... handling relations with all partners, so as to maintain good relations, while also protecting Kazakhstan’s interests. Politically, Kazakhstan is deeply tied to Russia, which has been explicitly shown in January 2022, when it requested the intervention of CSTO and Russian peacekeepers to face an attempted rebel
takeover
. The same can be said on other politically relevant positions, such as collaborating on the
creation
of an integrated digital information system for EAEU member states. Economically, Russia ...
... Beijing sees consensus in the Eurasian space as the elaboration of a common development strategy bolstered economically.
Third
, blurring the SCO’s regional security functionality means that one cannot always see a clear boundary between the SCO and the CSTO, especially since a number of countries, including Russia, are members of both structures. Moreover, if we take the Central Asian track, it is the CSTO that remains the real guarantor of high-level security for the countries of the region in the face of current challenges and threats, while the SCO’s ...
... that many Kyrgyz citizens have dual Russian-Kyrgyz citizenship.
Kyrgyzstan has a relatively well-developed non-governmental sector, which is stronger than elsewhere in Central Asia. Many local NGOs receive Western funding and stand for looser ties with Russia, down to exiting the EEU and the CSTO. It is their activists who often condemn Russia’s policies. Kyrgyzstan expressly refuses to burn bridges behind its relations with Ukraine, focusing on close economic, cultural and humanitarian ties with the country.
The cautiousness of the Kyrgyz ...
... reasons — an alliance no longer becomes an instrument for ensuring the collective interests of its participants, but a factor in diplomatic interaction between them. Now, Russia’s conditional ally in the South Caucasus can use the presence of the CSTO as a way to put pressure on Russian diplomacy, while removing all responsibility from itself. In another case, we are witnessing a direct military clash between Russia’s formal allies, each of which demands Moscow’s support.
As a result, the very idea of union, in the sense ...
... meeting touched upon matters of further economic support for Tajikistan. By building up contacts with Tajikistan while simultaneously controlling its foreign trade with its key partner, the U.S. wants to limit Tajikistan’s bilateral relations with Russia.
Finally, as a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Tajikistan intends to view this organization as a resource in case Dushanbe loses control of the situation in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO). January 2022 set a precedent of resorting to the CSTO’s forces in Kazakhstan to protect ...
... to the European theatre. This does not mean that Moscow will not have the resources to help its allies in the event of a situation akin to what happened in Kazakhstan - the forces required for this are extremely small in number compared to those that Russia will have to use in the West.
Therefore, now it becomes relevant for all CSTO countries not only to coordinate their actions, but also to create new practical mechanisms for responding to emerging external and internal threats. These threats will not disappear and will not be solved by any external actors - the countries of ...
... to the
recent turmoil in Kazakhstan
dealt a
significant blow
to Ankara’s ambitions in post-Soviet Eurasia and the “Turkic World.” In quick order, Kazakhstan’s President managed to gain control over the situation in close coordination with Russia and the CSTO. The episode vividly underscored the importance that Russia attaches to the post-Soviet space as its primary zone of vital national security interests. It also highlighted the reality that, in today’s multipolar world, Turkey, despite all the talk ...
... significant Russian ethnic minority in the northern provinces of the country, or the official status of the Russian language, all highlight that one cannot easily dismiss the critical importance that Kazakhstan bears for the national interests of Russia. .
Russia’s domination in the CSTO peacekeeping mission was not about occupying Kazakhstan, as there was no direct threat that could endanger Moscow’s vital interests; on the contrary, Kazakhstan is a battle ground to win minds and hearts of the population and less of a fortress....
... to a clan power struggle which has likely sounded the death-knell of the Nazarbayevs in domestic Kazakhstan politics.
Andrey Kortunov:
Political Extremists, Gangs First Ones to Gain from Kazakh Turmoil
With the Kazakh government stabilized and the Russian-led CSTO force now withdrawing, the political risk scenarios surrounding Kazakhstan domestic political, social, economic, and geopolitical future are still just as opaque, complex, and institutionally multivariate. Tokayev is confirmed as still President ...
... (Xinjiang) and the other neighboring countries (Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran).
The intensification of religious extremism in the country will have repercussions on the neighboring countries. If Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan can count on Russia to provide a response in case of a major crisis (the CSTO), the fear is more consequential for Pakistan, a nuclear power, which for its part could be influenced by religious extremism and lead to an even more consequential conflict with India.
In the end, China now seems the most likely actor to take a ...