..., they can lead to the worst scenario, a change of the deterrence doctrines of both Russia and the U.S. from a counter- or a second-strike capability to a pre-emptive one... ... risk inherent in the AUK–U.S. adventurism. The U.S. strategy of a new cold war with China envisages the creeping involvement of India in the anti-Beijing military alliance... ... proliferation in the Korean peninsula, and the less they work on the return of the U.S. to the JCPOA. Meanwhile Iran is raising the enrichment of uranium to 60 percent.
Is there a...
... in the SCO was its pronounced and unrelenting anti-Americanism, especially characteristic of Ahmadinejad’s years in power. China, remaining one of the key economic partners of the United States in the 2000s and 2010s, did not want the SCO to become a platform for anti-American rhetoric. Russia, too, had expectations to normalize relations with Washington at that time.
However, Tehran showed again that pragmatism,... ... of its foreign policy, proving that Iran can even negotiate the nuclear deal with the “Great Satan”. The failure of the JCPOA framework should be attributed to the inconsistency of the United States rather than to the stance professed by Iran. Besides,...
..., energy and a number of other sectors of the Iranian economy. It is likely that Biden will attempt to return America to the JCPOA. This will not be easy. The big question is: what will happen to Trump’s sanctions legacy? Will the sanctions be lifted,... ... towards key rivals in the international arena. The rivals themselves are also unlikely to let the grass grow under their feet. China, Russia and other nations will take into account the “bends” of the American policy, laying the groundwork in the event of ...
... supply, sale or transfer of conventional weapons and their components to Tehran. The document allows the United States to impose sanctions on any state involved in the arms trade with Iran. The US approach is not shared by other participants in the JCPOA, in particular, Russia and China, which regard the Iranian arms market as rather promising.
Dmitriy Kiku, Ivan Timofeev:
US Left Isolated, Iran Nuclear Deal Under Threat: What Will Crisis Over Iran in UN Security Council Lead to?
The expiration of a five-year embargo on the supply ...
... of balance and deterrence, and that the US' view of Iranophobia is a lie. Iran is, at the same time, aware that radical behavior can put the international community against it.
Iran is also aware that Trump's main goal is to force it to withdraw from JCPOA (in reaction to a possible extension of arms embargo), in order to put various powers, like Russia and China, on its side, against Iran. With this in mind, Iran is unlikely to engage in radical behavior, even if the embargo is extended.
While financing new arms purchases in the face of declining oil revenues due to sanctions and the global coronavirus ...
... start such a war, but the mixture of the Iranian pride and the US arrogance makes a highly explosive cocktail.
Pyotr Kortunov:
JCPOA: Forward Into the Past
Unfortunately, all prospects for bilateral negotiations between Washington and Tehran are gone at ... ... about a regional crisis management mechanism involving Iran and key neighboring Arab starts. Concerned overseas powers – like Russia, China, India, and EU – could assist in building this mechanism working with their respective regional partners. We should regard ...
... the 60-day period, this is a much more serious ultimatum, addressed primarily to the European parties of the agreement. From this we can conclude that Iran does not consider their efforts to create separate trading mechanisms sufficient to fulfil the JCPOA’s conditions. Since it is obvious that for Russia and China, US sanctions are not so important and fundamental, the ball is being thrown to the Europeans. It is a call to show more energy and somehow ensure that the European companies won’t comply with unilateral American sanctions. Achieving this, for ...
... accumulated potential of Iran’s telecom companies in communications control.
***
Despite the critical situation surrounding the JCPOA, which further deepens Iran’s domestic political crisis, Tehran is still determined to consolidate its positions in Syria ... ... follow the Lebanese scenario. Insufficient resources make the task far more difficult, and Tehran is forced to act with regard to Russia and China’s support, given the unwillingness of European investors to invest in post-war rebuilding of Syria. Iran also reaffirms ...
... may cooperate on a nuclear deal with Iran - the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) expires in a few years, so they will have to decide on further actions. The most... ...
The main issue at the moment is what the countries can do further in this direction. Russia did not participate in the last nuclear security summit in 2016, there is no... ... certainty that D. Trump will take part in the future summit. Richard Weitz noted that China-the U.S. cooperation in this area is more successful: there is a joint nuclear...
... Poland and Romania, as well as in Japan, South Korea, and the Middle East.
How might the 2013 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear accord with Iran impact U.S. Missile Defense deployments in Europe — particularly given the fact that Iran’s presumed nuclear weapons program and its missile program primarily justified those deployments.
Can the U.S., Russia, China and Japan find ways to at least freeze North Korea’s nuclear missile capabilities through diplomacy rather than through ...
