... currently taking the shape of a delusion or a nightmare. Russia will have to accept the fact that the Western option has receded for a more or less prolonged period. It will have to accept that its own Western character derives from its locus as the Western front of Eurasia. Russia is the only truly Eurasian state, containing both West and East within itself.
A viable Russian grand strategy under the circumstances can only be Eurasia-centric before it aspires to be ‘Greater Eurasian’. In this first stage it should encompass ...
... spotlight a few thematic areas in which a Russian intellectual intervention is imperative and feasible. These are the Cold war and the clash of contending world orders in the 21st century, the phenomenon and problems of globalization and the Greater Eurasia concept/project.
The Battle of (Big) Ideas
While a vast number of books on the end and the history of the Cold War have been published in the West, with widely diverse perspectives; of the Cold War seen teleologically, from the standpoint of how it ended, there isn’t a single major, recognized Russian work, even an anthology, in English—which for better or worse, is a quasi-universal language—on the same theme and topic. Thus, teleological western perspectives of contemporary history dominate if not monopolize, by default.
The same is true ...
... the international rules-based order."
Andrey Kortunov:
Why the World is Not Becoming Multipolar
How is one to interpret this; how to make sense of this? The discourse matches the action in the material sphere: the great military arc around the Eurasian heartland, ranging from the extension of NATO to the western borders of Russia, through the Persian Gulf deployment right to the Indo-Pacific maritime encirclement; the exit from multilateral arms control agreements; the trade wars and escalation of sanctions; and of course the aggressive and explicit character of official ...
... the elimination of borders between ideologies, nations, cultures and even the sexes. Here Kisoudis appeals to the Russian philosopher Konstantin Leontiev and his concept of “secondary blending oversimplification”, which is now observable in the West. So Eurasian Russia is opposing this exact trend and stands up for the preservation of diversity, traditional religions and cultural identities of the peoples all over the world.For Kisoudis, the opposition between traditionalism and postmodernism makes up the major ...
... to establish pragmatic, if not good-neighbourly relations) as an “internal matter” for the former union republics. However, many new independent states are interested in the participation of external players. This is also in the interests of the West, which fears “re-Sovietization” in the broad sense: not only or largely as a communist comeback, but as the establishment of a Russian sphere of political influence outside the control of the United States and its allies.
AP /EPA / Maxim Shipenkov
Ivan Timofeev, Elena Alekseenkova
:
Eurasia in Russian Foreign Policy:
Interests, Opportunities and Constraints
These different readings of the situation add an extra element of conflict to the division of the Soviet legacy and thus impede the completion of the historical process of the ...
... couple of years ago that most mainstream experts and politicians in the East and in the West shared the common view that the world was moving towards a multi-polar system.... ... mechanisms that many consider to be hopelessly antiquated. A common sanctions policy against Russia has been adopted. New efforts have been undertaken to enhance the level of trans-Atlantic... ... on ‘objective’ realities. It is often argued that the Atlantic and the Eurasian civilizations have opposed each other from the days immemorial, that ‘land’...
