... Moscow’s economic power as much as possible and ensuring Ukraine manages to preserve its sovereignty. Both are hugely dependent on the U.S. ability to manipulate the world petroleum prices and the amount of Russia’s oil and gas exports.
Ivan Timofeev:
US Sanctions Against Iran and the Future of the JCPOA: A View From Tehran and Moscow
Economic pressure on Moscow is (among other factors) largely sustained by the prices of gas and oil, whose export is a crucial component of Russia’s economy. Therefore, one of Washington’s primary efforts is centered ...
.... Hardliners, for example, might argue that such tests are guaranteed anyway, until Iran surrenders on all fronts. Supporters of diplomacy may respond by combining the rate hike with the coalition game, seeking to isolate the United States under the JCPOA and exploiting loopholes in sanctions regimes.
The debate within the United States itself promises to be difficult. On the surface it seems that the US president has the authority to lift sanctions immediately. President Trump resumed applying the restrictive measures by executive ...
... diplomatic marathon to reset the JCPOA started immediately after the new president of the United States took office. The first stumbling block was expectedly the sequence of actions. Tehran declares its readiness to return to the implementation of the JCPOA only after the lifting of US sanctions. Washington takes the opposite position—first, compliance with the terms of the deal by Iran, and only later—the resolution of the issue of sanctions. Simultaneously, both parties launched a series of consultations with other parties. China ...
... returned all previously lifted sanctions against Tehran, but also significantly increased pressure on the financial, metallurgical, energy and a number of other sectors of the Iranian economy. It is likely that Biden will attempt to return America to the JCPOA. This will not be easy. The big question is: what will happen to Trump’s sanctions legacy? Will the sanctions be lifted, suspended or modified? Under what conditions could this be done? For example, will the renewal of the arms embargo become such a condition? In any case, a certain window of opportunity is opening up for ...
... Transformations in Iran: How to Keep up with the Times
The Middle Eastern allies of the USA
Major regional players, such as Saudi Arabia or Israel, will be wary of the Biden administration’s first actions regarding the return of the United States to the JCPOA and the sanctions relief. The Israelis are openly against the deal concluded under Barack Obama. Given that J. Biden is well acquainted with both Israeli politicians and American lobbyists for Israel, and being a frequent guest of AIPAC conferences, one should ...
... Sanctions Act (
PL 115-44 CAATSA)
, although he could have introduced them without Congressional approval.
The problem is that no other party to the JCPOA has recognised the cancellation of the agreement. There are legal grounds for this.
Ivan Timofeev:
US Sanctions Against Iran: New Escalation
In 2018, President Donald Trump decided to withdraw from the JCPOA. This move was confirmed by the President’s
National Security Memorandum of May 8, 2018
, as well as by Executive Order 13846 of August 6, 2018, which renewed unilateral US sanctions against Iran. Yes, the United States is a permanent member ...
... as the EU. Iran itself continued to comply with the key parameters of the deal. But it took "signal" steps to demonstrate its ability to return to the military nuclear programme in the event that parties to the JCPOA failed to implement the JCPOA. The extraterritorial sanctions of the USA also caused general irritation — a large number of European, Chinese, Russian and other companies were forced to leave Iran. Therefore, the attempts of the United States to declare itself an important participant in the JCPOA as ...
... members are concerned about Iran's regional activities and Iran's nuclear and missile programs, and on the other, Brussels appears to be dissatisfied with Trump's unilateral policies. Iran's previous experience in negotiations with European powers to save JCPOA, lift sanctions, and the INSTEX suggests for them to be on the US's side eventually. The only thing that can bring Europe closer to Iran is the fear of JCPOA's death, but it seems that even this critical issue will not change Europe's behavior. Thus the answer ...
... “Nuclear Deal”. Nevertheless, in obedience to US sanctions, E3 showed their inability to oppose the United States or lobby for a solution which would satisfy Brussels. With the re-imposition of large-scale US economic sanctions, including the secondary sanctions initiated by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), conducting business relations with Iran has become economically meaningless and toxic. Consequently, Iran was deprived of the opportunity to receive its dividends from the signing of the JCPOA and attempts to incorporate itself into the global financial system. INSTEX, advocated by the European leaders, proved to be just a symbolic tool used by the EU for rhetoric. All EU actions do not allow Iran to achieve the main goal for which it ...
... companies. In addition to penalties, the Department of the Treasury may greatly reduce an opportunity for these banks to have correspondent or payable-through accounts in the United States or prohibit them altogether.
Ivan Timofeev:
US Withdrawal From the JCPOA and Anti-Iranian Sanctions: Pros and Cons
These restrictions are piling up on major sanctions resumed by Washington after its withdrawal from the JCPOA. They are regulated by
Executive Order 13846 dated August 6, 2018
. These sanctions target the oil, car manufacturing,...
