... diplomacy with regards to Russia. By passing PL 115-44 (CAATSA) bill, Congress incorporated Barack Obama's executive orders on Ukraine and digital security into federal law, denying the president the ability to rescind them or remove individuals from sanctions lists without congressional approval. CAATSA also gave the president the authority to use a fairly broad range of restrictive measures. The administration responded pragmatically. Trump signed CAATSA and in 2018, with Executive Order 13849, ...
... rate, jumping from $12 billion to $65 billion in two years, with crude oil accounting for the lion’s share of this growth. Initially, Western countries tried to cut off this flow, but Russian big business demonstrated a phenomenal ability to dodge sanctions: they used shell or fly-by-night companies in third countries and shadow fleets, along with other tricks. Indian big business provided much help in establishing bypass routes. In the end, this strategy bore fruit: Western political and economic ...
... exacerbation of Russia’s relations with the West in 2014. Official state relations were also sufficiently intensive.
Ivan Timofeev:
Ukrainian Crisis, Turkey and Eurasia: Who Wins?
At a first glance, Russia–Tajikistan relations have not significantly changed ... ... Tajikistan is the only state in Central Asia not to have sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine.
Tajikistan fears the West’s secondary sanctions that could be imposed on states that openly support Russia’s special operation, especially since the U.S. has already ...
... investors from other countries
On April 28, US President Joe Biden asked Congress to pass new legislation on the
confiscation of Russian property
. The presidential proposals were previously developed at the level of key agencies responsible for sanctions: the Treasury (financial sanctions), the Department of State (responsible for visa sanctions and political aspects of restrictive measures), the Department of Commerce (export controls), and the Department of Justice (which prosecutes violators ...
... a similar rethink. Russia faces a number of forks in the road, which could determine the direction of its foreign policy.
Relations with the West are a priority. The United States and the European Union this year will increase pressure on Russia via sanctions, military deterrence and information warfare. Russia will respond in kind, though the balance of power is significantly skewed in the West’s favor.
Broadly speaking, the aim of Western countries is to change Russia’s approach to Ukraine....
... politicians in Europe’s major capitals did not bite their tongues in connection with the announcement of the new round of sanctions by the United States and made their feelings quite clear on the matter speaks volumes. This has little to do with Russia.... ... pragmatism. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the response to Europe’s condemnation of Russia’s actions with regard to the Ukrainian crisis. The initial resentment turned into a blistering campaign to convince everyone that European values, and indeed ...
... levels of economic interdependence allowed Moscow to take a benign view on mounting political problems with Brussels— these problems were perceived as negligible or, at least, affordable compared to fundamental reciprocal economic interests.
The Ukrainian crisis and the subsequent EU sanctions against Russia proved this perception wrong. Of course, in Moscow the European decision on sanctions was interpreted as caused by the US pressure, but there are reasons to believe that the Russian side had expected EU countries to resist this ...