... world, as well as objective resource, demographic, technological and other constraints? Are there any areas in which Russia and China have comparative advantages that allow it to claim global leadership? How could these benefits be “operationalized”?... ... we can assume that by this time the ongoing conflict in Ukraine is already over and that some kind of accommodation with the West is already achieved. Such accommodation will be staged and partial; the odds are that even in 2035 some of the US and EU sanctions imposed on Moscow in 2022–2024 will still be in place. It is unlikely that the pre-2022 pattern of Russia-West relations can be restored ...
... world is evolving, albeit slowly and reluctantly, in the direction of a new geopolitical, economic and technological bipolarity. This is clearly not what most of us hoped for earlier this century, but this trend cannot be ignored and it affects both Moscow and New Delhi.
Year after year, Russia is moving farther east, strengthening and developing its multiple ties with China. Year after year, India is shifting further west, increasing various forms of cooperation with the United States. This is the reality we have to acknowledge before moving any further.
This trend contains considerable risks. If it continues in the medium term, the two friendly nations may eventually ...
... wants to become “junior partners” of either bi-multipolar superpower, nor do they want the other to do so either. For instance, without India preemptively averting the scenario of Russia’s potentially forthcoming disproportionate dependence on China by becoming its alternative valve from Western pressure, Moscow could either have voluntarily submitted to becoming the “junior partner” of either the People’s Republic or the U.S.-led Western bloc since it might not have been able to stand independently on its own for too long.
The Global Importance Of ...
