... CSTO and Russian peacekeepers to face an attempted rebel
takeover
. The same can be said on other politically relevant positions, such as collaborating on the
creation
of an integrated digital information system for EAEU member states. Economically, Russia is Kazakhstan’s second biggest partner, as number one and number three are respectively China and Italy. President Tokayev makes a point to maintain close contact with all of them, as he met Xi Jinping in October 2023, Giorgia Meloni in January 2024,...
... international law. At the meeting with the secretaries of the Security Councils of the SCO member states in Astana, K.-J. Tokayev reiterated his country’s commitment to the principle of indivisibility of Eurasian security, which is fully in line with Russia’s fundamental foreign policy principles enshrined in the
Foreign Policy Concept of 2023
. For Kazakhstan, which went through a turbulent period with massive riots in January 2022, the issues of regional security and strengthening the SCO potential is no less important. Notably, its cooperation on security issues in the region has intensified in ...
... to Russia. The country’s authorities have said they would not circumvent Western sanctions. But they may well fill the niches abandoned by Western companies due to corporate boycotts. Ample opportunities remain for the supply of their products to Russia through Kazakhstan without the sanctions regimes being violated. Their skilful implementation will benefit the country. Like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan is benefiting from rising energy prices.
Armenia, Georgia and Kazakhstan can be considered the main beneficiaries ...
... by his own appointee. This is a direct indication that Tokayev’s call for CSTO was oriented towards holding tight control against his political rivals rather than fighting against terrorist from the West which would threaten the very sovereignty of Kazakhstan.
Why Russia had to act?
In recent years, Central Asia has become a focal point for what many analysists have understood as the impending rise of China in the world order. Often, China’s inroads in Central Asia have put Russia on alert. However, Central Asia ...
... no meaningful change in resource governance in Kazakhstan, and they remain orphaned from the economic growth model. Several bifurcations emerge from such an analysis, such as the differing outcomes of institutions responsible for discourse control in Russia and Kazakhstan. Analyzing Republic of Kazakhstan as having lost all games aside from maintaining institutional integrity cedes discourse formation control to the Russian institutions which enacted state power while Kazakhstan could not. Micro bifurcations ...
... different conditions.
Therefore, now Russia should not try to understand what its further strategy might be; in any case, particular behaviour will be determined by circumstances. Our task is to explore the surrounding space in order to understand where Russia can stop if it does not want to resort to the historical paradigm of its behaviour. The developments in Kazakhstan, in their modern form, do not create any grounds for optimism or hopes for a return to an inertial path of development. Other states may follow Ukraine and Kazakhstan even if they now look quite confident. There are no guarantees — and it ...
... serious problem of how to multilateralize strategic arms control, because the lower we go—I mean “we,” the United States and Russian Federation—the lower we go, the more important nuclear capacities of a third country become, and we have to engage them ... ... lot of commitment, a lot of patience and a lot of stamina.
Schlanger
: Somewhat pressing right now, which is the situation in Kazakhstan: We were talking last night, given the upcoming meetings and the potential for a breakthrough, that maybe we should ...
... takes in relation to, for example, Armenia or Belarus, and not the actual bilateral relations.
Russia also cannot proceed from the assumption that fully ordinary bilateral diplomacy exists in relations with Lithuania or Romania. An opposite example is Russia's policy towards Pakistan, Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan - countries that have the resources necessary for independent survival and responsible foreign policy. China has tried to build traditional relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, but now these efforts are facing noticeable ...
... concerned, one should say that Iran represents serious potential for the Union’s expansion. Among the economies of the EAEU member states, observers and partners, the Iranian economy is
second
only to Russia’s. In terms of economic cooperation, Russia and Kazakhstan stand to benefit most from lowering tariff barriers. In addition, the project is of particular interest to Armenia, which is the only EAEU member that has a land border with Iran—currently under a partial blockade. Armenia could thus be used ...
... in 2017 the CIS Anti-Terrorism Centre held its first military exercise in Tajikistan. The reason behind this CIS initiative was probably the desire to include, among others, the Uzbek personnel–given that Uzbekistan left the CSTO in 2012 [
v
].
The Russian presence in terms of military bases is mainly part of the Soviet heritage. Kazakhstan is the country with the largest number of diversified military facilities. Near Lake Balkhash lies the anti-ballistic missile testing range Sary Shagan leased by Russia, while in the southern part of the country Moscow will be able to use the ...
