... project via third parties – the main conduit of the U.S. energy policy in Europe is Poland. Warsaw has been a staunch critic of both Nord Stream 2 and Gazprom, and its arguments are politically motivated. Poland threw the first spoke in the wheel of the Russian project in 2016, when Gazprom was counting on selling 10 per cent of its shares in the Nord Stream 2 operator,
Nord Stream 2 AG
, to five companies –
ENGIE, OMV, Royal Dutch Shell, Uniper
and
Wintershall
. In order for the deal to go through, permission had to be obtained ...
... moment the situation around Rosneft’s shelf projects with foreign companies being involved is still not clear. Rosneft is likely to lobby for the liberalization of access to shelf deposits, as most of the blocks are already split between them and Gazprom. However, it might be difficult to reach a consensus with the Russian leadership in the case that the USA strengthens sanctions against the Russian oil and gas sector.
What Will the New Sanctions Lead to?
Pavel Sharikov:
How to Make Russia-U.S. Relations Great Again?
The adoption of the new anti-Russian sanctions ...
... visit of the commissioner in October 2016 was called off.
Ukraine-Gazprom Arbitration Procedures
REUTERS/Gleb Garanich
Viktor Katona:
Will Ukraine be Gas Self-Sufficient?
Unlike Gazprom-EC relations, Naftogaz of Ukraine arbitration procedures against Russia’s Gazprom will be presumably completed without compromise from both sides.
It has been two years
that the action is being processed in the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce at the request of Ukraine to indemnify for expenses it ...
... while using gas as an attractive diplomatic tool (rather than weapon) encouraging other actors to join US-led organizational frameworks. Despite controlling 175000 km of pipelines and being present in more than 50 international and 20 domestic projects, Russia’s current position is shaky. Governmental favoritism of Gazprom, who has a privileged position with regards to controlling export routes, striped other companies such as Novatek and Rosneft of support in LNG projects that could take relevant place in South-East Asia in order to help Russia decrease its dependency ...
... be built for transportation of 31.5 bcm/a capacity. The 14 bcm of gas that are currently imported from Russia through Trans-Balkan line, could be diverted to Turkish Stream with the construction of first line. The second line could be used to export Russian gas to Southeast Europe. Nevertheless, due to the fact that Gazprom is conducting talks with European Commission (EC) to construct Nord Stream – 2, one could assert that the pipe game is far from over. Taking financial difficulties into account, Gazprom might also intent to use Turkish Stream as a leverage ...
....” Thus, the legitimacy and relevance of the matter is currently framed by the international community (i.e. is mostly top-town), however in future it is likely to depend on the relationship established between the State, oil and gas industry, and Gazprom.
Environmental risk management platform of Equatorial Principles calls for international banks to finance only those projects that have well-established CSR and concern for environment. There is only one Russian bank, Otkritie, who joined it so far, thus, the positive effect of the initiative is mostly accounted for by international banks who finance environmentally friendly projects in Russia. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development also assists ...
... existing gas interdependency. Nord Stream’s full capacity is not being used because of the restrictions on the OPAL pipeline, which links Nord Stream’s entry point at Greifswald, Germany with the Czech Border. Germany’s Wintershall and Russia’s Gazprom jointly own the pipeline. Furthermore, major German gas companies BASF Wintershall and E.ON Ruhrgas have gained access to natural gas fields in Western Siberia, while Gazprom has developed its transport and distribution capabilities by acquiring ...
... off imports should her conditions be not satisfied. Gazprom’s interests in Turkey Turkey’s growing population and business already make it world’s top-20 economy, promising higher energy demand in future. By going into Turkish market Gazprom avoids passing Ukraine which is no longer ruled by pro-Russian president and whose unreliable behavior (such as recent refusal to buy any gas from Russia) threatens Russian exports to the EU. Given that the deal with China can’t solve Russian over-supply issues, it would be quite logical to increase ...
... expensive natural gas (as is the case with Lithuania, with plans to
purchase LNG from the United States
) although this is an unlikely scenario given the slow economic growth on the continent.
People often make the mistake of thinking that the interests of Russia and the interests of Gazprom are the same. In this case, however, they are largely the same. The Russian government does not care who produces and supplies the gas – Gazprom or Novatek, which also seeks to export gas to Europe. All it cares about is whether these activities ...
... an integral part. The author concludes that the later an integration agenda is offered to countries of the region, the harder it will be for them to accept it as each of them has long been following its own course.
Stanislav Pritchin dwells on what Russia can do to attract Central Asia’s interest in the energy sector. In his opinion, the declared changes in Gazprom’s strategy of business operation in Europe should be accompanied by a revision of relations with Central Asian countries which have always been viewed as competitors. Pyotr Stegny writes about the vast opportunities opening up before Turkey ...