... can be inflicted through the ‘
application of calibrated damage
’. By placing an increased emphasis on ‘
strategic non-nuclear deterrence
’ since 2014, Russia has raised the threshold for nuclear use. That being said, while some of the Russian ... ... such as UAVs, through ‘tailored combinations of conventional … capabilities, together with the unique deterrent effect of nuclear weapons.’ Further, as noted by the U.S. Congressional Budget Office, the dual capability of hypersonic missiles may ...
... nuclear strike as a response to a nuclear attack by the enemy. Both assumptions are wrong. First, even the line between a first strike and a retaliatory strike is blurred and will be dissipating more and more as time goes by. Second, modern doctrines of nuclear deterrence envision the use of nuclear weapons not only in response to nuclear aggression.
The dichotomy of the instant retaliation
Dmitri Trenin:
Two Worlds of Russia’s Foreign Policy
During President Putin’s conversation with soldiers’ mothers in December 2022, one of them ...
... 2018 during Donald Trump’s presidency.
One of the key functions of any publicly available strategic document is to deliver information to other states – both friendly and hostile. Yet only in few areas does this matter as much as in the field of nuclear weapons.
NDS-2022, and particularly NPR-2022, contain a significant number of clearly defined U.S. norms and doctrinal guidelines regarding nuclear weapons and strategic stability, with the main target audience being the top political brass of ...
... possible negotiations on this topic.
However, there are provisions that, in my opinion, do not completely address the objectives of the document or are not generally constructive.
First, the document does not state what role Russia assigns to its tactical nuclear weapons in nuclear deterrence.
In addition, the presence of what is called in the West strategic unpredictability is explicitly stated in Paragraph 15, Clause D: one of the principles of nuclear deterrence is “unpredictability for a potential adversary in terms ...
... variants are also possible) most likely “packaged” in reentry bodies similar to the US-made
Mk4/Mk4A
.
Alexander Yermakov:
Nuclear Deterrence or Britain and France have Dignity of their Own
The total number of warheads is steadily declining, with the ... ... community, especially since the UK’s Ministry of Defence is mandated to notify the Parliament about any plans to develop new nuclear weapons. Giving credit where it is due, a relevant public
statement
was made very promptly.
Alexander Yermakov:
Is France’s ...
... between 5 and 7 kt.
According to official explanations, up to and including those contained in the new nuclear doctrine [
1
], the United States intends to use the weapon to give additional stability and flexibility to its regional (not strategic!) nuclear deterrence. The idea is that the number of such missiles will be limited, because they are intended for fairly specific purposes.
The U.S. military had long sought permission for low-yield nuclear weapons from the White House,
arguing
that the president was only limited to high-yield weapons as a last resort and that “interim” response options would come handy in certain scenarios. These were eventually termed “tailored” nuclear ...
Despite the degree of uniqueness stemming from its particular specifics, each case of nuclear weapons proliferation also exemplifies one or more of the five main determinants of a state’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons that have been identified in the relevant literature: security, domestic politics, norms, technology and economics....
