... Russia do not necessarily see eye-to-eye on many important international matters. In fact, no two nations in the world have completely identical interests—no matter how close their relationship may be.
Furthermore, what alternative to partnering with China do Western politicians and analysts offer Moscow? Their logic suggests that instead of turning into a junior partner to China, Russia should become a junior partner to the US. Nonetheless, the reality is that the US cannot properly handle even the closest ...
... countries’ private sectors to maintain economic, technological, financial and other forms of cooperation with Moscow. Even though in the Global South they mostly abstained from subscribing to US and/or EU financial sanctions against Russia, many non-Western countries had to stop serving Russian credit cards.
The pressure of the US financial system affects large countries like China: in order to provide for unrestricted interbank transactions between Moscow and Beijing, the two sides have to move away from the US controlled SWIFT system and to switch to the Chinese CIPS system and the Russian SPFS system. Such a switch is not ...
... When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and the USSR collapsed, China was still a distant, almost exotic country. Through the lens of “trade through change,” the country was seen to be moving towards democracy, in the former colonial style, according to Western values. The “Eurocentrism” in particular reflected an attitude of superiority towards China, as it had long been the extended workbench of the global economy. Hardly anyone suspected that the country had long wanted to tell its own story and had developed its own interests: the Grand Strategy.
China’s path to modernity is characterized ...
... control with Moscow and the nuclear deal with Tehran; and it continued to constantly provoke China over Taiwan – while launching a trade and technology war against Beijing to hamstring its prime economic competitor.
In the meantime, Russia, India and China – the three leading non-Western countries in Eurasia, as well as many of the continent’s other important independent players, continued to rise economically, as well as consolidate their cooperation. In purchasing-power terms, they currently represent, respectively, the fourth-,...
... destiny, and suchlike.
For several centuries, the West had the upper hand, so the Chinese principle simply lost out due to China’s lesser military and economic potential. But the balance of power has now shifted, and it is no longer possible to ignore China and its approach, whether we consider it sincere or not.
The Western approach to development is exhausted not only because the West is no longer the strongest. Just as importantly, the world has become so complex that conflicts can no longer address the entire range of problems. Previously, clashes led to the establishment ...
... non-energy commodities such as grain, wood products and chemical products since Russian capacity to compete on more high-tech markets remains limited.
Against the background of the restrictions on scientific and technical ties with China imposed by the West, China pays more attention to scientific contacts with Russia, including the engagement of Russian scientists into its projects. During Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia in March 2023, the two sides agreed to prepare an ambitious plan on bilateral economic ...
... will change, and the positions of Russia-US and China-US relations in US diplomacy may be swapped. After the end of the war in Ukraine, Russia may no longer be the "most direct threat" to the United States with Russia's relations with the West easing. At the same time, China-US relations will become the most direct focus of the United States. This is not to say that Russia-U.S. relations will turn friendly and China-U.S. relations will necessarily deteriorate, but only that Russia-U.S. relations will be relatively less ...
... military phase, but is characterised by many other dimensions of rivalry—from information warfare to direct and comprehensive Western military assistance to Ukraine. The Euro-Atlantic region has not experienced such crises since the end of the Cold War,... ... in NATO. In this sense, it is symbolic that consultations on the Eurasian security issues began precisely between Russia and China—two major powers and permanent members of the UN Security Council. Thus, the very first steps in creating a new structure ...
... reflect the new vision of China's foreign policy in the new international environment of the 2020s and further elaborate the more general Chinese foreign policy doctrine of "a global community of shared future."
Andrey Kortunov:
Decoding China: GSI and Beijing's International Role
Although the GCI does not directly challenge the Western "rules-based international order" paradigm, it has still faced harsh criticism from the West, similar to the two earlier initiatives. Over the past year, there have been numerous statements arguing that the GCI is fundamentally flawed ...
... would have to accept these rules unconditionally. Of course, the Rest, and Russia in particular, found it difficult to accept such an arrangement. One should also note that over last couple of decades the global balance of powers shifted in favor of non-Western nations, in particular, in favor of China. This critical shift had to be reflected in the international system, but the West, and the United States in particular, turned out to be unprepared for it and unwilling to recognize and to accept the shift.
Zhao Huasheng:
As far as Russia and the ...
