... from the same considerations, Russia’s growing cooperation with North Korea “on strategic and tactical issues” probably should not imply official support for Pyongyang’s steps in such a sensitive area as inter-Korean relations. As the U.S., South Korea and Japan are forming a triangle directed against North Korea, China and Russia, our adversaries are eagerly waiting for an excuse to blame us for similar aspirations and “supporting” what they see as North’s aggressive actions in preparation for war against the South. Some Russian social scientists speculate ...
... the US line in Korean nuclear affairs, also plays a negative role.
The situation around the Korean Peninsula in the current conditions cannot but be affected by the aggravation of China's relations with the US or Russia’s relations with the US and South Korea. China views the balance of power in Northeast Asia primarily through the prism of its confrontation with the United States. Under these conditions, keeping the DPRK afloat is of strategic value to China. In addition, China does not see the DPRK's nuclear ...
... "strategic autonomy" from Washington. True, ROK is a US ally and it regards America as its prime security provider. Still, Seoul has special relations with Beijing and Moscow; these special relations are ones the ROK is not ready to give up. The ROK-China economic relations remain critical for the South Korea prosperity. The South Korean approach to North Korea is not a carbon copy of the US or Japanese positions. It is clear that the South Korean leadership is not ready to automatically subscribe to any new anti-Russian or anti-Chinese policies ...
... deterrence capabilities. While the country is unable to afford 5th generation fighter jets and heavy equipment to be on a par with South Korea and the United States, nuclear weapons ensure the country’s deterrence against any adversary, while cyber warfare ... ... National Estimates (1971). North Korean Policy Toward the Non-Communist World: Objectives, Results, and Prospects. CIA (1980). China’s Policy Toward Korea: A Delicate Balance. David E. Sanger, David D. Kirkpatrick and Nicole Perlroth (2017). The World ...
... Chine draw from the Korean War to better handle conflict?
This year marks the 70
th
anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War. It was initially a civil war that gradually evolved into an international conflict, during which the Soviet Union and China supported North Korea. Last Friday, China commemorated the 70
th
anniversary of the Chinese People's Volunteers army entering the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. How to evaluate China's ...
... its plans to eradicate North Korea as a state and have it swallowed up by its neighbour to the south. Meanwhile, the people of South Korea, for whom reunification has long been part of the national mentality, have started to come to the realization that ... ... economic and social problems will be so great that they may jeopardize the country’s status and economic position. Moving on to China and Russia, they do not want to see a conflict breaking out on the Korean peninsula and call for stability, in the hope ...
... today is impossible within a single economy, and Chinese companies depend on parts coming from other Asian countries
Tracing the entire technological chain, we can assume that the Japan–South Korea conflict is closely linked to the trade war between China and the United States. South Korea’s Samsung Electronics is
hindered by the restrictions
on deliveries of Huawei memory chips since the latter is under U.S. sanctions. In turn, interrupting the chain of semiconductors delivery from South Korea will slow down the development ...
... rapprochement between North and South Korea, as this would hamper its immediate goal of eliminating the nuclear potential of North Korea (as well as the longer term objective of toppling the entire regime). What is more, the reconciliation of North and South Korea could be interpreted as a reduction of the military threat in its own right. In this case, the United States would have fewer opportunities to build up its military potential in Asia, which is directly primarily against China. For this reason, the United States does not want to allow “liberties” on the part of its junior partner in the union. Donald Trump is actively and unambiguously against a détente and is keen to step up the pressure as much as possible, including ...
... attained a consensus on the prospects of separate state-building with growing economic and later cultural integration of the two states. As a result, South Korea in essence started acting as North Korea’s principal global sponsor and advocate, unseating China in that role. South Korea’s economic aid became the principal factor in North Korea’s “survival,” and the role of the United States dropped, causing its displeasure.
Washington is hardly pleased with Seoul’s current pro-active stance, although Seoul is protecting ...
... the leader of regional formats. In the run up to the events, and while they were taking place, Beijing resolved a number of bilateral conflicts and settled the issue of the deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system with South Korea. China decided to resume its relations with Seoul and, despite the lack of concessions on South Korea’s part, to lift its sanctions. Xi Jinping also succeeded in making significant progress in smoothing out contradictions with Vietnam on the South Sea ...