... elite, as sustainable peace on the peninsula is unlikely without it. The need to create channels of high-level political interaction is just as obvious. Such channels could be set up in the form of a “crisis management centre” involving North Korea, South Korea, China, the United States, Japan and Russia.
Third, the international community is within its rights to demand a guarantee from Pyongyang that North Korea will not pass on its nuclear and ballistic missile technologies to third countries, thus demonstrating ...
... military presence in the region in order to protect itself against the North Korean threat. This primarily implies the intensified deployment of anti-missile defence systems; as part of this process, the U.S. has already deployed a THAAD battery in South Korea. China sees the U.S. anti-missile defences near its borders as an immediate threat to its security.
Trump's “maximum pressure” has so far proven no more effective than Obama's “strategic patience”.
China is gradually increasing economic pressure ...
... Seoul agglomeration which encompasses up to 50% of South Korean population. Moreover, North Korean military capabilities are too diverse for one THAAD battery to seriously alter the situation.
Complex deployment has resulted in steep deterioration in South Korea’s relations with China, which is not only the most powerful country in the region, but Korea’s key economic partner. In Chinese’ view, being part of long-range early warning radar, AN/TPY2 might be efficient to fix Chinese ballistic intermediate-range missiles ...
... does not seem to be fading gradually. On the contrary, it continues to be fanned, and what is more, it is being fanned to a large extent by external forces. Again the forecast is pessimistic: after the official announcement that the resistance from China and inside South Korea has been overcome, backtracking would be a criminal show of weakness. So we can be sure that THAAD complexes will be deployed in South Korea with much fanfare next year (and perhaps sooner if the North provides a pretext). The consequences ...
... essence, limited to fighting between the columns’ front lines. Other units will simply have no room for deployment: they will not be able to travel across the mountains, and they will be not able to climb over the heads of their comrades.
Today, China is North Korea’s most certain ally.
This order is also conditioned by the relative strength of the two sides. South Korea estimates North Korea’s mobilization potential at 600,000 trained reserve troops and 400,000 territorial militiamen (no more than
1,900,000 with Chinese reinforcements
), while the US and South Korea (without their allies) can deploy ...
... “Chinese volunteers” fought (many of them giving their lives for the cause, including Mao Zedong’s own son). From the point of view of geopolitics, preserving the South Korean buffer that prevents the appearance of thousands of U.S. and South Korean troops along the 1000-kilometre long border between Korea and China is imperative for Beijing.
Security and Cooperation in Northeast Asia:
the Russian-South Korean Experts Joint Paper
However, the young Kim Jong-un listens to the Chinese even less than his father and grandfather did – and even throws down ...
... principal bloc in the Asia-Pacific, which coordinates integration and convergence, decreases in tariffs and rates, and improvements in trade and economic relations. Importantly, politically the APEC brings together all major powers, including Russia and China.
Experts and politicians are aware that the TPP is an American integration project within the Asia-Pacific.
Unfortunately, Russia and China are not APP members, which will encourage them to increase their presence in the APEC. We will be watching ...
... Russia–North Korea–South Korea gas pipeline and the establishment of a unified power system in Northeast Asia, which would also cover East Siberia and the Russian Far East.
What Should Be Done?
www.project-syndicate.org
The six-party format (North and South Korea, China, Russia, the United States and Japan) appears to be the most advantageous in terms of discussing the nuclear issue and other problems on the Korean Peninsula, as well as Northeast Asian security as a whole.
Russia, like China is objectively interested ...
On February 24, 2014 Seoul hosted an international conference on development of the Far East and cooperation between South Korea, China and Russia. The event was organized by Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade.
Russia was represented by RIAC Program Manager
Lyudmila Filippova
and
Anatoly Savchenko
, Assistant Director at the Institute of History, Archeology and ...
... channelled in the 2000s towards production expansion, the future demand by international fleet for new tonnage even by 2020
will hardly
reach 80 per cent
utilisation of current capacity
.
The current trends underpinning the growing competition between South Korea and China have led to a drop in shipbuilding prices. In 2011 alone,
prices across various segments
of the merchant fleet dropped by between 5 and 15 per cent. In 2012, the average decline was in excess of
8 per cent
. In 2011, prices for some items were ...
