Russian Aces in Syrian Skies
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Research Fellow at the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations under the Russian Academy of Sciences, RIAC expert
Russia’s admittedly highly unusual military operation in Syria is rightly in the global media’s crosshairs, with most analysts trying either to uncover Moscow's hidden objectives or forecast the mission’s outcomes. Deploying an air force contingent beyond national borders (especially in a distant country), launching airstrikes against the enemy to defend an ally in a domestic conflict, cruise missile attacks and heavy media support – all these features have been traditionally associated with the United States.
Russia’s admittedly highly unusual military operation in Syria is rightly in the global media’s crosshairs, with most analysts trying either to uncover Moscow's hidden objectives or forecast the mission’s outcomes.
Deploying an air force contingent beyond national borders (especially in a distant country), launching airstrikes against the enemy to defend an ally in a domestic conflict, cruise missile attacks and heavy media support – all these features have been traditionally associated with the United States. The Russian mission has been bolstered by the public and illustrative accentuation of national and international law.
Before the operation, President Putin obtained approval from the Federation Council, although the December 16, 2009 amendments to the Federal Law on Defense exempted him from such an endorsement for the prompt use of force at another state’s request. At the same time, President Obama carried out the operation in Libya in the absence of the approval of Congress that used its rights under law and voted against its extension 90 days after it had been launched. As for international law, Russia is acting on a request for military assistance from the legitimate and internationally recognized government of Syria, only to replicate the precedent of the U.S. coalition operation in Iraq – acting on a request from Baghdad. However, the Western coalition's attacks on targets in Syria are definitely in the gray zone, since Damascus has never issued appropriate consent [1].
These legitimization measures seem largely aimed at a Russian audience, which has been taught to condemn similar actions when carried out by the West. For the same reasons, Russian officials continue to stress the differences between the Russian mission in Syria and semi-legitimate Western action, ignoring the fact that the coalition is operating primarily in Iraq [2].
But now it is important to look at how aircraft were deployed.
Anadyr-2
Hmeymim airfield, satellite image
Russian servicemen and specialists were in Syria before the conflict erupted. This contingent includes the now famous 720th Russian Navy Material and Technical Support Facility in Tartus, the Military Attaché Office, instructors and advisors training Syrians to use military equipment bought in Russia. After the Syrian war broke out, Russia launched the Syrian Express – a chain of military supplies delivered by sea using Russian Navy ships, primarily landing vessels. Routes from Novorossiysk can ensure continuous traffic, while the Montreux Convention on the Black Sea straits and protection of the St. Andrew Flag guarantee delivery. The 2012 incident with Russian dry cargo ship Alaed has shown that deliveries made by commercial vessels can be easily blocked merely by legal action, for example by revocation of the insurance – without any use of force.
Air deliveries to Syria are even more difficult. Back in 2012, the Turkish authorities forced down a Syrian Air Moscow-Damascus flight alleging that military cargos had been carried across the Turkish airspace. Until recently, Russian military transportation aircraft carrying humanitarian supplies had been bypassing Turkey through Bulgaria and Greece, but in early September Sofia banned these flights. The decision was likely prompted by an urge to delay supplies for deploying the Russian contingent. Since then, Russian aircraft fly over the Caspian Sea, Iran and Iraq.
It is hard to find out when exactly Russia began to covertly transfer its forces to Syria for this operation. Most likely, the build-up of cargo and personnel started in August 2015 via the Syrian Express. Major engineering works were launched in the Hmeimim airfield southeast of Latakia, the area was chosen due to its logistical significance (Latakia is a major seaport) and security considerations. In fact, this is one of the few areas reliably controlled by government forces. On the downside, the small commercial airport is unfit for combat aircraft. As a result, in the absence of servicing sites and enough taxiways, they have been placed on one of the two runways.
Hmeymim airfield, satellite image
Aircraft appeared on the airfield in late September. Interestingly, in mid-August Turkish media reported the transfer of Russian MiG-31s, allegedly arriving at the Mezzeh airbase in a western suburb of Damascus. Today, it is clear that there was some disinformation around this, while the roots of the reports are intriguing. Several Russian combat aircraft may have arrived back in August, and Turkish journalists tapped into some murky sources to determine aircraft type, happening upon the 2007 contract for delivery of MiG-31E by Russia's Rosoboronexport.
The MiG Corporation has repeatedly denied the existence of any such contract. At the same time, this news might have been generated by rumors about the possible future arrival of Russian aircraft, or it may have been a coincidence.
Su-30SM multirole fighters were the first to land in Hmeimim. Several days later, Su-25SM attack planes and Su-24Ms followed. The advanced Su-34 bombers were the last to arrive. All flew over Iraq to escort transports equipped with commercial transponders handled by Iraqi air traffic controllers [3]. The West must have known about the deployment since then. Even if the flights had not been agreed upon with Iraq, they would have been traced by E-3 Sentry and E-7 Wedgetail AWACS systems [4] covering Iraqi skies. But the Pentagon and the State Department kept silent. Was it part of a game or an agreement with Russia? We are unlikely to learn the truth, at least in the near future. The media highlighted this fact using photos from social media and remote sensing preformed on request of information agencies like Stratfor.
Over 50 planes and helicopters in Syria were waiting an order from President Putin who on September 28 was to fly to New York.
A Limited Contingent
Su-30SM
A comparison of the Russian air group with the Western coalition’s standard expedition contingents shows that they are structured around similar principles, i.e. one or more multirole fighter units adapted for precision weapons, one or more tanker aircraft, and long-distance reconnaissance aircraft [5]. Should Russia opt to join the U.S. coalition and be based with the others somewhere in the Gulf, its contingent would have four to twelve Su-30SMs, one or two IL-78s, and an IL-20M.
One major difference in the Russian deployment lies in the fact that it is based close to the strike areas located 100-300 km from Latakia, so that flights can last less than 60 minutes. Most U.S. aircraft are based in the UAE and Qatar, over 1,500 km from the combat theater. Some allies are based in Kuwait (Canadians), Jordan (part of the French force) and Cyprus, with the British operating from their RAF Base Akrotiri, which means that they need much more flight time to reach their targets [6]. Due to their frontline deployment, Russian pilots can perform several flights a day, whereas one coalition sortie may take eight hours or more, placing a significant strain on both aircraft and crew. Besides, Russians do not need in-flight refueling that is still rare for Russian tactical aviation, while some aircraft, for example the Su-25, have no refueling systems at all.
Forward basing definitely comes with reduced security, but an alternative deployment would only be feasible in Iran, an unlikely scenario for diplomatic reasons. The only hope seems to lie in vigilant Russian and Syrian guards, and the loyalty of Latakia residents [7].
Su-24M
Equipped with precision weapons, target acquisition and navigation systems, Russia’s multirole fighters are a solid main strike asset. Other countries add outboard containers with electro-optical systems, infrared imagers, range scopes and aimers. In addition, bombs are fitted with JDAM guidance systems. This approach is popular due to its simplicity and cost-effectiveness, with JDAM’s average cost standing at USD 27,000, around the cost of a one-hour flight for an F-16 fighter. In comparison with a guided missile, a bomb boasts a much greater payload-to-total mass ratio, as well as greater kill ability. Cheap guided bombs have virtually ousted their unguided alternatives, while the U.S. Air Force has managed to almost completely switch to precision weapons. Before the JDAM system was adopted, the Desert Storm operation employed only eight percent of guided air-delivered munitions, accounting for 84 percent of total munitions costs.
Unfortunately, due to both objective and subjective factors (such as inferior aerodynamics), Russia does not have a JDAM program for retooling unguided weapons into guided systems. Russian aiming and navigation container systems for tactical fighters are also still at the R&D and testing stage. As a result, strike missions rely on specialized aircraft, bombers and attack planes optimized for ground targets. With help of advanced built-in aiming systems, modernized Su-24s and Su-25s drop the unguided bombs almost as precisely as their guided counterparts, while precision weapons are used for critical and complex targets.
Su-25
Hence, the Su-24Ms, Su-25SMs and Su-34 attack aircraft and bombers comprise the Russian air group’s core strike force, while air cover is provided by four Su-30SMs, the most advanced Russian fighter, and reconnaissance – IL-20M ELINT aircraft. There are also Mi-8AMTSh and Mi-24P helicopters for search and rescue and direct troop support.
As of mid-October, the Russian air group included twelve Su-24Ms, twelve Su-25SMs, four Su-30SMs, six Su-34s, one IL-20M, as well as an unknown number of light drones and helicopters.
Operation Inherent Resolve Russian-Style
The Russian air campaign began on September 30, 2015 several hours after the operation had been officially announced. At the initial stage, aircraft focused on enemy headquarters, command posts, depots and fuel and lubricants storage sites in order to disorganize enemy combatants prior to the government army’s massive offensive launched on October 8.
Attacks were mounted against ISIS and other antigovernment forces, mostly using unguided bombs, Su-24M bombers and Su-25SM attack aircraft, which are normally sufficient for open and relatively large and unfortified targets. Complex, small and fortified facilities were attacked using guided weapons systems including KAB-500S satellite-guided bombs, X-25M and X-29 guided missiles, and cassettes with self-aiming antitank elements, as well as Su-34 bombers.
Su-34 with KAB-500S air bomb
Su-30SM fighters cover the attack aircraft and bombers during the airstrikes, which seems especially critical for operations near the Turkish border because the Turks have a track record of attacking Syrian planes and helicopters for any, even brief, incursion.
During the first week, Russia matched the Western coalition in terms of the number of airstrikes per day in Iraq. In Syria, the allies have been quite passive recently, frequently delivering only several strikes a day against the ISIS hardware and manpower.
After the Syrians launched their ground offensive, Russian air attacks abruptly intensified, with 86 strikes on October 13 alone – an impressive figure of minimum three averaged sorties a day. And the number does not include helicopters engaged to support the Syrian offensive, although low-flying helicopters do arouse concern. All total, strike aircraft have made 669 sorties over two and a half weeks.
The Russian group has seen a decline in strike intensity after the October 13 peak. Hence, we can expect reinforcements, primarily provided by modern Mi-28N combat helicopters, as well as attack planes and fighters. An extra airbase may be also required, as well as the engagement of long-range aviation from airfields in the North Caucasus.
The Russian Navy is working hard to bolster these air defense capabilities and providing supplies. It has also demonstrated its massive strike capacity, using the sea-based cruise missiles launched from the Caspian Sea. Frigate Dagestan and small missile ships Grad Sviyazh, Veliky Ustyug and Uglich have fired 26 Kalibr cruise missiles against 11 targets to showcase Russia’s assets for precision conventional strikes at strategic distances, something previously employed only by the United States and Britain [8].
the Russian Federation, October 16, 2015
This cruise missile launch was accompanied by impressive video (https://youtu.be/iMasnaAf_H4) illustrating Russia’s ability to wage a live media war, recently a prerogative of the United States. As far as media is concerned, the Russian effort appears more massive than that of the coalition, offering daily briefings and videos of targets hit, photo arrays on a special website, generals able to face the press with eloquence and journalists given access to cover the operations in situ, etc.
In 1991 before Desert Strom, the United States was still affected by the Vietnam experience because it is victories rather than years that cure national traumas of such scale. In 2015 when the Syrian operation was launched, Russia seemed to be recalling Afghanistan. Should Russia fulfill the tasks set, no matter how ambitious, ranging from stabilizing the frontline to destroying IS, it would mean that, in reality it is defeating both today’s flesh-and-blood enemy and the 25-year-old ghost of the moral defeat. Victory would bring Russia stronger and better-equipped allies, and also earn it a full-fledged role of a global actor and a center of power. Players only use their aces when they intend to win.
1. Damascus did not complain to the UN about military aggression.
2. As of October 13, 2015, attacks on targets in Iraq accounted for 64.5 percent of the total, while strikes in Syria peaked in winter.
3. Commercial flights over Iraq continue despite the war on the Islamists and the year-long air campaign, although many international routes have been moved to Iranian airspace.
4. The E-7A Wedgetail is an Australian AWACS aircraft.
5. Based on Central Command assets, the U.S. air group is similar to, but much stronger than the others.
6. Turkey has recently allowed the U.S. Air Force to use its air bases, although with limited scope, primarily for search and rescue operations. No intensity outbursts have been traced.
7. Latakia is the largest Alawite city and Bashar Assad’s birthplace. For a brief time after WWI, it was the capital of the Alawite State.
8. During the current campaign, Americans used sea-based cruise missiles once, with 47 Tomahawks launched in September 2014 from a missile cruiser and a destroyer (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/09/23/tomahawk-missiles-the-latest-u-s-weapon-used-against-islamic-state/). Great Britain is relatively short of Tomahawks that are used mainly by nuclear submarines. The Royal Navy launched a limited number during the Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq (2203) and Libya wars.
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