... directly with the Chinese counterpart. In Kazakhstan Erlan Turgumbayev is at the end of this international security communication line, perhaps suggesting why has kept his place in Tokayev’s cabinet. This domestic and foreign security integration between China and Kazakhstan is much more important than any foreign ministry statements. In China, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has very little power in setting or enacting policy. Where China did exercise agency in the Kazakh unrest though was in the very low ordinate ...
... Security Council and a stronger, perhaps more competent grip on the organs of state power in Kazakhstan. From this position, Tokayev might be able to achieve some policy goals designed to assuage popular discontent. Any material benefit to the people of Kazakhstan looks years away though, and despite humiliating himself in front of Russia and China, the new Tokayev may yet prove much the same as the old Nazarbayev.
... Armenia or Belarus, and not the actual bilateral relations.
Russia also cannot proceed from the assumption that fully ordinary bilateral diplomacy exists in relations with Lithuania or Romania. An opposite example is Russia's policy towards Pakistan, Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan - countries that have the resources necessary for independent survival and responsible foreign policy. China has tried to build traditional relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, but now these efforts are facing noticeable difficulties.
It is very likely that as international politics return to a dynamic balance of power, the leading powers will ...
...
Eight Principles of the “Greater Eurasian Partnership”
According to a study, between 2015 and 2020, Russian supplies amounted for 62% of the arms market in the whole region. This percentage has considerably increased during the last decade, with Kazakhstan being the largest consumer of the area [
viii
]. However, this monopoly is not equally distributed among Central Asian states. Uzbekistan prefers buying weapons from China, while Turkey is the largest arms supplier for Turkmenistan [
ix
].
In case of a conflict, together with the actual military presence on the ground, Russia holds another two trump cards. In peacetime, Central Asian bases are under direct control ...
...
note
the possibility of a merger between Kazakh underground forces and Uyghur separatists. Uyghur terrorist organisations are quite powerful. There is also the risk that terrorist groups established in oil-rich areas of the Caspian and northeastern Kazakhstan and the spread of jihadist ideology there could jeopardise China’s future interests in the region.
A new trend is for radical Islamists to engage increasingly in crime while ordinary criminals are themselves turning to radical Islamism, particularly in western Kazakhstan. Prisons have become breeding grounds ...
... electrical and mechanical machinery and equipment, coffee and tea, shoes, textile goods, and fruits and nuts. Vietnam’s exports to Kazakhstan grew six-fold in 2016 before falling by 13.6 per cent in 2017 and then growing by 20 per cent in 2018. The growth was ... ... sanctions. Mostly likely, sanctions against Tehran will continue to expand.
Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation with China
Zachary Paikin:
Orders Within Orders: A New Paradigm for Greater Eurasia
The Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation ...
The Working Group on the Future of U.S.-Russia Relations’ Report
Central Asia stands out as a comparatively “nontoxic” region where there are limited, but not insignificant, opportunities for U.S.-Russia collaboration both bilaterally and within multilateral frameworks: in the space industry, civil security, job-creation mechanisms and rural human capital, and knowledge sharing for instance. Any proposal of U.S.-Russia cooperation in a concrete domain will have to be made in a tri- or-multipartite...
... two working days, leading Russian, Mongolian, Chinese, Kazakh, and Kyrgyz experts, diplomats and journalists were discussing the implementation and integration of Greater Eurasia and the Belt and Road initiatives, the prospects for «Russia-Mongolia-China» economic corridor, the opportunities for cooperation in tourism in the context of the Tea Route, as well as the role and position of the Baikal-Amur region of Asia in Eurasian infrastructure projects.
A.K. Tulokhonov, Academician of RAS Siberian ...
... US$ 500 million is a blank cheque for Uzbekistan to spend however it wishes, the 250 million with CDB for support Chinese SMEs to bring technology transfers to Uzbekistan. This development is mirrored in the recent creation of a new
US$ 500 million Kazakhstan-China Eurasian Nurly Fund
and the
Russia-China Investment Fund
, a US$ 225 million fund denominated in RMB established principally by the sovereign wealth fund Russian Direct Investment Fund and China Investment Corporation. These funds are designed ...
... continued. An important event in Russia–China relations in the run-up to the summit was the state visit by the President of the Russian Federation, which resulted in the deepening of the comprehensive bilateral strategic partnership. The leader of Kazakhstan made a similar trip to China, as did the President of Kyrgyzstan, the country which officially assumed chairmanship of the SCO for the upcoming year following the Qingdao summit.
Andrey Kortunov:
SCO: The Cornerstone Rejected by the Builders of a New Eurasia?
The endorsement ...
