... only in theory but also in historical practice. At a minimum, the Vietnam and Afghan conflicts of the bipolar era constituted proxy wars in which one nuclear superpower confronted the other indirectly; yet they were never interpreted as a failure of nuclear deterrence.
Consequently, nuclear weapons cannot be used to eliminate instability at lower levels of escalation, because such instability is inherent to nuclear deterrence itself. It is impossible to compel Washington, London, Brussels, or other unfriendly actors to abandon their ...
China is narrowing the gap and adding complexity to Russian–US strategic nuclear deterrence relations
In recent years, the missile and nuclear forces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have ... ... warhead, there is no reliable evidence to confirm this.
In addition, China is also notably expanding its arsenal of land-based nuclear weapons. In 2021, a group of US analysts led by M. Korda, studying commercial satellite images, discovered two positional ...
... dismissive approach toward NATO, amid the ongoing hostilities in Ukraine and rising tensions around Taiwan, has fueled doubts among American allies about the reliability of U.S. security guarantees. Since the early 1950s, the strategy of so-called extended nuclear deterrence has been rooted in the U.S. commitment to use nuclear weapons in the event of an attack on allies, whether with nuclear or conventional forces.
“Nuclear options” have been debated within NATO before, but the issue has now galvanized political elites stronger than ever in such countries as Germany,...
... nuclear forces?
Aleksey Arbatov:
Nuclear Doctrine and Strategic Stability
Strict numerical parity is not essential for credible nuclear deterrence. Russia has not even maxed out its New START limits, often falling well below them (especially in terms of ... ... expensive to produce and maintain). But given that the U.S. has nuclear-armed allies, a substantial arsenal of strategic-range non-nuclear weapons, which is growing both quantitatively and qualitatively (and can also be used for counterforce strikes against ...
... reinforce his message, on February 27, 2022, at a meeting with then-Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, the Russian president issued
orders
to put the Russian deterrence forces on a special regime of combat duty.
Nuclear deterrence can essentially be interpreted as a specific foreign policy tool—the threat to use nuclear weapons to prevent an adversary from implementing certain actions. The 2020 policy paper “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence”
spells out
the possible actions by other states that should be prevented ...
... Kiev actively lobbied for it. On the Russian side, warnings about a possible response were also transparent and clear, including conventional missile and nuclear options. Changing the nuclear doctrine towards expanding the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons has also been discussed for a long time.
The new stage has not changed the situation on the battlefield, but has opened the way for a transition to new stages of escalation with a minimum of incentives to reduce it.
The basic scenario ...
....” The mention of strikes using nuclear weapons or other types of WMD against Russian bases or forces outside Russian territory, which could also lead to the use of Russian nuclear weapons, also catches the eye. The previously existing principle of nuclear deterrence continuity up to the use of nuclear weapons has remained intact. What may come after such use is still a matter of question, but it is unlikely to be anything good.
Vadim Kozyulin, Head of the Center for Global Studies & International Relations at the Diplomatic Academy under the ...
... strategic planning documents pertaining to military security, which undoubtedly include the “Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence,” is both necessary and natural.
One last point: the 2020 edition of the doctrine clearly states that nuclear deterrence is ensured continuously, but only up until nuclear weapons are actually used. It will be extremely interesting to see whether this wording is retained in the new document.
First published in
Profile
... dangerous due to the involvement of non-nuclear-weapon states in the preparation and planning of US nuclear operations. The essence of “extended deterrence” is changing: “nuclear umbrellas” are being replaced by supporting the possible use of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear forces. This trend is particularly evident in the interaction between Washington and Seoul, which established the Nuclear Consultative Group and approved (on the margins of the NATO summit) the Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula.
New coalition and alliance constructs resembling NATO are taking shape: AUKUS, new formats in Northeast Asia between the United States, South Korea, and Japan emphasizing space infrastructure....
... 24 hours, and 121 carriers or 1,139 charges within 30 days. Of particular significance are the U.S. plans to deploy tactical nuclear weapons, including medium-range missiles, which further increases their strike potential. In this context, the development ... ... Pentagon’s desire to create a broad regional missile defense infrastructure in Asia Pacific to meet the country’s unique nuclear deterrence needs [
5
]. Notably, no country of East Asia, in whole or in part, has ever expressed its intentions to unprovokedly ...
