US Elections: Significance for Iran

Given that American foreign policy today is largely burdened with containing Russia and China, an active anti-Iranian policy may face a lack of resources. Therefore, Trump’s victory will be undesirable for Tehran.

The outcome of the US presidential elections has very little significance for Russia. The elections are also unlikely to fundamentally change the course of American foreign policy towards China. However, for Iran, the outcome of the elections is of greater importance. A victory for Kamala Harris will not lead to a return to the parameters of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or the 2015 “Iran nuclear deal”, but is unlikely to lead to a sharp escalation of pressure on Iran. A victory for Donald Trump, however, could result in increased pressure on Iran, given the tougher position of the Republicans on relations with the Islamic Republic. For Tehran, a victory for the Republican candidate threatens a new wave of sanctions.

Iran has been in a confrontation with the United States for 45 years. It has been characterised by periods of increasing and decreasing tensions, when political and even military crises have been replaced by periods of mutual concessions and compromises. One particularly striking episode of de-escalation was the “Iran nuclear deal”. It was a multilateral agreement between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council — Britain, China, Russia, the United States and France, with Germany joining. The essence of the deal was that Iran would abandon its nuclear weapons programme in exchange for the lifting of sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, as well as the unilateral sanctions which had been imposed by the United States and other initiating countries. The Democratic administration lifted most of the sanctions on Iran, pursuant to its obligations under the JCPOA.

However, American participation in the deal was not secured by an international treaty. It was not approved by the US Senate and reflected only an executive order issued by the US President. Any new president could easily cancel the deal. Having come to power in 2016, Trump set a course for the US to withdraw from the deal, which was done in 2018. At the same time, the US presented Iran with a number of new demands. These demands were voiced by Secretary of State Pompeo and were called the “12 points”. Iran’s reaction was predictably negative, since the Americans, in fact, demanded the surrender of positions in key areas of Iranian foreign policy. In the end, the key argument against the new Trump presidency is the experience of his first term.

Meanwhile, four years of Joe Biden’s presidency have not returned the United States to the nuclear deal, although Biden had the authority to cancel Trump’s sanctions decrees. This was partly due to Iran’s retaliatory steps: against the backdrop of US sanctions, Tehran also began to scale back its obligations to implement the deal. The United States demanded that Iran return to compliance with the deal, and only then would be ready to consider easing or lifting sanctions. Iran, on the contrary, demanded that sanctions be lifted first, and only then was ready to return to the JCPOA’s parameters. Ultimately, the negotiations reached an impasse. Nevertheless, the period of Biden’s presidency was still not marked by the emergence of new legal mechanisms for sanctions at the executive level. The US did not lift sanctions, but it applied existing legal mechanisms without much enthusiasm.

The coming to power of Donald Trump will most likely return Iran to the list of priorities. However, in practice, Iran is already under serious sanctions pressure. The emergence of new measures is unlikely to destabilise Iran. Most likely, the direction of the blow will be the intensification of work with US allies and partners in order to strengthen sanctions compliance in their jurisdictions with regards to Iran.

Trump’s victory will be undesirable for Tehran, but it is difficult to call it mortally dangerous for the country. Despite the difficulties in the economy due to sanctions, Iran has managed to accumulate a margin of safety. The negative experience of the JCPOA and the successes of the DPRK in developing a missile and nuclear programme will probably motivate Iran to gradually develop its own capabilities.

Given that American foreign policy today is largely burdened with containing Russia and China, an active anti-Iranian policy may face a lack of resources. Therefore, Trump’s victory will be undesirable for Tehran.

The outcome of the US presidential elections has very little significance for Russia. The elections are also unlikely to fundamentally change the course of American foreign policy towards China. However, for Iran, the outcome of the elections is of greater importance. A victory for Kamala Harris will not lead to a return to the parameters of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or the 2015 “Iran nuclear deal”, but is unlikely to lead to a sharp escalation of pressure on Iran. A victory for Donald Trump, however, could result in increased pressure on Iran, given the tougher position of the Republicans on relations with the Islamic Republic. For Tehran, a victory for the Republican candidate threatens a new wave of sanctions.

Ivan Timofeev:
The Trump Factor

Iran has been in a confrontation with the United States for 45 years. It has been characterised by periods of increasing and decreasing tensions, when political and even military crises have been replaced by periods of mutual concessions and compromises. One particularly striking episode of de-escalation was the “Iran nuclear deal”. It was a multilateral agreement between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council — Britain, China, Russia, the United States and France, with Germany joining. The essence of the deal was that Iran would abandon its nuclear weapons programme in exchange for the lifting of sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, as well as the unilateral sanctions which had been imposed by the United States and other initiating countries. The deal was enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution 2231 in 2015, meaning it had the highest level of legitimacy. The Obama administration actively promoted the deal and considered it an achievement of American diplomacy. Previously, the United States had consistently increased its sanctions against Iran, combining its unilateral measures with restrictions imposed by the UN Security Council. Among the most painful measures for Iran was the threat of secondary US sanctions against other countries and their companies and citizens purchasing Iranian oil. By that time, the US had managed to develop a mechanism for targeted financial sanctions, aimed not at foreign countries, but at individual companies and corporations. The threat of sanctions was supplemented by the risks of administrative and criminal prosecution by the US authorities for evading sanctions if it was directly or indirectly related to American jurisdiction. The immediate impact of such a threat is difficult to assess. However, a number of buyers of Iranian oil heeded the US demands to reduce these purchases in order to avoid having sanctions applied to them. Ultimately, the Democratic administration lifted most of the sanctions on Iran, pursuant to its obligations under the JCPOA.

However, American participation in the deal was not secured by an international treaty. It was not approved by the US Senate and reflected only an executive order issued by the US President. The legislative framework for anti-Iranian sanctions was only suspended within the powers of the president, rather than cancelled. Any new president could easily cancel the deal. Moreover, the Iran Nuclear Deal Review Act (INARA) required the president to report to Congress every 90 days on its implementation.

Pyotr Kortunov:
JCPOA 1.01: Now or Never

Having come to power in 2016, Trump set a course for the US to withdraw from the deal, which was done in 2018. At the same time, the US presented Iran with a number of new demands. In addition to complying with the terms of the nuclear deal, the conditions for lifting sanctions included curtailing the missile programme, significantly reducing the remaining infrastructure in the nuclear industry, providing access for IAEA inspectors to all facilities in the country without exception, the release of all US citizens, ending support for groups and movements in the Middle East that the US considers terrorists, withdrawing troops from Syria, refusing to threaten US allies in the region, etc. These demands were voiced by Secretary of State Pompeo and were called the “12 points”. Iran’s reaction was predictably negative, since the Americans, in fact, demanded the surrender of positions in key areas of Iranian foreign policy. Despite criticism of the withdrawal from the deal from other members of the UN Security Council, the US continued the course of imposing sanctions. During the presidency of Trump, their set was expanded in comparison with the situation in 2015. In the end, the key argument against the new Trump presidency is the experience of his first term.

Meanwhile, four years of Joe Biden’s presidency have not returned the United States to the nuclear deal, although Biden had the authority to cancel Trump’s sanctions decrees. This was partly due to Iran’s retaliatory steps: against the backdrop of US sanctions, Tehran also began to scale back its obligations to implement the deal. The negotiations of the JCPOA signatories in Vienna in 2021 did not produce results. The United States demanded that Iran return to compliance with the deal, and only then would be ready to consider easing or lifting sanctions. Iran, on the contrary, demanded that sanctions be lifted first, and only then was ready to return to the JCPOA’s parameters. Ultimately, the negotiations reached an impasse.

Nevertheless, the period of Biden’s presidency was still not marked by the emergence of new legal mechanisms for sanctions at the executive level. At the level of Congressional law, only certain provisions of the bill H.R. 815, which became law, were an innovation. But they did not fundamentally worsen the sanctions regime. The past four years can be characterised as marking time. The US did not lift sanctions, but it applied existing legal mechanisms without much enthusiasm. Secondary sanctions against third-country individuals were rare, and criminal and administrative cases related to sanctions evasion did not deviate from the general routine. Iran, for its part, continued to evade sanctions using methods that had taken shape over a long period of time, avoiding a sharp aggravation of political contradictions with the US and its allies, but also not deviating from its line.

Andrey Kortunov:
Iran: The Middle East’s Joker

The coming to power of Donald Trump will most likely return Iran to the list of priorities.

We should expect a more complete coincidence of policies at the level of the Administration and Congress, given that the overwhelming majority of bills on Iran sanctions are proposed by Republicans or Republicans in coalition with Democrats. It is possible that new executive orders will tighten sanctions regimes, the passage of further laws supplementing the “legislative web” of restrictive measures against the Islamic Republic. However, in practice, Iran is already under serious sanctions pressure. The emergence of new measures is unlikely to destabilise Iran. Most likely, the direction of the blow will be the intensification of work with US allies and partners in order to strengthen sanctions compliance in their jurisdictions with regards to Iran. Despite the destruction of the JCPOA, Trump, during his presidency, still avoided a military escalation of relations with Iran. Given that American foreign policy today is largely burdened with containing Russia and China, an active anti-Iranian policy may face a lack of resources. Therefore, Trump’s victory will be undesirable for Tehran, but it is difficult to call it mortally dangerous for the country. Despite the difficulties in the economy due to sanctions, Iran has managed to accumulate a margin of safety. The negative experience of the JCPOA and the successes of the DPRK in developing a missile and nuclear programme will probably motivate Iran to gradually develop its own capabilities. The question remains whether Iran will accelerate its developments and to what degree of deterrence the United States is prepared to go to thwart both the Islamic Republic’s nuclear and non-nuclear plans.

First published in the Valdai Discussion Club.