...
agreement
between the two. Be that as it may, at this stage, the Pacific countries are certainly not ready to host or deal with nuclear weapons in any other way.
Nuclearizing the Periphery: Great Power Impacts
Andrey Kortunov:
Does the Non-Proliferation ... ... of the five NWSs (nuclear weapon states)—China, Russia and the US—have direct stakes in the region. However, the crippled arms control system has not been trilateralized as China has refused to be included in the configuration, nodding to its incomparably ...
... weapons, like one does may not care about health when having no medical problems. It turned out later that the ubiquitous complacency was premature....
It is no accident that in the current climate of international confrontation, when threats of using nuclear weapons have once again become foreign policy instruments, arms control treaties are falling apart like a house of cards. For the treaties prevent returning nuclear weapons to their initial function as instruments of war and credible military threats. It is no coincidence that those now calling for the use of ...
..., these factors could seriously undermine its confidence in the ability to launch a guaranteed retaliatory strike with a force sufficient to ensure reliable deterrence.
On the other hand, the U.S. was reluctant to see further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons without them being linked to other issues. First and foremost, Washington is concerned about the radical growth of China’s nuclear capabilities—under the Trump presidency, Beijing’s inclusion in strategic arms control was, for some time, a
mandatory condition
for as much as extending the New START. Under the Biden administration, this issue was still in the initial stages, implying a softer touch, though it has never completely left the agenda and would ...
... 2018 during Donald Trump’s presidency.
One of the key functions of any publicly available strategic document is to deliver information to other states – both friendly and hostile. Yet only in few areas does this matter as much as in the field of nuclear weapons.
NDS-2022, and particularly NPR-2022, contain a significant number of clearly defined U.S. norms and doctrinal guidelines regarding nuclear weapons and strategic stability, with the main target audience being the top political brass of ...
....
START I was developed as a bilateral Soviet–American treaty but it became a multilateral instrument following the collapse of the USSR: Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine acceded to the current Russian–American treaty and committed to eliminating nuclear weapons on their territories to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear states.
To a certain degree, the Treaty’s key achievement lies not solely in asserting arms control but in ensuring that all subsequent treaties resulted in progressively greater reductions in strategic nuclear arms. The comprehensive control system developed as part of START I ensured sufficient mutual confidence in compliance with the ...
... the United States agreed to start a bilateral Strategic Stability Dialogue).
The only way to do this is to continue and expand arms control. Since third parties are not going to join the process in the near future and since no one has thus far calculated ... ... the next START should include broader and stricter measures for arms restrictions instead of another direct deep reduction of nuclear weapons. In addition to traditional ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, this means limiting all long-range nuclear air- and ...
... Still, no one thought to take any steps to prevent them from doing so. The only way to explain this is that the development of nuclear weapons in these countries, while a direct violation of the non-proliferation regime, is perceived as a regional problem,... ..., to some extent, responsible for the current state of affairs.
From today’s vantage point, the 50-year history of nuclear arms control looks increasingly disappointing. The arms control that we have known since Brezhnev and Nixon signed the first agreements ...
... the hypersonic weapons. Some of the work worth mentioning had been carried out by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research: a study “Hypersonic Weapons: A Challenge and Opportunity for Strategic Arms Control” [
1
] and a report on a UNIDIR-UNODA Turn-based Exercise “The Implications of Hypersonic Weapons for International Stability and Arms Control” [
2
]. One more important report was produced by the RAND Corporation, with a focus on proliferation ...
... strategic arms control treaty could limit additional types of weapons, such as short-range missiles and non-nuclear weapons that could potentially cause significant damage. Russia has always pushed to include strategic missile defences in these strategic arms control treaties, while U.S. officials have pressed to include so-called tactical nuclear weapons, amongst other areas, but both sides would abandon these positions in the course of the talks.
Andrey Kortunov:
The Post-INF Treaty world: Cutting Сosts and Reducing Risks
President Trump would prefer this — to get a new treaty that ...
... Kingdom have, of their own accord, reduced the number of nuclear warheads in their own arsenals to 300 and 215, respectively. For comparison, the Russian Federation and the United States have 7,200 and 7,000 units of nuclear arms, including tactical nuclear weapons and warheads stored in warehouses, respectively.
However, arms control cannot be reduced to an arithmetic problem. The question also includes ‘algebraic’ considerations — the combat readiness of nuclear arsenals, their degree of transparency, confidence-building measures, the dialogue on military doctrines,...
