... various areas. The messianic plans of the Biden administration to create an “alliance of democracies” in the Middle East seem unfeasible, too. Understanding this would make it much easier for Russia and the major regional players – Egypt, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia – to make their constructive contribution to the solution of global problems.
... elections in May 2023, and the new aspects it has now acquired following the victory of incumbent President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Judging by the leadership’s recent steps, Turkey wants to maintain continuity with its previous policies, as demonstrated by Turkey’s efforts to strengthen and expand ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE; in 2022, Riyadh and Ankara agreed to start a new phase of bilateral cooperation. Turkey has also expressed its intention to restore diplomatic relations with Egypt, Syria and Israel. Interestingly, Ankara had already taken some ...
... military presence and operational capabilities in the region, Washington is now less and less willing to get involved in regional issues. This logically leads to the inevitably growing autonomy and activity of regional states. First of all, this concerns Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Washington’s traditional partners in the region are now pursuing a more autonomous policy as compared to that of 8-10 years ago, promoting their national interests, diversifying their portfolios of partnerships and hedging ...
... important recent developments in the regional configuration are among the signs of easing of tensions. The normalization of Turkey’s relations with neighboring Arab states, including a cautious rapprochement with Syria, mitigation of most disagreements ... ... Bahrain), the establishment of normal interstate relations with Syria, the maintenance of hidden channels of communication between Saudi Arabia and Iran with the assistance of Arab partners, the growing role of the UAE, Egypt and Qatar as moderators of internal ...
... renewed relationship with Damascus enables the Emiratis to more effectively deter or closely monitor the mounting influence of Turkey and Iran in Syria.
The second factor is
ideological
. The UAE’s leadership has
found
an ideological ally in President ... ... similar to UAE's President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, has been on a counterrevolutionary crusade against Islamism, while Saudi Arabia and Qatar have supported Islamic radicals in Syria. The UAE was concerned about the empowerment of Islamist movements ...
... well as Africa, to compete with the Islamic camp led by Saudi Arabia. Thus, the competition will not be limited to a confrontation between Shiites and Sunnis, but we will also see the growing power struggles within the Sunni political-religious camps (Turkey — Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Nigeria and Indonesia). Another split will be between countries backing moderate Islam and those claiming to support moderate Islam, but in reality funding extremist cells.
In 2020, the assiduous fading of state bodies in many ...
... choosing to support Khalifa Haftar, especially after all his failures, are very slim. On the contrary, it is entirely possible that their involvement in operations against the LNA will increase against the backdrop of increased military assistance from Turkey (including for groups that are part of the Tripoli Defence Forces).
Khalifa Haftar fully, and erroneously, expected that military support from his external allies (Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and France) would help his forces overcome the enemy’s resistance. While the LNA could count on the direct participation of the Egyptian special forces (as well as on the operational air force of Egypt and the United Arab Emirates) during ...
... Presence in Southeast Europe and Russia’s New Strategy
The United States is pushing forward only those decisions that assure their influence on the pan-European processes as well as strengthen their positions in the global confrontation. Russia, China, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, which are accumulating more and more influence in the region, taken separately, are not so powerful. In any case, they are simply not able to offer any alternative to the “European choice”. However, they have never even planned to offer ...
According to the new findings of the ongoing research project, Asian investors continue to increase direct investments in the EAEU. During the monitoring period (2008–2016), FDI stock originating from 12 Asian countries (China, Japan, Turkey, India, Israel, Mongolia, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran, Singapore, and Vietnam) has increased from $32 billion in 2008 to $75.6 billion in the beginning of 2017.
China continues to expand its economic presence in EAEU countries and other CIS states, retaining its leadership among ...
...
Notably, from the crisis of 2013–2014 and until recently, there has been no particular friction between Qatar and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as Doha has actually stopped all political and financial support for the Muslim Brotherhood’s affiliates. The Qataris ... ... back the Syrian rebels, but without any political framework: in fact, they financed some groups politically affiliated with Turkey or Jordan. The Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, now deprived of Qatar’s aid, lost its role as the leader of the ...