/2013/12/30/extrem-site-dok.html [in Russian]

16. http://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/5495b98a9a7947bb5e5f3e5a

17. Vladimir Putin signed the Federal Law "On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation for the Clarification of the Procedure of Personal Data Processing in Information and Telecommunication Networks” http://kremlin.ru/acts/46291 [in Russian]

18. E.Chernenko, Data on citizens is registered in Russia. Kommersant, October 2, 2014 http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2580152 [in Russian]

19. CNN poll: Favorable views of Russia drop following Malaysian airliner crash. July 21st, 2014. http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2014/07/21/cnn-poll-favorable-views-of-russia-drop-following-malaysian-airliner-crash/

20. Americans See China's Economic Power as Diminished Threat. February 26, 2015 Gallup. http://www.gallup.com/poll/181733/americans-china-economic-power-diminished-threat.aspx?utm_source=critical%20threat%20to%20vital%20interests%20to%20the%20United%20S&utm_medium=search&utm_campaign=tiles

21. Henry Kissinger: To settle the Ukraine crisis, start at the end. Washington Post. 5 March 2014 http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html

22. International relations. Levada Center, February 9, 2015 http://www.levada.ru/09-02-2015/mezhdunarodnye-otnosheniya [in Russian]

23. Russia’s foreign policy enemies and partners. Levada Center, October 21, 2014. http://www.levada.ru/21-10-2014/vneshnepoliticheskie-vragi-i-partnery-rossii [in Russian]

24. Sanctions of the West: consequences and reaction. Levada Center, February 3, 2015 http://www.levada.ru/21-10-2014/vneshnepoliticheskie-vragi-i-partnery-rossii [in Russian]

25. Minority report: Nikolai Svanidze, Echo of Moscow Radio, February 6, 2015 http://echo.msk.ru/programs/personalno/1487674-echo/ [in Russian]

26. A. Kortunov, Seven Steps beyond the Horizon of the Crisis, Russian International Affairs Council, February 4, 2015 /en/inner/?id_4=5191#top