... force sufficient to ensure reliable deterrence.
On the other hand, the U.S. was reluctant to see further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons without them being linked to other issues. First and foremost, Washington is concerned about the radical growth of China’s nuclear capabilities—under the Trump presidency, Beijing’s inclusion in strategic arms control was, for some time, a
mandatory condition
for as much as extending the New START. Under the Biden administration, this issue was still in the initial stages, implying a softer touch, though it has ...
... constructive dialogue on other areas of arms control. In this sense, the signing of the New START agreement in 2010 was rather an exception to the general trend.
Igor Ivanov:... ... the United States is the only party responsible for the current state of affairs in arms control. We cannot ignore the fact that the world ceased being bipolar when the... ... extremely critical of India and Pakistan when it emerged that they had developed their own nuclear weapons. Still, no one thought to take any steps to prevent them from doing...
... better. The problem with the New START Treaty is that it limits just Russia and the U.S., though Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine are technically included as they inherited some of the Soviet arsenals. In the past, the Russian government said that other (nuclear weapons states) should participate in these treaties.
The New START Treaty, like its earlier versions, focuses on long-range nuclear arm missiles and bombers. A new type of strategic arms control treaty could limit additional types of weapons, such as short-range missiles and non-nuclear weapons that could potentially cause significant damage. Russia has always pushed to include strategic missile defences in these strategic arms control ...
... public opinion in the West or the East that would force the national leaders to accept arms control as a foreign policy priority.
Therefore, Russia, the United States and... ... doing this.
First, even the absence of formal obligations under the INF Treaty or the New START Treaty cannot stop the sides from honouring them de facto. The analysis of... ... the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Withdrawal from the INF Treaty and, more importantly, refusal...
... we started preparing ourselves for the possibility of waking up in March 2021 in a world where there are no restrictions on nuclear weapons.
The potential disintegration of New START would not be catastrophic for Russia, all the more so because the country could derive some benefit from the “inter-treaty” period and approach the next, and hopefully inevitable, stage of arms control from the best position possible. However, a protracted nuclear arms race would present a serious danger both for ...
... United States and Russia, as well as by a large group of states that have the necessary capabilities. Many of those countries are in high-risk regions where military tensions are already elevated.
Dmitry Stefanovich:
Post-Helsinki Opportunities for New START and the INF Treaty?
I would venture to suggest that, following the withdrawal from the INF Treaty, the U.S. Administration will waste no time in making the decision not to prolong the New START Treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) signed ...
...
Second, traditional, legally-binding agreements that are subject to ratification—which have long constituted the structure of arms control—are also on their way out. Not only is it difficult and perhaps even impossible to ratify any national agreement today, especially with regards to nuclear weapons, the ongoing U.S.-Russia confrontation further complicates this process. Under such strained conditions, whether ... ... growing use of artificial intelligence.
Going forward, it is possible that instead of traditional bilateral regimes like INF and New START, future agreements will favor more flexible, multilateral formats like that of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. Such a format,...
