What Can We Counter Brute Force With? Three Models

The kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by US special forces has raised the question of what other states should do to avoid a similar outcome. Kidnapping a national leader is just one possible use of force. Current media coverage also highlights other options, such as the seizure of merchant ships and the threat of territorial annexation, or airstrikes. In other words, we are talking about the use of force by one state against another. The beginning of 2026 brings us back to the fundamental question of national security. How do states counter the use of brute force by other states? Which foreign policy model should be chosen to minimise damage or prevent the use of force?

During the Cold War, international relations were characterised by a clear alliance structure. Security could be ensured either by cooperating with the Western bloc, led by the United States, or with the Eastern bloc, led by the USSR. Many local conflicts unfolded precisely around this axis, although there were also countries that tried to distance themselves from this choice. Today, this structure has become less clear. Centres of power alternative to the United States exist, but they are either unwilling or unable to form clear alliances among themselves with an anti-American focus. China has growing influence in a number of countries, but has not yet converted this influence into military-political blocs. Russia is the most powerful player in the CSTO, but the alliance is not directed against the United States. Even when it comes to sanctions, third countries are reluctant to identify themselves as alternatives, exercising extreme caution in diversifying global finance and supply chains. Russia has found itself at the forefront here due to the very fact of a severe crisis in relations with the United States. The situation could change if the threat of force becomes even more acute. At the very least, the demand for support from China, Russia, or other centers of power could increase. The idea of ​​a "European army" could find new life. The dynamics of this model will be one indicator of the extent to which the world is truly becoming multipolar.

Finally, another adaptation model is to simply accept US demands. In the short term, Washington has every chance that threats or the actual use of force will produce results. In some places, it might succeed in changing a government, in others, seizing territory, or in forcing submission based on the painful experience of previous victims. But here, too, there's a difficulty. This adaptation model works when the use of force is backed by significant economic resources and a willingness to share them. Even then, sustainability of results is not guaranteed. Colossal resources were invested in supporting the Afghan government, but they didn't work. Just as, for example, the USSR's expenditures on socialist allies in Eastern and Central Europe failed in their time. As soon as resources dwindle, loyalty disappears, and demands are met like an Italian strike. Feigned loyalty to the United States and its leadership can prove more dangerous than open resistance.

The kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by US special forces has raised the question of what other states should do to avoid a similar outcome. Kidnapping a national leader is just one possible use of force. Current media coverage also highlights other options, such as the seizure of merchant ships and the threat of territorial annexation, or airstrikes. In other words, we are talking about the use of force by one state against another. The beginning of 2026 brings us back to the fundamental question of national security. How do states counter the use of brute force by other states? Which foreign policy model should be chosen to minimise damage or prevent the use of force?

The typological diversity of modern states also determines the diversity of threat adaptation models. There are approximately two hundred nation-states in the world; the vast majority will not be able to respond proportionally with force to match force. A balance of power remains a luxury enjoyed by only a small group of countries, but they define the core of global politics.

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Responding to force with force is perhaps the oldest strategy. It defines the essence of war, as well as the anarchic nature of international relations. Everybody is out for himself. The weak should be beaten. If you want to survive, use force or threaten to do so, in response or pre-emptively. Peace is temporary, as is one’s choice of allies. The best means of ensuring security is superiority over others, or the ability to inflict such significant damage on them that the use of force becomes too painful and costly.

The modern United States is the most formidable military power; it possesses a full range of modern weapons and a solid scientific, industrial, and technological base for their reproduction. Washington has the ability to project its power globally and conduct targeted military operations anywhere in the world. In the hands of the current administration, force is used without unnecessary formalities or verbal framing.

However, despite the media effect, military force still has its limits. Overt aggression against China or Russia would be suicidal. Other nuclear powers are more vulnerable due to their more limited capabilities. Under certain conditions, this could be mitigated by pre-emptive strikes, the interception of their nuclear-armed carriers, and other means. However, the very possibility of even a few carriers reaching US territory makes the use of force against nuclear-armed states justifiable only in the most extreme cases.

Building up nuclear arsenals or becoming a nuclear power is becoming a rational strategy for ensuring national security under the current conditions. The experience of North Korea shows that, with concentrated resources and political will, even a small country with extremely limited resources can become a nuclear power.

In the Korean case, the nuclear factor is complemented by a multitude of other safety mechanisms. The armoured train of the North Korean leader can be considered a peculiar symbol here. Kidnapping or assassinating the leader of the DPRK would prove to be a difficult task for any adversary.

Given emerging experience (including Greenland), the rationale for acquiring nuclear weapons is emerging for both US adversaries and allies. Among these adversaries, Iran is the most obvious candidate. US and Israeli special operations may have set back the nuclear programme. The country's political system is under pressure from internal protests and economic problems. But Tehran already has its own missile systems, as well as nuclear capabilities. If the current political system remains intact, Iran's emergence as a nuclear power is only a matter of time.

Among US allies, South Korea could make a move to pursue nuclear status. The immediate pretext is nuclear deterrence against North Korea. But in the long term, deterrence also makes sense in the broader context of relations with China, Russia, Japan, and even the United States. South Korea had previously considered obtaining nuclear weapons. Back then, the United States thwarted these plans with a combination of signalling sanctions and security guarantees. Whether the status quo can be maintained in the future remains an open question. Japan is another candidate. The country has a powerful industrial and financial base. Formally, the development of nuclear weapons could also proceed from the pretext of deterring North Korea. But in the future, this could extend beyond the Korean issue. In Europe, Germany appears to be an obvious candidate. The country has the necessary material and technical resources.

Paradoxically, Washington will likely find it more difficult to contain its allies' nuclear ambitions than its adversaries' appetites. Iranian-style sanctions are limited here due to the high level of interdependence among Western economies, while the use of military force against militarily powerful allies is risky. Their political course can be influenced through a change of power during the next election. But even here, difficulties may arise: fundamental foreign policy objectives tend to transcend political expediency.

In South America, Brazil is among the candidates. In Africa, South Africa may choose to develop them again. They will face a more difficult situation given their greater economic and military vulnerability. However, the nuclear option itself has a chance of becoming a long-term priority.

Clearly, nuclear weapons are not widely available. Their mere presence hardly solves all security problems. It merely mitigates the most severe options, such as direct military aggression. It's clear that a pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons against the United States by, for example, North Korea would lead to a more powerful retaliatory strike. The United States would only suffer severe damage, while North Korea would simply be destroyed in such a scenario.

However, recent experience shows that the use of force can be balanced even without nuclear weapons by countries with far less resources. Despite all its might, the United States was unable to defeat the resistance in Afghanistan. This was despite the fact that the insurgents were not supported by other powers, at least not on the scale on which the United States supplied the Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union. Despite its overwhelming superiority, Washington was ultimately forced to withdraw from Afghanistan and accept the new authorities.

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Most modern states do not possess the same power as the United States or the same social, cultural, or geographic conditions for resistance as Afghanistan. But there are many other areas in which even poorer countries will strengthen their security. These include counterintelligence, the security of leaders and key facilities, information security, and much more.

There is another model: the search for allies. During the Cold War, international relations were characterised by a clear alliance structure. Security could be ensured either by cooperating with the Western bloc, led by the United States, or with the Eastern bloc, led by the USSR. Many local conflicts unfolded precisely around this axis, although there were also countries that tried to distance themselves from this choice. Today, this structure has become less clear. Centres of power alternative to the United States exist, but they are either unwilling or unable to form clear alliances among themselves with an anti-American focus. China has growing influence in a number of countries, but has not yet converted this influence into military-political blocs. Russia is the most powerful player in the CSTO, but the alliance is not directed against the United States. Even when it comes to sanctions, third countries are reluctant to identify themselves as alternatives, exercising extreme caution in diversifying global finance and supply chains. Russia has found itself at the forefront here due to the very fact of a severe crisis in relations with the United States. The situation could change if the threat of force becomes even more acute. At the very least, the demand for support from China, Russia, or other centers of power could increase. The idea of ​​a "European army" could find new life. The dynamics of this model will be one indicator of the extent to which the world is truly becoming multipolar.

Finally, another adaptation model is to simply accept US demands. In the short term, Washington has every chance that threats or the actual use of force will produce results. In some places, it might succeed in changing a government, in others, seizing territory, or in forcing submission based on the painful experience of previous victims. But here, too, there's a difficulty. This adaptation model works when the use of force is backed by significant economic resources and a willingness to share them. Even then, sustainability of results is not guaranteed. Colossal resources were invested in supporting the Afghan government, but they didn't work. Just as, for example, the USSR's expenditures on socialist allies in Eastern and Central Europe failed in their time. As soon as resources dwindle, loyalty disappears, and demands are met like an Italian strike. Feigned loyalty to the United States and its leadership can prove more dangerous than open resistance.

First published in the Valdai Discussion Club.