....S. have therefore been prompted to recognise, at least at expert level, the need to work on technical deconfliction measures in this part of the world. This requires finding a way to untangle the Cyprus, Libya and Syria questions.
Artyom Semyonov:
Gas Without a Fight: Is Turkey Ready to Go to War for Resources in the Mediterranean?
As for Russia’s policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, we should recall Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov visited Damascus and Cyprus in 2020. Mr. Lavrov emphasised that escalation was inadmissible and called for peaceful resolution of the ...
... the export of nuclear technologies. As such, it has always regarded Turkey as one of its key energy partners in Europe.
Energy cooperation between the two nations can be split into several major areas:
Trade in energy products, primarily the flow of Russian natural gas to Turkey, is the fastest developing area.
Russia’s oil and petroleum products are shipped through the Turkish Straits, with a similar transit route for natural gas being a possibility.
Russia’s foreign direct investment in the country’s ...
... import diversification is an issue of top priority. When it comes to supply diversification, the first thing that comes to mind is to decrease the dependency on Russian gas, which is currently slightly
more than half
of total demand. Of the 160 bcm/a of Russian gas exported to Europe, Turkey is the second biggest customer of Gazprom with volumes of
27 bcm/a
after Germany
.
Significantly decreasing import dependence on Russia is not possible in the near term but Ankara could strive to remove itself from the position of “end ...
... in Moscow), it is clear that Russia is in desperate need of this partnership. Today Russia is trying to get Israeli word on not supplying any gas to Turkey in return for Russia’s abstention from supplying Iran with anti-aircraft missiles. Will Turkey stop buying Russian gas?While Ukraine already stopped buying Russian gas (it is doubtful whether Putin won’t cut gas exports first in retaliation for shutting Russian plane. However, neither Russia (receiving from Turkey $10bln last year alone), nor Turkey (whose 57% ...
... position on the new foreign policy, especially with regard to the Balkans, will be an additional factor making the negotiations difficult. It seems that concrete progress may be achieved only on the first string of the pipeline, which is due to bring Russian gas to Turkey from the Trans-Balkan pipeline crossing Ukraine’s territory.
Ankara does not have a clear picture of what plans Moscow is building in connection with the construction of the project. Turkey does not rule out the fact that the Kremlin could ...
... demonstrated by the fact that since 2014
more gas has been supplied to Europe via the Nord Stream pipeline than via the Slovak-Ukrainian border
.
RBC
Gazprom is also trying to speed up the progress of agreement and construction, since in order to supply gas to Europe by 2018-2019 construction should be starting now. The Russian giant’s leadership
set the objective of concluding an intergovernmental agreement with Turkey in the second quarter of this year
in order to deliver the first gas via the new pipeline by December 2016. Gazprom has made substantial concessions to the Turkish side,
agreeing to a discount of 10.25% instead of the originally proposed 6%
.
...
... aspirations to join the EU. Umland believes that Armenia may not be entirely lost to the Russian Customs Union, even after it rejected moves from the EU (See: Euractiv, 2013)... ..., so why the EU or EU taxpayers will want such enlargement is very questionable. No gas prowess of the Central Asia, which as my earlier post outlines is owned by China... ... the traffic problems and high apartmental prices, I may reconsider my stance.
Is Turkey On The Table?
Still, participation of Central Asian states in the EU may not...