... In quick order, Kazakhstan’s President managed to gain control over the situation in close coordination with Russia and the CSTO. The episode vividly underscored the importance that Russia attaches to the post-Soviet space as its primary zone of vital ... ... Turkey, despite all the talk of becoming an independent regional power, will continue to assume its position as the bulwark of NATO in post-Soviet Eurasia, rather than join any rival—Russian or Chinese—pole. These basic geopolitical realities will remain ...
... neighboring countries. If Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan can count on Russia to provide a response in case of a major crisis (the CSTO), the fear is more consequential for Pakistan, a nuclear power, which for its part could be influenced by religious extremism ... ... take a position in the conflict in 2021. It remains to be seen whether Beijing wishes to engage in a conflict that the USSR and NATO had difficulty in controlling before it, or whether it wishes to confine itself to controlling the Wakhan Corridor and economic ...
... adversaries while the flow of migrants may mitigate some of its own internal struggles.
China and Russia, relieved that the NATO presence on their borders has been significantly diminished, still have a vested interest in the stability of Afghanistan.... ... Asian neighbors and that it may be forced to play a greater military role in the region as the primary security guarantor for CSTO allies.
These countries have been actively engaging with the Taliban and the Kabul government, hedging their bets in anticipation ...
... mere 0.4% of its GDP in its armed forces, with fewer than 6,000 soldiers relying on Soviet equipment, and therefore of little interest to NATO. Apart from the lack of military means, Moldova is a neutral state that does not wish to join an alliance (NATO or CSTO). A poll carried out in 2018 shows that 22% of Moldovans are in favour of a project to join NATO and 43% against it.
While Moldova's integration into the EU would be a strong symbol and testify to the resilience of Brussels' soft power in a post-BREXIT ...
... around Moscow. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) that many in Russia view as potential “Eurasian” counterbalance to the North Atlantic Alliance is hardly capable of filling the “geopolitical vacuum” in the near future. While NATO continues the process of enlargement, the CSTO, on the contrary, is shrinking, as Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan have all pulled out of the organization within the past ten years (Tashkent has even managed to leave the CSTO on two separate occasions, once in 1999 and again in 2012).
The idea ...
... littoral state. These military aspects of the deal echo a narrative long propagated by Russian president Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, namely, to avoid conflicts and maintain peace, there must be a legally binding agreement that NATO will not expand or penetrate into areas Russia considers within its “sphere of interest.” Such a ban would also be in the interests of Tehran, as Iran is against any Western presence on its borders.
From the perspective of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,...
... the political will of the
leaders of key Euro-Atlantic region countries, a process is launched for a
comprehensive restoration of partnership with Russia on the one hand, and NATO,
the U.S. and the EU on the other. Relations are built according to a CSTO-NATO
format. The main objective is to provide mutual security guarantees and joint
countermeasures against terrorism, extremism, and the rising tide of cyber
crimes. The U.S., EU, China, and Russia take steps to create an all-inclusive
security space....
... level of countering extremism. As long as Europe does not have an inclusive security institution, it will be hard to build an effective system to fight new threats and challenges. However, this does not preclude cooperation between Russia and NATO, the CSTO and NATO, Russia and the EU, and so on.
Ivan Timofeev
is Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club, Director of Programs at Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC).
First published in (
Valdai Discussion Club
)
... confrontation, re-energized national interest-based rivalries and re-emerging blocs, OSCE remains the only organization that is trusted – more or less – by all participating states. Merely because other security organizations, be it the US-led NATO or Russia-led CSTO, are deemed as representative of the political aspirations of a narrow group at best and serving national interests of the leading states at worst. In other words, regardless of criticisms,
trust
is the capital the organization still possesses against ...
... this sphere.
Mr. Tolipov, is this discussion relevant in view of the reality on the ground and the forces’ capabilities? Is such cooperation actually possible?
I've met many Western colleagues to discuss this issue and have frequently heard that NATO-CSTO cooperation on Afghanistan is hardly likely, ostensibly because of both obvious and deeper reasons. First, the United States is not interested in strengthening, and would rather check, the process of building cooperation. Second, the CSTO is far ...
