Russia and India: Key Areas of Cooperation

President Vladimir Putin’s current visit to India is his first since the start of the Special Military Operation in 2022. This gives it a certain symbolic weight: over the past three years, Russia–India relations have not only withstood the impact of Western sanctions and political pressure but have also developed to a degree that would have seemed unimaginable just a decade ago. The President’s trip to India serves as a consolidation of the progress achieved and a signal that the special relationship between Moscow and New Delhi is here to stay, while trade between our countries will continue to grow.

The political partnership between Russia and India represents a rare phenomenon in Russia’s foreign-policy practice: it is not reactive but genuinely proactive. It is not a tactical response to isolated challenges, but a deliberately shaped and consistently maintained axis designed to generate long-term, mutually beneficial political dividends. At every meeting, Vladimir Putin and Narendra Modi reaffirm their shared commitment to the idea of a multipolar world. In the context of an international order evolving toward natural multipolarity, any state seeking to preserve internal stability and autonomy in political decision-making will be able to do so only through a broad network of ties with other centers of power. Russia and India view each other precisely as such centers. Whatever turbulence global politics may experience in the coming decades, New Delhi remains confident that Moscow will continue to be a reliable and valuable partner, while Moscow is equally certain that New Delhi will maintain its course of strategic autonomy and will not join any anti-Russian coalitions, including military ones. Such confidence is uncommon in relations between major powers. It has allowed both sides to navigate difficult periods in the past—and will remain a key factor enabling them to withstand any challenges that may arise in the future.

Russia and India’s economic relations are breaking records: the current fiscal year will likely see bilateral trade exceed $75 billion, a level not observed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This surge was driven primarily by Western sanctions and the subsequent rupture of Russian exporters’ traditional commercial ties with partners in Europe, which accelerated the long-announced “pivot to the East.” It quickly became clear, however, that at least in part this pivot to the East resulted in a re-pivot toward the West: a significant share of Russian hydrocarbons sold to India and other Asian states is re-exported to Europe after refining. India thus serves as a transit hub, ensuring the uninterrupted operation of this “oil pump.” As a result, Russia sells at a discount, Europe buys at a premium, and the difference is captured by Indian refining companies as a reliability premium amid geopolitical turbulence.

This model faces two fundamental problems: first, its growth has clear limits; and second, it is highly dependent on the broader foreign-policy environment.

To avoid this situation, and at the same time address the massive trade imbalance between India and Russia, it is necessary to change the very model of economic interaction. At present, India exports to Russia primarily agricultural goods, pharmaceuticals, and light-industry products. To prevent a collapse in trade should sanctions be lifted or further tightened, India’s exports to Russia must expand. This applies above all to heavy machinery and high-tech products, to which Russia has lost access because of sanctions.

Another important area of cooperation is the creation of new production chains. Against the backdrop of declining volumes of Western investment in its economy and a clear reduction in interest from Western companies, India needs capital and technology. Russia, living under sanctions, needs goods. This creates a situation that quite literally pushes the two economies toward cooperation and toward forming production chains in which Russia can assume responsibility for R&D, while India takes on the role of the manufacturing base.

One of the key factors that can—and should—shape the further convergence between Russia and India is the improvement of expert capacity. Both Russia and India face a clear shortage of specialists, although the deficit is far more pronounced in India. The country still lacks academic institutions that systematically train experts on the contemporary Russian economy and legal system with knowledge of the Russian language. In this context, developing such expertise becomes an immediate priority. This challenge can be addressed through a comprehensive effort: opening branches of Russian universities and think tanks in India, increasing quotas for Indian students in Russia (including in the social sciences), and expanding exchange programs. The greater the number of qualified Russia experts in India—and vice versa—the more substantial the impact of this factor will be.

President Vladimir Putin’s current visit to India is his first since the start of the Special Military Operation in 2022. This gives it a certain symbolic weight: over the past three years, Russia–India relations have not only withstood the impact of Western sanctions and political pressure but have also developed to a degree that would have seemed unimaginable just a decade ago. The President’s trip to India serves as a consolidation of the progress achieved and a signal that the special relationship between Moscow and New Delhi is here to stay, while trade between our countries will continue to grow.

Politics

Russia-India Сooperation in Agriculture and Food Security. RIAC and Synergia Foundation Report

The political foundation of the current stage of Russia–India relations was laid in 2000, when Vladimir Putin and Atal Bihari Vajpayee signed the Agreement on Strategic Partnership. Since then, nothing has changed conceptually in the political relationship between Moscow and New Delhi: neither side seeks to transform the partnership into a formal alliance. The addition of the term “specially privileged” to the phrase “strategic partnership” in 2010 only underscored that relations with India are no less important for Russia than those with China.

The vector set 25 years ago has shaped the development of bilateral relations ever since. Moscow supported New Delhi’s bid to join the SCO, where India was eventually admitted in 2017, and has consistently advocated for India’s inclusion among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. India, in turn, has steadily supported Russian initiatives in international organizations and, after the start of the conflict in Ukraine, declined to condemn Russia—much to the disappointment of European and American officials and politicians who had expected moral support from the “world’s largest democracy.”

The reasons that allow this strategic partnership to endure and flourish have puzzled outside observers for decades. Indeed, in the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet–Indian partnership, formalized by the 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, was usually explained through a set of entirely practical considerations: the Soviet leadership’s desire to secure a valuable ally in Asia, to establish close ties with one of the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, and to shield itself from a potential Chinese attack—something that was taken quite seriously in both New Delhi and Moscow at the time. Had clashes along the Line of Actual Control in the Himalayas or on the USSR’s Far Eastern frontiers escalated into a full-scale armed conflict, Beijing would have faced the prospect of waging a two-front war in two remote and inhospitable theaters, with complex logistics and harsh climatic conditions. After the end of the Cold War and the normalization of Russian-Chinese relations, this incentive for rapprochement disappeared, yet it had no effect on the relationship between Moscow and New Delhi.

It appears that the underlying reason is that the political partnership between Russia and India represents a rare phenomenon in Russian foreign policy practice: it is not reactive, but proactive in nature. It is not a tactical response to an emerging problem, but a deliberately constructed and carefully maintained axis designed to yield mutually beneficial political dividends in the future. At every meeting, Vladimir Putin and Narendra Modi reaffirm their commitment to the concept of a multipolar world. In the context of a shifting international order moving toward natural polycentricity, any country seeking to preserve internal stability and independence in political decision-making in the new era can do so only by relying on a broad network of interactions with other centers of power—and Russia and India view each other precisely as such centers. No matter how turbulent global politics becomes in the coming decades, New Delhi remains convinced that Moscow will continue to be a reliable and valuable partner, while Moscow is confident that New Delhi will stay the course of strategic autonomy and will not join any anti-Russian alliances, including military ones. Such confidence is rare in relations between major powers, and it has allowed the partnership to withstand difficult moments in the past and will continue to do so in the future.

Economy

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Economic relations between Russia and India are breaking records: the current fiscal year’s trade turnover is likely to exceed $75 billion, a level not seen since the dissolution of the USSR. This growth has been driven by Western sanctions and the subsequent rupture of Russian exporters’ commercial ties with their traditional partners in Europe, accelerating the long-declared “pivot to the East.” It soon became clear, however, that at least part of this pivot to the East amounted to a partial “turn back toward the West.” A significant share of Russian hydrocarbons sold to India and other Eastern states ends up in Europe after being refined. India thus plays the role of a transit hub, ensuring the uninterrupted functioning of the “oil pump.” In the end, Russia sells at a discount, Europe buys at a premium, and the margin is pocketed by Indian refineries as a reliability premium amid geopolitical turbulence.

This model has two major problems. First, its growth has clear limits and is extremely dependent on the broader foreign-policy environment. The record figures were reached in record time—less than three years—but Russia is now selling to India, in value terms, roughly the same amount of oil it once sold to Europe before the conflict began. This does not mean that trade growth will stop in the next fiscal year; however, the pace will clearly slow, and the stated goal of reaching $100 billion by 2030 will have to be approached gradually rather than through a sharp surge. The second problem will become fully apparent if the West either abruptly lifts or, conversely, tightens sanctions. In the first scenario, India’s role as an intermediary would no longer be needed; in the second, there is a risk that Indian companies—deeply integrated into Western business networks—may choose not to take the risk and withdraw, leaving the intermediary role to firms from other countries. In either case, trade turnover could collapse just as rapidly as it grew.

To avoid this situation, and at the same time address the enormous trade imbalance between India and Russia, the very model of economic interaction must change. At present, India exports mainly agricultural products, pharmaceuticals, and light-industry goods to Russia. To prevent a collapse in trade should sanctions be lifted or tightened, India’s exports to Russia must expand. The focus should be on heavy machinery and high-tech products to which Russia has lost access due to sanctions. This would benefit both sides. India would gain a guaranteed market and an incentive to develop its own high-tech industries (spare parts, electronics, and so on), which has been declared a priority under the Make in India and Atmanirbhar Bharat programs. Russia, in turn, would be able to secure access to goods that it cannot produce domestically in the short term.

Another important area of cooperation is the creation of new production chains. Against the backdrop of declining Western investment in its economy and a clear reduction in interest from Western companies, India is in need of capital and technology. Russia, living under sanctions, needs goods. This creates a situation that effectively pushes the two economies toward cooperation and the formation of production chains in which Russia can assume responsibility for research and development (R&D), while India serves as the manufacturing base. With sufficient flexibility, such arrangements would, on the one hand, make it possible to involve companies from third countries in production, and on the other, facilitate the entry of jointly produced Russian-Indian goods into global markets.

Finally, India could play with respect to Western technologies and investment the same transit-hub role it already plays with oil—serving as an intermediary through which Western companies interested in maintaining or expanding their business in Russia could invest and export to the Russian market. If this mechanism has worked for oil, it may also work for capital and technology. The only question is political will, well-developed operational mechanisms, and a clearly organized logistical framework capable of reducing transaction costs.

Experts and People

Gleb Makarevich:
Inventing Eurasia: How Russian Proposals for a Collective Security System Harmonize with South Asian Realities

One of the key factors that can, and should, shape the further rapprochement between Russia and India is raising the level of specialized expertise. An expert in and of himself—whether in the Russian or Indian economy, specific industries, or domestic politics—does not produce or sell a physical good. But as a specialist, he can identify in a timely manner which goods should be sold, to whom, and where. Expert services can save companies considerable resources.

At the same time, there is a clear shortage of specialists in both Russia and India, though the deficit is far more pronounced in India. In Russia, in recent years, specialized universities, responding to the demands of the moment, have significantly expanded the training of professionals who work directly with India, primarily economists with knowledge of Hindi (although the training of specialists in Indian law remains seriously underdeveloped). In India, however, there are still no academic institutions that systematically train experts in the modern Russian economy or Russian law with knowledge of the Russian language. Most universities that teach Russian studies are oriented toward history and literature. As a result, the niche of specialists on contemporary Russian realities is often filled by individuals who, in many cases, enter the field by chance and derive all their information about Russia from the U.S. and British press.

In this context, training specialists becomes a top priority. This task can be addressed through a comprehensive set of measures—opening branches of Russian universities and analytical centers in India, increasing quotas for Indian students in Russia (including in the social sciences), and intensifying exchange programs. The more highly qualified Russia specialists India has, and vice versa, the more significant the impact of this factor will be.

Finally, an important issue is the development of tourism. It is no secret that the flow of tourists from Russia to India is far greater than the flow from India to Russia. Some travel to India for a couple of weeks of warm sea, sunny skies, and fresh fruit in the middle of winter; others come in search of ancient wisdom or just because it is interesting to them. The inbound flow from India, however, is far weaker. First, Indians on average have less disposable income, and those who do tend to prefer domestic tourism, neighboring countries, or Europe. Second, many Indians simply have no idea what there is to see in Russia beyond Red Square and the Hermitage.

These problems can and should be addressed by reducing costs and removing barriers. An important step in this direction could be an agreement to waive visas for organized tour groups. However, corresponding measures are also required from Russia’s tourism industry, above all special offers tailored to Indian travelers, who may be interested not only in the classical destinations of Moscow and St. Petersburg, but also in natural and industrial tourism.

At the time of writing, neither the visit’s program nor the list of signed documents and agreements had been released. Nonetheless, the visit itself is the main event: it signals that the period when the public dimension of the partnership had to be downplayed so as not to ruffle Western feathers has now passed.