... directive
from Donald Trump on October 30 “to start testing our Nuclear Weapons on an equal basis.” Yet despite the scale of both the exercises and the announcements, these developments amount to little more than routine measures aimed at maintaining nuclear deterrence.
Since Ukraine launched its first major counteroffensives in the autumn of 2022, Russia has seen lively debates over the nature and logic of deterrence. These discussions have produced a wide range of expert opinions—both on the very ...
China is narrowing the gap and adding complexity to Russian–US strategic nuclear deterrence relations
In recent years, the missile and nuclear forces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have undergone serious qualitative and quantitative changes. This causes concern in the United States and among its allies in the ...
... dismissive approach toward NATO, amid the ongoing hostilities in Ukraine and rising tensions around Taiwan, has fueled doubts among American allies about the reliability of U.S. security guarantees. Since the early 1950s, the strategy of so-called extended nuclear deterrence has been rooted in the U.S. commitment to use nuclear weapons in the event of an attack on allies, whether with nuclear or conventional forces.
“Nuclear options” have been debated within NATO before, but the issue has now galvanized ...
... could rely on different means to deter China than it used against the U.S. (for example, about one-third of the Pioneer intermediate-range missile systems were deployed east of the Urals). Today, however, the U.S. faces the challenge of maintaining nuclear deterrence of one peer adversary and the other near-peer (with a trend toward narrowing the gap). Both are located at equal intercontinental distances, which makes it difficult to allocate forces to deter only one of them in a way that would not ...
... an unprecedented debate within Russian expert and political circles regarding the possible use of nuclear weapons in the context of the armed conflict in Ukraine. In 2024, this debate centered on amendments to Russia’s official Military Doctrine on nuclear deterrence, which were promulgated in November of that year. The issue gained even greater urgency following the victory of Republican candidate Donald Trump in the U.S. presidential election in November. These developments will have a tangible ...
Kiev is the most vulnerable party in any development of the situation—both radical and basic. The question is the price for all participants. The price for Ukraine will be the highest
Russia and the West are going through another stage of military-political escalation. Its immediate indicator was Ukraine’s use of American and British missile systems to strike Russian territory, the emergence of Moscow’s new nuclear doctrine, the subsequent destruction of Ukraine’s Yuzhmash plant by a medium-range...
Russia’s leading experts on the new Russia’s nuclear doctrine
On November 19, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin
signed
Executive Order Approving the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence. The new nuclear doctrine incorporates the changes announced by Mr. Putin at a meeting on nuclear deterrence on September 25, 2024. What is the main difference between the new doctrine and the previous version? How can the new doctrine ...
It would be a gross mistake to consider the changes to the nuclear doctrine as a response to the Ukraine crisis alone
During a meeting of the Russian Security Council standing conference on nuclear deterrence on September 25, it was announced that changes would be made to the document titled “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.” At the time of writing, the revised version of the document ...
... possible use of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear forces. This trend is particularly evident in the interaction between Washington and Seoul, which established the Nuclear Consultative Group and approved (on the margins of the NATO summit) the Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula.
New coalition and alliance constructs resembling NATO are taking shape: AUKUS, new formats in Northeast Asia between the United States, South Korea, and Japan emphasizing space infrastructure....
... on fixed land-based, sea-based, and mobile land-based components. Back in 2012, a number of U.S. policymakers mentioned the Pentagon’s desire to create a broad regional missile defense infrastructure in Asia Pacific to meet the country’s unique nuclear deterrence needs [
5
]. Notably, no country of East Asia, in whole or in part, has ever expressed its intentions to unprovokedly attack American bases, much less the territory of the United States. Pyongyang’s
statements
about “striking a ...
