... Russo-Indo interplay serves to simultaneously balance Russia’s relations with China and India’s with the West’s, which prevents either from becoming disproportionately dependent on their other partners and thus risk a reversion back to Sino-U.S. bi-multipolarity, which only benefits those superpowers. If Russia became dependent on China, India might then become dependent on the U.S. to maintain the balance of power, and vice versa if India became dependent on the U.S. first.
Their special and privileged strategic partnership therefore keeps tri-multipolarity trends alive with the ...
... geostrategic position of having stakes in both blocs, which explains why it closely cooperates with them in order to advance its goal of becoming a third pole of influence in the bi-multipolar transitional phase of the global systemic transition to multipolarity. Regarding the Western bloc, it shares these countries’ concerns about China’s rise, especially considering its summer 2020 clashes with the People’s Republic over their disputed Himalayan border. As for the non-Western bloc, it agrees with Russia, China, and others that international relations must diversify from their hitherto dependence on Western states and structures. Due to its interests in both blocs, India hopes to serve as a bridge between them as well as a balancing force within ...
... present analysis attempted to compellingly make the case that this emerging scenario will represent a much more complex version of multipolarity than the current one. Trump’s U.S.-Chinese trade war, which in turn provoked the new Cold War between these two ... ... pragmatically recalibrate America’s grand strategy away from its hitherto unsuccessful attempts to simultaneously “contain” both Russia and China. The resultant outcome could fundamentally transform the geostrategic situation in Eurasia, both by providing the U.S. with ...
... authoritarianism of various sorts.
This triple attribute of bipolarity is an important theoretical presupposition in the analysis of bipolarization and a logical starting point for understanding the cognitive and theoretical differences between China, Russia and the West on this issue. In China, there is a tradition to emphasize the material dimension of bipolarity (or multipolarity). For the Chinese, the international structure has a natural attribute initially. Whether it is unipolar, bipolar or multipolar, these structures merge as a pure reflection of existing asymmetries in international players’ material potentials....
... the inevitable multipolarity is an obvious truth. This state of affairs is not typical only of Russia. In the meantime, both groups omit some important details that were clearly pronounced in 2018, when the picture became more complex.
Igor Ivanov:
Russia, China and the New World Order
It is difficult to argue against the idea of multipolarity if we look at it from the realistic (neo-realistic) point of view. In Russia the school of realism and its derivatives has remained the most influential up to now and is a landmark for many experts on international affairs abroad. In effect,...
G20 in Implementing Russia’s Strategic Tasks
The G20 is an important international forum, a meeting ... ... instruments of “integrating integrations,” which entails Russia paying attention to China, India and other Asian partners, as well as the gradual stable growth of Russia’s... ... international relations. Active discussions in such a format confirm the relevancy of multipolarity and the current processes of reconfiguring the world. In such circumstances...
... several decades, the multipolar world should have finally taken shape as a new global political system with relevant norms, institutions, and procedures.
Yet something clearly went wrong. The world is not behaving as the founders had predicted.
Elusive Multipolarity
Igor Ivanov:
Russia, China and the New World Order
In October 2016, twenty years after Yevgeny Primakov’ policy article was published in the journal International Affairs, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin gave a speech at the Annual Meeting of the Valdai ...
... at almost exactly the same time and once again clearly demonstrated the ever growing multipolarity of global and trans-regional development. However, while the Group of... ... cooperation between the member states.
The Qingdao summit finalized the results of China’s year as chair of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). In addition... ... member states, observers and the SCO dialogue partners continued. An important event in Russia–China relations in the run-up to the summit was the state visit by the President...
... rather than going it alone. Barack Obama is trying to do this and having some success.
Russia should clearly determine its own niches, priorities and advantages in a multipolar... ... To learn to use its “undervalued” assets. And believe me, it has many.
China needs the wisdom not to be dragged into a race for the sake of the race. That... ... the UN will be carried out.
But I would stress that, given the current trend towards multipolarity, it would be very difficult to build a system of global management.
How...
