Brothers Forever: Russian–Serbian Economic Partnership Amid Geopolitical Turbulence

Russian–Serbian economic relations, despite their long history and strategic importance for both countries, have faced new challenges in recent years as a result of tensions in international politics. The visit of Russian and Serbian presidents to Beijing in September 2025 became a milestone that highlighted the countries’ determination to strengthen bilateral cooperation in a time of global transformation.

Energy has been and will remain the backbone of bilateral relations, at least on the economic front. Russia has historically ensured Serbia’s energy security through gas and oil supplies as well as investments in key fuel industry assets. This dependency is structurally unavoidable in the medium term. Serbia is geographically and infrastructurally integrated into the southern branch of the gas pipeline network, and diversification toward alternative sources would require billions in investment and decades of work. Belgrade’s main challenge now is balancing its policy of military and strategic neutrality as well as economic pragmatism in relations with Russia and its path toward EU integration. Close economic cooperation with Moscow is likely to continue and may even expand in some areas, but Belgrade’s public rhetoric is growing more cautious. To avoid external pressure, the focus is shifting away from political statements toward technicalities such as discounts and settlement arrangements. Sanctions on NIS, in which Gazprom Neft owns a 51% stake, are a textbook example of the extraterritorial application of restrictive measures. Their effectiveness, however, is far from absolute: NIS will continue operating, adapting to new conditions, because the Serbian economy remains heavily reliant on Russian assets and supplies.

Belgrade will keep up its multi-vector course, carefully weighing the costs and benefits of working with Moscow each time. This “fence-sitting” will continue as long as it remains feasible and beneficial for Serbia and its energy security. Western pressure is a defining but not decisive factor: it will not push Serbia in a complete U-turn anytime soon, but it will keep constraining the scope of Russia–Serbia economic ties. Future standoffs will probably concern upcoming digital and infrastructure projects rather than the existing NIS assets. China, for its part, could emerge as a third pole for Serbia through its Belt and Road Initiative, helping diversify economic risks and partially offset Western pressure. The meeting in Beijing symbolically underscores the growing multipolarity of today's economic processes.

Russian–Serbian economic relations, despite their long history and strategic importance for both countries, have faced new challenges in recent years as a result of tensions in international politics. The visit of Russian and Serbian presidents to Beijing in September 2025 became a milestone that highlighted the countries’ determination to strengthen bilateral cooperation in a time of global transformation.

Behind closed doors: diplomatic protocol or a friendly conversation?

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The meeting between Vladimir Putin and Aleksandar Vucic in Beijing proved to be far more significant than was initially expected from a formal diplomatic encounter. The fact that their conversation lasted for over an hour suggests that the leaders chose to have an extensive exchange of views rather than make routine remarks. For Russia, it was important to draw attention to advancing energy cooperation. As expected, the Serbian president stated his country’s interest in maintaining the preferential terms for gas supplies. Aleksandar Vucic had previously noted that natural gas from Russia meets more than 80% of Serbian demand and that, despite Belgrade’s efforts to diversify supplies, this reliance will persist for at least the next few years. Natural gas is the resource on which the Balkan country’s economic stability this winter most directly depends.

Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic said he had proposed three key provisions for new gas supply agreements during talks with Vladimir Putin: greater flexibility in adjusting volumes, affordable pricing and increased deliveries from Russia. Vucic described these parameters as critical to preserving Serbia's energy stability.

Under the existing contract, which expires on September 30, Serbia imports 6 million cubic meters of natural gas daily at 290 euros per 1,000 cubic meters. Back in May, the head of the state gas company Srbijagas, Dusan Bajatovic, said that the countries were negotiating a long-term deal with a duration of three to 10 years that would boost annual deliveries to 2.5 billion cubic meters.

Naturally, the discussions in Beijing were not confined to matters of energy security and potential contracts. The Kremlin reported that the presidents addressed the development of humanitarian ties and promotion of cultural and economic initiatives. President Vucic reiterated Serbia’s commitment to its principled stance, independence and military neutrality. Serbia's status as Europe's only holdout on Russian sanctions illustrates that Belgrade’s decisions are driven by national interests rather than external pressure.

So the meeting in Beijing went beyond diplomatic protocol and became a venue for substantive dialogue. Aleksandar Vucic expressed gratitude for support while making clear that Serbia expects specific proposals on gas supplies and energy cooperation. Vladimir Putin, for his part, sought to show that Moscow respects Serbia’s independent stance and sees Belgrade as an autonomous actor with whom it can discuss not only economic matters but also broader European and global political issues.

In this sense, the meeting’s atmosphere spoke for itself: beneath the external formalities lay a lively dialogue between two leaders who actually understood each other’s expectations. Serbia is seeking to ensure energy security in a volatile international environment, while Russia is looking to keep in its sphere of influence an ally with weight in the Balkans. Declarations about traditionally fraternal and close Russia–Serbia relations effectively mask a lot of pragmatism; it is precisely this pragmatism that underpins the real value of bilateral relations between Moscow and Belgrade today.

Pressure and threats: Serbia’s defense of its energy sector

The complex situation surrounding Serbian energy company NIS remains in the global media spotlight. The U.S. Department of the Treasury has for the sixth time postponed sanctions on the firm, this time until the end of September. Washington’s concerns center on its ownership structure: Russian companies Gazprom Neft and Gazprom together hold a majority stake, while the government owns less than 30%. Belgrade is understandably uneasy with these developments. Serbian Energy Minister Dubravka Djedovic Handanovic assured citizens that NIS would maintain uninterrupted fuel supplies, stressing that the country did not deserve such measures, whose motivations should be traced to the broader confrontation between Russia and the West.

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Russian investments in NIS have delivered tangible benefits to Serbia and become a pillar of its energy sector. Now Belgrade is at a crossroads: look for a way to buy out the Russian stake or push for further waivers from sanctions. The company remains the dominant player in Serbia’s fuel market, so every move by Washington is perceived as a threat to energy stability.

Through statements and threats, the United States has been patiently pressing Belgrade to cut ties with Russian capital, turning an economic matter into a tool of political pressure. However, Serbia is trying to tread carefully: it cares more about keeping the system stable than making bold moves, since public welfare and economic stability depend on this. These dynamics reflect the complexity of Serbia’s position, as it has to maneuver between global power centers while handling the utterly pragmatic task of ensuring uninterrupted operation of an energy system that is vulnerable and sensitive to any shocks.

The West keeps looking for ways to put pressure on Belgrade, but the effectiveness of these instruments remains questionable. The risk of U.S. sanctions against NIS has emerged as the main signal of dissatisfaction with Serbia’s ties to Russia, but their implementation has already been delayed six times. Washington is holding back, aware that fuel supply disruptions and an energy crisis could trigger instability in the Balkans. The European Union, for its part, says that Serbia–Russia relations cannot continue as before. Belgrade is expected to make specific statements, not send ambiguous signals. Brussels believes Serbia should reaffirm its strategic commitment to the European path and prove in practice its readiness to embrace EU values in politics, the economy and culture. Yet the presence of alternative partners, namely Russia and China, gives Belgrade enough confidence for balancing between centers of power.

Beyond gas: other areas of bilateral economic cooperation

Despite Western efforts to impede closer economic cooperation between Russia and Serbia, bilateral trade grew by more than 8% in the first quarter of 2025, which indicates the resilience of their economic ties amid global instability. Russia’s exports are dominated by minerals, chemicals and food products, while Serbia’s main exports to Russia include agricultural goods, textiles and industrial equipment.

At the 2025 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, the countries discussed strategic areas of cooperation, including tourism, infrastructure projects and innovation. Agreement was reached on a program to boost tourist flows in 2025–2026. Last year, the number of Serbian tourists visiting Russia rose by nearly 11%, while Russian tourist arrivals in Serbia jumped 24%. The program includes measures to simplify payments and jointly promote the tourism potential of both nations. Discussions also touched on the possible rollout of Russia’s Mir payment system in Serbia. Prime Minister Djuro Macut said that Belgrade would consider this proposal, but the final say rests with Serbian financial institutions. Joint infrastructure projects, such as the modernization of the Valjevo–Vrbnica railway line, also received special attention. Initiatives like these reflect Belgrade and Moscow’s drive to develop multifaceted cooperation, grounded in their economic interests and diversification of partnerships, which is particularly relevant amid external pressure and Western sanctions.

Future prospects and multipolarity

The Prospects for Russian-Serbian Relations Amid Sanctions. RIAC Working Paper

Energy has been and will remain the backbone of bilateral relations, at least on the economic front. Russia has historically ensured Serbia’s energy security through gas and oil supplies as well as investments in key fuel industry assets. This dependency is structurally unavoidable in the medium term. Serbia is geographically and infrastructurally integrated into the southern branch of the gas pipeline network, and diversification toward alternative sources would require billions in investment and decades of work. Belgrade’s main challenge now is balancing its policy of military and strategic neutrality as well as economic pragmatism in relations with Russia and its path toward EU integration. Close economic cooperation with Moscow is likely to continue and may even expand in some areas, but Belgrade’s public rhetoric is growing more cautious. To avoid external pressure, the focus is shifting away from political statements toward technicalities such as discounts and settlement arrangements. Sanctions on NIS, in which Gazprom Neft owns a 51% stake, are a textbook example of the extraterritorial application of restrictive measures. Their effectiveness, however, is far from absolute: NIS will continue operating, adapting to new conditions, because the Serbian economy remains heavily reliant on Russian assets and supplies.

Belgrade will keep up its multi-vector course, carefully weighing the costs and benefits of working with Moscow each time. This “fence-sitting” will continue as long as it remains feasible and beneficial for Serbia and its energy security. Western pressure is a defining but not decisive factor: it will not push Serbia in a complete U-turn anytime soon, but it will keep constraining the scope of Russia–Serbia economic ties. Future standoffs will probably concern upcoming digital and infrastructure projects rather than the existing NIS assets. China, for its part, could emerge as a third pole for Serbia through its Belt and Road Initiative, helping diversify economic risks and partially offset Western pressure. The meeting in Beijing symbolically underscores the growing multipolarity of today's economic processes.