... was no exception. In October, NATO held its Steadfast Noon nuclear exercises, followed by the U.S. Global Thunder drills and Russia’s strategic nuclear forces exercises. Developments did not end there: against the backdrop of these exercises, Russia ... ...
Sarmat
ICBM. Meanwhile, the U.S. was given an ambiguous
directive
from Donald Trump on October 30 “to start testing our Nuclear Weapons on an equal basis.” Yet despite the scale of both the exercises and the announcements, these developments amount ...
... states, the UN Security Council, key decision-making body that could adopt legally binding resolutions. Five nations (France, Russia, China, the UK, and US) were granted permanent status and given veto power. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA),... ... great-power conflict.
Zhao Huasheng, Andrey Kortunov:
The World in 2035: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly
The emergence of nuclear weapons was a significant milestone in post-World War II. It changed the perception of war and had a revolutionary impact on international security. With their immense destructive power, nuclear weapons put human existence in danger. Nuclear war has a ...
Now restraint is giving way to deterrence
In early August, an official statement from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs put an end to yet another potentially useful arms control instrument: the unilateral moratorium ... ... intends to acquire U.S. Typhon launchers as a stopgap measure until ELSA is ready.
What will happen in Russia
Ivan Timofeev:
Can Nuclear Weapons Help Avert a Russia-NATO War?
By the end of 2025, new rocket regiments and/or brigades with appropriate weapons ...
... possibility of a return to extreme-era dynamics cannot be dismissed
The Ukraine conflict may well pave the way for a larger scale Russia-NATO confrontation. While hard to fathom and with everything suggesting that the scenario remains quite unlikely, it relies ... ... defence spending and invest in arms manufacturing and infrastructure in the foreseeable future.
Any attempt to assess the role of nuclear weapons in a present-day armed conflict stumbles upon the fact that the experience in using them in combat is virtually ...
Restarting the architecture of missile and nuclear arms control in a Russian-American or broader format appears highly improbable
The ongoing negotiations between Russia and the United States on ... ... obligations, the country made notable strides in developing advanced missile systems. Yet, the regime governing missile and nuclear weapons continued to deteriorate. In 2019, the Trump administration initiated the withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range ...
In parrying these security threats, it is important for Russia not to engage in a quantitative and tit-for-tat arms race but to respond asymmetrically,... ... unprecedented debate within Russian expert and political circles regarding the possible use of nuclear weapons in the context of the armed conflict in Ukraine. In 2024, this debate... ... Worst and Strive for the Best. Russia’s and China’s Perceptions of Developments in International Security
The concept of strategic stability has many different interpretations...
... retaliatory strike from Moscow. A radical scenario will bring to its limit all those weaknesses in the structure of European and international security that have been accumulating over a long period of time. In this case, the world order really risks collapsing ... ... order be created.
The alternative is to avoid a situation where Moscow decides to try to put a fat end to the conflict by using nuclear weapons against Ukraine.
Cruise and ballistic missile strikes on Russian territory will not break the will of the Russian leadership. Quite the opposite. They will increase the motivation to ...
... the Russian Federation and/or its allies, on military formations and/or facilities of the Russian Federation outside its territory.
The latter likely refers to the inadmissibility of attacks on Russian forces and assets still stationed in Syria and Russian war ships in the world ocean in order to use them as an escalation step within the limited use of nuclear weapons.
Dmitry Stefanovich, Research Fellow at the Center for International Security, Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO RAS)
The main difference, perhaps, is the formalization of “threats to sovereignty and territorial integrity” rather than “threats to the very existence ...
... means of deterring China at the regional level.
Zhao Huasheng, Andrey Kortunov:
Prepare for the Worst and Strive for the Best. Russia’s and China’s Perceptions of Developments in International Security
Innovative systems and disruptive technologies
At the short-lived consultations in Geneva that took place ... ... and fall of 2021, the main disagreement between the parties was that the U.S. proposed reducing both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons [Pifer 2020; Gottemoeller 2020: 139–159], while Russia raised the issue of limiting both nuclear and non-nuclear ...
... relations with China are based, among other things, on conventional arms control in border areas (Shanghai and Moscow agreements), and the relevant control body recently met again in Astana. The Russian-Chinese mutual commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other also plays a significant role.
Zhao Huasheng, Andrey Kortunov:
Prepare for the Worst and Strive for the Best. Russia’s and China’s Perceptions of Developments in International Security
There is also a Russian-Chinese agreement on notifications of launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. It is possible to use such mechanisms in the future to reduce regional and global tensions involving new states....
