“Light of the World” No More. China and Russia Should Help Restore Multipolarity in the Middle East
China’s foreign minister Wang Yi poses for a group picture with members of the Palestinian factions during the signing of the ‘Beijing declaration’ at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing
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Research Manager of Public Affairs, International Cooperation Department, Grandview Institution, China
Hamas’ incursion into Israel last October inflicted casualties never seen before in Israeli history, prompting an Israeli response which indiscriminately targeted militants and civilians. Aside from reopening a 76-year-old wound, causing it to ooze with pus and blood, the resurgence of conflict in the Gaza Strip has once again cast light on the hypocrisy of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. In contrast to the meager humanitarian aid delivered to Gaza, and President Joe Biden’s glib claim that “the United States remains committed to the Palestinian people’s right to dignity and to self-determination,” Washington has pledged “ironclad” support for Israel, ammunition worth millions of dollars, vetoed three UN resolutions at the UN Security Council and sent two aircraft carrier strike groups to the Eastern Mediterranean..
The staunchly pro-Israel stance of the U.S. sparked outrage among Muslim countries, as it left them powerless to stop the humanitarian disaster in Gaza unfolding before them. These countries are no strangers to American betrayal. Over the past couple of decades, they have witnessed Washington use false accusation as casus belli to attack Iraq, leave their Kurdish allies at the Turks’ mercy and abandon Afghanistan to the Taliban after occupying the country for over two decades under the pretense of promoting liberal democracy. To these countries, Washington is not the “city upon a hill” and the U.S. is not the “light of the world”. Perhaps Pax Americana has brought peace and prosperity to the rest of the world, yet it has only seen the Middle East consistently set ablaze.
China’s vision for the Middle East rests on two pillars: self-determination and mutually beneficial win-win cooperation. Western media tend to portray China and the U.S. as engaging in a “New Cold War”. Yet again, China and the U.S. are not in the same weight division; the U.S. outclasses China in almost every category. China has benefited immensely from globalization and cannot return to being a hermit kingdom once again. The only way China could survive the American containment is to restore multipolarity in the world.
In the context of the Middle East, China believes that the main reason why it is caught in a ceaseless cycle of conflict is because external powers are interfering and attempting to shape the region in its own image. The Middle East’s fate should only be determined by its population. The Middle East and its countries are neither chessboard nor pawns to great powers. The only way for Middle Eastern countries to become masters of their own destiny is to “stop fighting tribe against tribe”, put aside their differences and pursue mutually beneficial win-win cooperation.
Being the only powers in the world capable of challenging U.S. hegemony in the region, China and Russia offer an attractive alternative to Middle Eastern countries: one which does not leave them in a dilemma of having to choose between sacrificing their prosperity or security.
Increased Chinese and Russian footprint in the region means the U.S. can no longer expect Middle Eastern countries to obey its orders without question and has to actually expend resources to win them over.
However, this does not mean China and Russia should seek to oust the U.S. from the Middle East. On the contrary, Beijing and Moscow should welcome Washington to stay and other powers to come, provided they respect the autonomy of Middle Eastern countries and contribute to the overall stability of the region. Chinese and Russian role in the Middle East should be limited to settling disputes diplomatically, providing economic and military assistance so that countries can defend against threats themselves, and only coming in to prevent countries from collapsing when invited.
Competition does not have to be a zero-sum game, it could take the form of benign competition where every party involved benefits, and there is no clear winner or loser, with Beijing and Washington competing to normalize diplomatic relations between countries in the Middle East as one such example.
With the impact of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict felt across the world and the possibility that the hostilities escalate into a regional war looming on the horizon, it is more pressing than ever for the West to realize that Middle Easterners are not exotic, backward and weak, but capable of having agency; and for the international community to come together to restore multipolarity in the Middle East by returning the Middle East to the Middle Easterners.
Hamas’ incursion into Israel last October inflicted casualties never seen before in Israeli history, prompting an Israeli response which indiscriminately targeted militants and civilians. Aside from reopening a 76-year-old wound, causing it to ooze with pus and blood, the resurgence of conflict in the Gaza Strip has once again cast light on the hypocrisy of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. In contrast to the meager humanitarian aid delivered to Gaza, and President Joe Biden’s glib claim that “the United States remains committed to the Palestinian people’s right to dignity and to self-determination,” Washington has pledged “ironclad” support for Israel, ammunition worth millions of dollars, vetoed three UN resolutions at the UN Security Council and sent two aircraft carrier strike groups to the Eastern Mediterranean.
The staunchly pro-Israel stance of the U.S. sparked outrage among Muslim countries, as it left them powerless to stop the humanitarian disaster in Gaza unfolding before them. These countries are no strangers to American betrayal. Over the past couple of decades, they have witnessed Washington use false accusation as casus belli to attack Iraq, leave their Kurdish allies at the Turks’ mercy and abandon Afghanistan to the Taliban after occupying the country for over two decades under the pretense of promoting liberal democracy. To these countries, Washington is not the “city upon a hill” and the U.S. is not the “light of the world”. Perhaps Pax Americana has brought peace and prosperity to the rest of the world, yet it has only seen the Middle East consistently set ablaze.
Regional powers such as Saudi Arabia continue to strike Faustian bargain with the U.S., as it is the only country in the world both capable and willing to guarantee the continued survival of the government. However, a “wind of change” is blowing across the region, and we are currently in the calm before the storm. A global revolt is underway, helmed by the proponents of a multipolar world order against the unipolar world order led by the U.S. and its Western allies.
Following the October 7 attack, U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken visited Saudi Arabia in an attempt to convince the Saudis to embrace the U.S. view of the conflict. Once in Riyadh, Blinken was left waiting several hours for a meeting presumed to happen in the evening with the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, before he was informed that there had been an impromptu change in schedule. It was no accident, but a deliberate act of defiance and a protest against American foreign policy in the region.
It is not the first time that the top U.S. diplomat has been affronted by the Saudi crown prince. When Blinken met with him in Jeddah last June, the U.S. flag was conveniently absent at the reception. There is no mistake, Mohammed bin Salman is sending a signal to Washington that Saudi Arabia is tired of being marginalized and denied representation, as well as of American exceptionalism, a sentiment shared by other countries in the region.
“The Straw that Broke the Camel’s Back”
China in the Mashriq: New Best Friend
While countries of the Middle East resent American betrayal, they at least understand it as realpolitik, as the U.S. prioritizing its own national interests and as the America First policy in practice. What they cannot tolerate is Western hypocrisy. In this instance, there is not one “straw that broke the camel’s back”. What incited countries in the Middle East to collectively mutiny against the U.S.-dominated international discourse is a series of false narratives.
First, the West claims that human rights are universal and often criticizes the monarchies, theocracies and stratocracies in the Middle East for human rights violations. Yet there was a marked discrepancy between the way the EU treated refugees from Syria and Ukraine, with the former being denied entry to numerous EU member states, for no other reason than the fact that Syrians are overwhelmingly Muslim and Ukrainians are overwhelmingly Christian.
Second, the West often paints the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and the great power competition between China and the U.S. with Manichean terms, as a battle between “democracies” and “autocracies”. On this basis, the West argues that countries in the Middle East should support the West by standing on the “right side of history”, namely by sanctioning Russia for the military stand-off with Ukraine and China for the “internment camps” in Xinjiang.
Yet it ignores the fact that most countries in the Middle East do not fit the Western definition of democracies, which is evident after the U.S. did not invite any Muslim countries of the Middle East—apart from Iraq—to the two Summits for Democracy it hosted. Similarly, the West ignores the fact that the word “democracy” has been tainted by the Arab Spring when cries for it were exploited by extremists, separatists and ambitious warlords, and Arab Spring became “Arab Winter”.
China the Mediator
When President Barack Obama announced the U.S. would “pivot to Asia” in 2012 and began to reallocate resources and divert American attention away from the Middle East to counter a resurgent China in East Asia, nobody in Washington could have expected that the U.S. would be returning to the Middle East soon, albeit this time to vie for influence with China. Yet this is precisely what happened last March when China successfully mediated the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
The importance of this achievement cannot be understated. Years of geopolitical rivalry exacerbated by sectarian differences saw millions of lives lost to the Saudi–Iranian proxy war. The rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran was hailed as a major diplomatic victory for China by the international community. The Abraham Accords—the U.S.’ own attempt at promoting peace and stability in the region—pales in comparison.
Although the U.S. successfully brokered the normalization of ties between Israel and four Arab countries, this will not last as long as the U.S. continues to ignore the elephant in the room and the plight of the Palestinians. Hostilities will resume periodically between Palestine and Israel, which means that permanent peace in the region remains impossible.
While the U.S. was initially supportive of Israel, there is a growing rift between the Biden administration and Israel. Afraid of losing his grip on power, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hopes that adopting an aggressive stance and prolonging the war will allow him to harness the rally around the flag effect to its full potential.
Netanyahu’s decision has resulted in the unfolding of a humanitarian disaster with no end in sight. With the election fast approaching and the American public divided over U.S. support of Israel, Biden desperately needs the conflict in Gaza to end before it costs the Democrats the election. Yet due to the Israel lobby’s influence on American foreign policy, U.S. pressure on Israel to agree to a ceasefire and commit to a two-state solution has been minimal.
The U.S. has been claiming for months that Saudi Arabia and Israel are on the verge of normalizing relations. Nothing could be further from the truth. Saudi Arabia demands an end to Israeli occupation and the recognition of a Palestinian state as the precondition of Saudi–Israeli normalization. Yet Israel remains unwilling to commit to a two-state solution, even if only nominally.
China’s success and U.S. failure can be explained by the following reasons:
First, China is impartial, and the U.S. is not. Non-interference had been China’s modus operandi since 1954. Middle Eastern countries are more willing to be persuaded by a country to sit at the negotiating table if said country is not meddling in its domestic affairs or funding its rivals.
Second, China has no military ambition in the region. In contrast to the U.S. aircraft carrier roaming the Persian Gulf, defending its “backyard” against competitors, Chinese military presence in the Middle East is limited. Although China is heavily reliant on the Middle East for crude oil and natural gas, as long as the first and second island chains remain intact, Chinese ability to project its military power outside of its immediate vicinity remains limited, and the Middle East continues to be of lesser importance compared to Taiwan or the South China Sea. Unable and unwilling to challenge U.S. military dominance in the region, China is content with countries in the region being neutral.
Nations in the Middle East have no desire to take sides in the great power competition between China and the U.S. because they are preoccupied with problems of their own, because non-alignment is the most effective way to advance their own national interests and because they have no desire to topple American hegemony only for it to be replaced by that of China. There is no guarantee that he who fights too long against dragons will not become a dragon himself.
China’s vision for the Middle East rests on two pillars: self-determination and mutually beneficial win-win cooperation. Western media tend to portray China and the U.S. as engaging in a “New Cold War”. Yet again, China and the U.S. are not in the same weight division; the U.S. outclasses China in almost every category. China has benefited immensely from globalization and cannot return to being a hermit kingdom once again. The only way China could survive the American containment is to restore multipolarity in the world.
In the context of the Middle East, China believes that the main reason why it is caught in a ceaseless cycle of conflict is because external powers are interfering and attempting to shape the region in its own image. The Middle East’s fate should only be determined by its population. The Middle East and its countries are neither chessboard nor pawns to great powers. The only way for Middle Eastern countries to become masters of their own destiny is to “stop fighting tribe against tribe”, put aside their differences and pursue mutually beneficial win-win cooperation.
Toward a Multipolar World Order
China in the Gulf: Tried Its Best, You Know the Rest
Beijing’s non-interference policy means that it is unwilling to engage in military intervention—unless the UN has authorized it to do so—or sign defense pacts with other countries. While many Middle Eastern countries surely appreciate Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi saying “the Middle East belongs to the people of the Middle East,” the reality is that many nations in the region are plagued by a myriad of external and domestic security threats. External security threats range from Israel to Iran depending on the country in question. Domestic security threats include terrorism, extremism, sectarian violence, separatism, tribal feuds and popular uprising. Believing rightly that their own military is incapable of deterring these threats from challenging their rule, the leaders of these countries oftentimes resort to signing defense agreements with foreign nations.
China’s unwillingness to engage in military intervention or sign defense pacts leaves not only Middle Eastern countries, but nations across the world in an awkward situation. A report published by the U.S. National Intelligence Council in 2012 predicted many countries in the world are becoming increasingly economically dependent on China and militarily dependent on the U.S, a trend which is likely to continue in the future
Ever since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the U.S. has been the main distributor of global wealth. Although this arrangement capped the autonomy of Middle Eastern countries, it has been deemed to be relatively satisfactory until recently. As the U.S. is struggling to contain a resurgent China, it has been piling pressure on Middle Eastern countries to join the American camp against China. This leaves countries of the Middle East faced with a difficult dilemma of having to decide between prosperity and security.
Recently, Washington has been claiming that it is about to reach a defense pact with Riyadh. According to anonymous sources in both the Gulf and the U.S., the latter guarantees to defend Saudi Arabia, unlock access to more advanced American weapons and help the country develop its civilian nuclear program in exchange for Riyadh ceasing its military and economic cooperation with Beijing.
Since the Saudi defense minister visited China as recently as June 25, it is highly unlikely for Riyadh and the Washington to reach an agreement, at least not on the reported terms. Saudi Arabia knows too well that adopting a multifaceted approach to foreign policy is the only way to survive in an increasingly complicated international arena.
Fortunately, Moscow does not share Beijing’s unwillingness to engage in military intervention or sign defense pacts, evident when Moscow joined the Syrian civil war at the request of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Furthermore, Chinese and Russian interests converge in the Middle East, with both countries in agreement that decades of American unipolar primacy have proven that the concept of hegemonic stability does not work. There needs to be democracy in international relations and a platform where voices of countries are heard regardless of their size or strength.
Being the only powers in the world capable of challenging U.S. hegemony in the region, China and Russia offer an attractive alternative to Middle Eastern countries: one which does not leave them in a dilemma of having to choose between sacrificing their prosperity or security.
Increased Chinese and Russian footprint in the region means the U.S. can no longer expect Middle Eastern countries to obey its orders without question and has to actually expend resources to win them over. Averse to getting caught between the U.S. and Iran after Washington assassinated Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Major General Qasem Soleimani in Iraq, Baghdad voted to expel American troops from the country. Washington ignored the move, while then-U.S. President Donald Trump even responded with threats of sanctions.
To this day, there are still 2,500 U.S. troops stationed in Iraq. This would not have happened with China and Russia actively acting as a counterweight in the region. On the one hand, Chinese economic prowess and Russian success in combating terrorism and quelling rebellion in Syria would have made U.S. threat of sanctions toothless and silenced anyone in Iraq opposed to expelling American troops. On the other hand, given the Chinese and Russian presence to check and balance the U.S. monopoly on power, Washington would no longer have free rein in the Middle East and would have had to think twice about conducting assassinations in a third country, let alone have the audacity to threaten said third country afterwards.
However, this does not mean China and Russia should seek to oust the U.S. from the Middle East. On the contrary, Beijing and Moscow should welcome Washington to stay and other powers to come, provided they respect the autonomy of Middle Eastern countries and contribute to the overall stability of the region. Chinese and Russian role in the Middle East should be limited to settling disputes diplomatically, providing economic and military assistance so that countries can defend against threats themselves, and only coming in to prevent countries from collapsing when invited.
Competition does not have to be a zero-sum game, it could take the form of benign competition where every party involved benefits, and there is no clear winner or loser, with Beijing and Washington competing to normalize diplomatic relations between countries in the Middle East as one such example.
The Inevitability of Sino–Russian Cooperation in the Middle East
Russia is China’s ideal partner in the Middle East for three reasons:
First, long gone is the heyday of the Soviet Union, and while the Russian military remains respected, with the country’s economy feeling the weight of Western sanctions, Moscow can only support a limited number of external activities, most of which are in Russia’s immediate vicinity.
Currently, Moscow does not have any ambition or the capability to build a sphere of influence in the Middle East, and it is content with leaving Middle Eastern countries to their own devices—provided they are stable—and happy to help rid them of the “American yoke.” Moscow is more concerned with maintaining its great power status, which means being relevant in Middle Eastern affairs and having its voice heard. Russian military presence in Syria is no exception, and Russia does not move to stop Israel or Turkey from attacking Syrian government forces. Russian objective in Syria is to counter the spread of terrorism and prevent Syria from becoming a failed state, not to defend Syria from external threats which cannot topple the government.
Second, Russia is on good terms with every Middle Eastern country and many non-state actors, especially the three countries crucial to resolving the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Trust is a valuable resource to would-be mediators, and once lost, is difficult to replace.
Although Russian–Iranian relations are marked by historical grievances, from the Russian Empire carving up Persia and vying for spheres of influence with Great Britain during the Great Game, to the Soviet Union supporting Iran’s adversary in the Iran–Iraq War, Moscow and Tehran were able to mostly compartmentalize their differences.
Russia proposed its own collective security architecture for the Persian Gulf in 2019, which called for a multi-format dialogue between regional rivals and the establishment of an “Organization for Security and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf,” an attempt to replicate the 1991 Madrid Conference, which saw the Soviet Union and the U.S. successfully persuade Israel and hostile Arab countries to sit together at the negotiating table.
The initiative was welcomed by Tehran, because it aligns with Iranian interest. In the same year, then-Iranian President Hassan Rouhani presented the Hormuz Peace Endeavour before the UN General Assembly, which also calls for the establishment of a regional dialogue forum. When then-Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi was elected into office, he proposed a neighborhood policy which reiterated the need for dialogue between Middle Eastern countries.
Following the outbreak of conflict in Ukraine and the failure to revive the Iran nuclear deal, Russia and Iran have become “brothers in arms” united by Western animosity and sanctions. The two countries are of the same mind that peaceful coexistence among Middle Eastern countries can only exist if there are no U.S.-led anti-Iranian coalitions or alliances.
Recently, Moscow and Theran have been fostering closer military cooperation. In exchange for Iranian diplomatic and military support, Russia finally agreed to sell SU-35 fighter jets, according to the Iranian diplomats. Given how long it took Moscow to deliver S-300, and how cautious Moscow was not to upset the balance of power or jeopardize its relations with other regional powers, it is yet to be seen whether or when Moscow will deliver on its promise.
Russian–Saudi relations are characterized by both competition and cooperation. Being the second and the third largest oil producers in the world, the two countries are in direct competition with each other for market share. In 2020, Moscow and Riyadh were locked in an oil price war after negotiations to cut oil production broke down. The “war” sent oil prices tumbling, which hit U.S. shale oil producers particularly hard, because they need prices above $40 per barrel to turn a profit. The war’s “unintended side effect” had observers guessing if Moscow and Riyadh were secretly working together to cut Washington out of the market?
Since the outbreak of conflict in Ukraine, the Russian economy has felt the weight of Western sanctions and has grown even more reliant on oil revenues. To avoid diplomatic isolation and keep the Russian economy afloat, Moscow has been developing deeper ties with Riyadh via the OPEC+ format to regulate global oil market. Saudi Arabia recently threw its weight behind Russia and supported an OPEC+ decision to cut oil production, which works in Moscow’s favor and saw oil price soar. In response to Riyadh’s lending a hand to Moscow in a difficult time, Biden warned the U.S. would be reevaluating its relations with Saudi Arabia.
Riyadh’s willingness to spite Washington and pursue closer ties with Moscow can be attributed to Mohammed bin Salman’s personal feud with Biden and the endorsement of multipolarity, but it should not be interpreted as siding with Russia. Riyadh is careful to strike a balance between Washington and Moscow, as it remains concerned about Iran’s growing military capability and influence in the region despite the Saudi–Iranian rapprochement. Although Moscow has been careful to portray its “alliance” with Tehran as a marriage of convenience, Riyadh cannot help but to look at the closer Russian–Iranian military cooperation with suspicion and remains unwilling to put all its eggs in one basket.
Russia’s relations with Israel are equally complicated, given that the Soviet Union backed Arab countries’ fight against Israel and severed diplomatic relations with Israel after the Six-Day War. Russian–Israeli relations improved greatly after the turn of the century thanks to the personal relationship between the long-standing leaders of the two countries. Despite having conflicting agendas in Syria, Russia and Israel tacitly agreed to avoid direct conflict with each other. According to an anonymous source from a renowned Israeli think tank, Israel will warn Russia to evacuate the area before striking Iranian or Syrian government targets.
Ties between Russia and Israel deteriorated following the October 7 attack, however, there is no evidence the relations have gone beyond the point of no return. Western media claim Russia benefits from the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, but the truth is far more nuanced. On the one hand, the conflict is diverting Western attention away from Ukraine. Military and financial support once intended for Ukraine is now being delivered to Israel instead. On the other hand, Russia does not want to see the conflict continue, because Israel is home to the third largest population of ethnic Russians outside the former Soviet Union, and Moscow is deeply concerned about the safety of Russian diasporas.
Last November, Russian negotiations with Hamas helped release three Russian hostages. This June, after Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov met with senior Hamas official Mousa Abu Marzouk, the latter pledged to have the remaining two Russian hostages released first, once a ceasefire agreement has been secured. Marzouk also called on Moscow to be a guarantor of any ceasefire agreement with Israel, as in comparison to Washington, Hamas considers Moscow to be a fairer arbitrator, whose position is more likely to be accepted by both sides.
Indeed, although Israel is furious at Russia’s seemingly close relationship with Hamas, Iran and the Syrian government, with Netanyahu and the Israel Defense Forces divided on how to proceed in Gaza, Israel increasingly understands the need to be on the good side of Russia if it was to withdraw from Gaza with dignity. Israel has so far refrained from delivering weapons to Ukraine or imposing sanction on Russia.
Third, Moscow recognizes the need to maintain stability in the Middle East. Neither Beijing nor Moscow wants to see the region becoming a hotbed for terrorism once again. Although an unlikely coalition of Russia, Iran, the U.S. and other countries routed ISIS from its stronghold in Syria and Iraq in 2019, the attacks believed to have been perpetrated by the terrorist group’s affiliate, ISIS-K, in Iran and Russia earlier this year are a grim reminder that ISIS is crippled, but not eradicated.
Israel Will Have to Negotiate with Hamas
About 10% of Russia’s total population are Muslim, excluding four to five million migrant workers mainly from Muslim-majority countries in Central Asia. With such a large Muslim population, Russia could not afford turning a blind eye to developments in the Middle East. At the height of ISIS in 2016, there were between 3,000 and 5,000 Russian speaking jihadists fighting for them in Syria in Iraq. Returnees brought radical ideologies back with them, which greatly contributed to the radicalization of Russia’s Muslim-majority North Caucasus region and Central Asian neighbors, threatening Russia’s national security. If Russia is not actively combating terrorism in the Middle East, then it will have to do so in its peripheries or on its soil.
There is ample evidence that ISIS and other terrorist organizations could exploit the Palestinian–Israeli conflict to make a comeback. While the intensity of fire between Israel and Hezbollah has remained relatively low, their saber-rattling has increased. Hezbollah has recently released drone footage proving that it is capable of launching attacks deep into Israeli territory, which prompted Israel to respond by threatening to send “Lebanon back to the stone age”.
If Israel was to act upon its word, it would spell disaster for the entire region. Lebanon has been suffering from an economic crisis and political turmoil for five years now. An Israeli invasion would only exacerbate the situation, and a refugee crisis which will inevitably ensue, turning Lebanon and its neighbors into epicenters for terrorist activities.
Conclusion
Since the October 7 attack, the Houthis have been attacking ships passing through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, disrupting global trade and forcing ships to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, which increased both shipping time and cost. Egypt is hit particularly hard by the Red Sea crisis, because it is dependent on revenues earned from the Suez Canal, which have dropped by 40% compared to the previous year. Egypt has been on the brink of an economic crisis for two years now, with the value of its currency plummeting by 75%.
The Red Sea crisis is a result of the spillover effect of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. If the conflict continues, or worse yet, if Israel invades Rafah—the last city in Gaza that has not been completely devasted by the Israeli invasion—and spurs Palestinian refugees to flock into Egypt, it will have devastating consequences for the Egyptian economy and potentially bring Egypt into direct conflict with Israel.
With the impact of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict felt across the world and the possibility that the hostilities escalate into a regional war looming on the horizon, it is more pressing than ever for the West to realize that Middle Easterners are not exotic, backward and weak, but capable of having agency; and for the international community to come together to restore multipolarity in the Middle East by returning the Middle East to the Middle Easterners.
(votes: 10, rating: 5) |
(10 votes) |
Beijing offers an alternative to past approaches for the Mashriq states, which have spent many years grappling with internal and external challenges
China in the Gulf: Tried Its Best, You Know the RestBeijing is rather reluctant to get deeply involved in intra-regional politics in the Middle East, as this could provoke new tensions with the U.S.
Special Forces at the Ready: How the War in Gaza Brought the U.S. Back to the Middle EastThe debate over the post-war arrangements in Gaza is unlikely to put an end to the controversy about a possible U.S. presence “on the ground.”
Israel Will Have to Negotiate with HamasInterview with Vladimir Morozov, Vice-Rector of MGIMO University