A Thaw in Russia-Saudi Relations?
Sergei Lavrov and Adel bin Ahmed Al-Jubeir in Kremlin.
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On August 11, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir was in Moscow on an official visit and met with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov, aiming to facilitate the reset of the bilateral relationship launched by Riyadh earlier this year after the change of power in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
On August 11, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir was in Moscow on an official visit and met with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov, aiming to facilitate the reset of the bilateral relationship launched by Riyadh earlier this year after the change of power in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Last January 23, Salman ibn Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud, half brother of the late King Abdullah took throne of Saudi Arabia. This new ruler immediately began updating the country's domestic and foreign polices. As part of this initiative, Foreign Minister Saud al-Feisal, who had occupied the post since 1975, was replaced by the younger and more dynamic Adel Al-Jubeir.
Saudi’s new leaders have markedly stepped up contacts with Moscow, and this June, Deputy Crown Prince and Defense Minister Mohammad bin-Salman attended the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), along with Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir, Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Ali Al-Naimi, Governor of Saudi Arabia’s General Investment Authority Abdullatif Al-Othman, as well as other officials and business leaders. While in St. Petersburg, the Crown Prince also met with President Vladimir Putin. In fact, that was the first major official delegation from Saudi Arabia to Russia since 2011, when bilateral relations were virtually frozen over fundamental differences on Syria.
Saudi Arabia’s new leaders genuinely want to diversify their international political and economic ties, and Russia may appear attractive due to its prominent role in the energy market and established relations with Iran, Syria, Iraq and Yemen
At first glance, improved ties between Riyadh and Moscow may seem part of Saudi Arabia’s response to the rapprochement between Washington and Tehran, Saudi's eternal regional rival. However, there are grounds to believe that Saudi Arabia’s new leaders genuinely want to diversify their international political and economic ties, and Russia may appear attractive due to its prominent role in the energy market and established relations with Iran, Syria, Iraq and Yemen.
The key aim of Al-Jubeir's visit was "discussion of a broad spectrum of global and regional problems in order to reach agreement for the two countries’ mutual benefit." Since top diplomats of Russia, Saudi Arabia and the United States met in Doha in early August, Riyadh seems eager to continue these talks soon.
What do Saudis Want?
As seen from the talks between Lavrov and Al-Jubeir in Moscow, the Syrian problem is of greatest concern to Saudi Arabia. They are still at variance over the issue with Russia, but only as far as President Bashar Assad is concerned.
Riyadh believes that Assad is "part of the problem rather than of the crisis’ resolution, and there is no place for him in any future Syria." Saudi does not rule out any of the three scenarios of regime change potentially on the table, i.e. peaceful regime change, regime change via transitional council, and military regime change. At the same time, Moscow backs negotiations between Damascus and the opposition. The sides concur on the need for a transitional period and for the preservation of government structures. Moscow also agreed to advance individual contacts with the Syrian opposition, including with the Syrian National Council, sponsored by Saudi Arabia. However, Riyadh hopes that Moscow will turn its back on Assad.
What is in it for Moscow?
In exchange for potentially making these concessions, Saudi Arabia promises to "energize relations with Russia along all tracks including military cooperation." Riyadh might even sign a contract with Moscow for the purchase of certain weapons [1], although the sum and the tentative date of the deal have yet to be determined.
The Syrian problem is of greatest concern to Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund has outlined plans to invest USD 10 billion in Russian infrastructural, agricultural, medical, and logistical projects. According to Russian Direct Investment Fund Director General Kirill Dmitriev, seven projects have already been selected, while ten agreements are due to be signed before the end of 2015. However, the transfer period of four to five years seems less than satisfactory, because during plans may well change over that time.
The recent St. Petersburg International Economic Forum produced another relatively positive message, i.e. six bilateral agreements on nuclear energy cooperation, providing Russian businesses with a legal basis for the construction of 16 nuclear reactors for electric power generation. However, the involvement of Russian specialists is under a cloud, because similar accords have also been granted to the United States, France, Argentina, Japan among other countries.
What is to be done?
Improved bilateral trade and economic relations are definitely a welcome development, as they open a tried and tested path to alleviating political tensions. And prospects for cooperation seem to be presenting themselves in numerous fields, including hydrocarbons, farming, medicine, infrastructure, etc.
But is it appropriate for Moscow to concede over President Assad in exchange for Riyadh's promises, while they are unsubstantiated by actual contracts? Russia would not benefit from making a decision this significant hastily.
Saudi Arabia’s new leaders may yet unlock a new stage in the bilateral relationship. In fact, they have already made a couple of friendly moves such as offering their neutrality over the Russia-Ukraine conflict and nonparticipation in sanctions against Russia. At the same time, remember that the Muslim world respects muscle that can be relied on in extremis. Unconditional concessions to Saudi Arabia – over Assad now and later on over Iran and Yemen, Saudi's other headaches – would damage Russia's relations with those countries in the Middle East.
By giving in, Russia may receive a one-time bonus of investment in a Russian pilot project, or in weapons or construction contracts, but even that would hardly create a solid foundation for the continued development of bilateral relations in trade, economy and investments.
Unconditional concessions to Saudi Arabia – over Assad now and later on over Iran and Yemen, Saudi's other headaches – would damage Russia's relations with those countries in the Middle East.
What Russia should do now is demonstrate political will in defending its interests, for example by insisting on its initiative about establishing a broad coalition against Islamic State terrorists. Bilateral tensions seem to have peaked, and Riyadh is unlikely to be interested in re-igniting the confrontation. Common sense and practical needs point to a normalization of the dialogue, meaning that both sides need compromise.
Russia has both the time and resources to defend its interests and thus can count on additional friendly steps from Riyadh before King Salman's official visit to Russia expected this year.
1.In particular, the deal may cover Iskander short-range ballistic missiles.
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