Prospects for the Development of Russian-American relations

There has been a peculiar pattern in Russian-U.S. relations. Every five or six years, the leaders of both countries solemnly declare the end of the “Cold War”. However, within a short time, the two sides – Moscow and Washington – again find themselves in a state of crisis, be it political or military. For example, Russian and American negotiators started arms control processes anew, but then the cycle of rapprochement/divergence repeated again.

There has been a peculiar pattern in Russian-U.S. relations. Every five or six years, the leaders of both countries solemnly declare the end of the “Cold War”. However, within a short time, the two sides – Moscow and Washington – again find themselves in a state of crisis, be it political or military. For example, Russian and American negotiators started arms control processes anew, but then the cycle of rapprochement/divergence repeated again.

The failures of all previous attempts to achieve rapprochement between Russia and the United States offer up two conclusions. First, problems in bilateral relations are provoked not by ill will between the leaders of Russia and the USA, but because of much more deeply rooted causes. Second, the two countries’ high conflict-prone relationship is not the true legacy of the Cold War, but instead reflects systematic differences. The following questions are most relevant to the issue at hand: what determines the conflict-prone character of Russia-U.S. relations and is it possible to forecast or, ideally, mend the cycling of mutual tension with a view towards 2020?

1. The Evolution of Russian-American relations.

The abovementioned pattern is not coincidental. The material and technological structural foundations for Russian-American relations have remained unchanged since the Cold War. As was the case between the USSR and the USA, bilateral relations of Russia and the USA have been built on the basis of mutual nuclear deterrence and the logic of mutually guaranteed elimination. The further development of economic relations has been impeded by the Jackson-Vanik amendment of 1974 and overall the low level of foreign trade. Such a system inevitably reproduces a logic of politico-military confrontation.

This cyclical character has been endemic to Soviet-American relations since 1945. One can clearly distinguish those periods when Moscow and Washington attempted to establish a dialogue in the strategic sphere, those when they curtailed their negotiations and teetered on the brink of politico-military confrontation, and those again when they attempted to broach a dialogue. This logic has carried into contemporary Russia-U.S. relations as well. The short periods of rapprochement between Russia and the USA have been associated with strong dialogue on strategic issues, whilst the periods of disengagement have had to do with the impossibility on reaching agreement on rules for ensuring strategic stability.

The first attempt of Russia-U.S. rapprochement covered the period from 1991 to 1993. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian leadership, headed by B.N. Yeltsin (1991-1999), wanted to achieve the following:

• recognition of Russia within the borders of the RSFSR of 1991;
• withdrawal of nuclear weapons (NW) from the territory of the republics of former USSR;
• international recognition in the struggle against the Supreme Soviet.

Within the framework of the Camp David Declaration (February 3, 1993), Presidents Yeltsin and George H.W. Bush stated their intent to build “a new partners alliance”. The Washington Charter, signed June 17, 1992, recorded the intent of the Parties to build “a common security system from Vancouver to Vladivostok”. However, the U.S. was only ready to support Yeltsin on the condition of that deep reductions were made to Soviet military (primarily nuclear) capabilities. Therefore, after the three situational objectives were addressed, tensions in bilateral relations started to rise. The “mild confrontation” between Russia and the USA in early nineties was a logical result of mutual disappointment by the two sides in each other. The United States supported Yeltsin in his standoff against the Supreme Soviet (1993) and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (1996). However, Yeltsin’s refusal to continue arms reduction processes was taken by Washington as a violation of the tacit conditions of the “deal” made in the early 1990s.

At the same time, Moscow perceived the actions of USA as part of an attempt to revolutionize the system of the global governance, including reducing the role of the UN through the rise of the G7—NATO tandem. This fear prompted the elevation of Russian strategic nuclear forces (SNF) to be regarded as a guarantee of Russia’s security against potentially hostile actions from the U.S.

The second attempt to bring the two countries closer together covered the period from 2001 to 2003. These developments were based on the mutual need to prevent the collapse of the arms control system. Such a threat became a reality after the refusal of Russia to ratify the START-II [1] and the announcement by the Clinton Administration of its intent to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. The clashing of the two sides over counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan during 2001 and 2002 emerged as a psychological background for negotiations.

In the end, Moscow agreed to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and launched joint Russia-NATO programs to develop the BMD and TMD systems. The Bush Administration for its part signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SOR) with Russia in 2002 and later the Moscow Declaration on Strategic Partnership, under which it committed itself to consult with Moscow on all issues concerning NMD deployment.

However, the strategy of taking “unilateral actions” announced by the second Bush Administration caused apprehension in Moscow; confrontation was growing. In his Munich speech on February 10, 2007, President Putin stated that in case of deployment of “the third BMD position site” and the continuation of NATO eastern enlargement, Moscow could take responsive military measures. Over the next year and a half, the two sides engaged in “reciprocal escalation” on issues of BMD and CFE. The “five-day war” in South Ossetia in August 2008, with Russia and U.S. involvement, was the finale of the “mild” confrontation of the late 2000s.

The third attempt to achieve rapprochement concerns the so-called “reset” period of 2009-2011. This was based on the following objective reasons: (1) the heightened risk of the arms control regime collapsing; (2) the need to reduce the threat of military conflict between Russia and the USA; and (3) and the desire of the Obama Administration to identify on which terms Moscow might accept major strategic potential reductions.

During the first year and a half of its inauguration, the ‘reset’ policy was a relative success. Russia and the USA managed to sign New START (the Prague Treaty) and enact the “Agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation” (the 123 Agreement). The Parties expanded their cooperation on Afghanistan, even up to the establishment of a transportation logistic center in Ulyanovsk for NATO cargo transit. The U.S. suspended the process of NATO expansion into the post-Soviet territory and the deployment of the BMD “third position site” in Poland and Czech Republic. Moscow started to work together with the U.S. on issues related to Iran’s nuclear program and Washington lowered the degree of the U.S. involvement in the domestic political processes of the CIS countries, most prominently in Ukraine.

However, by the middle of 2010, problems started to surface in the ‘reset’ policy. Differences arose between the Parties about the interpretation of the Preamble to the New START, which recorded the interrelation of negotiations on BMD/SOA. Russia drafted an additional protocol to the New START, related to BMD and White House proposed signing a cooperation declaration on BMD. However, over the last 15 years, Russia and the USA have signed at least five similar declarations, none of which was implemented. During the Washington Summit of June 24, 2010, no agreement was reached on BMD.

Presidents B. Obama and D. Medvedev confined themselves to a joint statement on about the intent to cooperate on the issue of monitoring the launching of ballistic missiles. Over the following year and a half, the sides could not solve the BMD problem. At the Lisbon NATO Summit of November 20, 2010, Russia and the Alliance countries agreed to search for a compromise in the framework of the Euro-BMD project.

But, on January 9, 2011, the NATO Council made a decision that the Euro-BMD system of the Alliance would be deployed separately from Russia. Later negotiations by the NATO-Russia Council in Sochi (July 4, 2011) did not yield success. The failure of BMD negotiations on the eve of the Chicago NATO Summit in May 2012 meant that the search for a compromise would be postponed indefinitely.

At the same time, a set of contradictions was growing in the Russia-U.S. relations, which were caused by:

• the refusal by Russia to start negotiations on the limitation of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in Europe;
• differences in the positions of Moscow and Washington on Syria;
• intensification of U.S. policy in Central Asia starting in the fall of 2011;
• exacerbation of political problems such as the “Magnitsky case” or the “Bout case”.

Officially the Kremlin and the White House denied that relations had deteriorated. However, after an openly negative reaction by the Barack Obama administration to the results of parliamentary and presidential elections, it became impossible to ignore the mutual lack of understanding. This might entail a new round of potential strategic upgrading, which almost always has been accompanied by an aggravation in relations.

2. Global Patterns in the Development of Russia-U.S. Relations

Up until 2020, the overall environment for Russia-U.S. relations will remain relatively conflict-prone. The most serious problems are concentrated in the area of strategic stability and related issues of nuclear non-proliferation. Less significant (but still unstable) will be the problems connected to international legal structures and the energy sphere. Without a set of stabilizing economic ties between Russia and USA such as those between China and the U.S., things stand to worsen. The system of military and strategic parity remains the only stabilizing factor in Russia-U.S. relations. However, its maintenance requires the modernization of Russian nuclear missile potential, which inevitably will create new entanglements between Moscow and Washington.

2.1 Problem of Strategic Stability

The maintenance of strategic stability remains the key problem for Russia-U.S. relations. Already by the late 1980s, a new category of expert literature emerged that argued that the Cold War did not herald an outstanding success: Soviet military potential was not dismantled the way Germany and Japan were after World War II. The reduction of Russian military, especially nuclear, potential is still regarded as a priority for U.S. national security policy.

For its part, Russia has not intended to radically reduce its strategic military potential. The Russian elite considers these capabilities to be a guarantee against potentially hostile actions from Washington. From the American perspective, strategic stability has been traditionally linked with defining the parameters of strategic nuclear force development. The basic strategic stability concepts were formulated in 1977 by prominent American arms control expert Paul Nitze. In his memorandum for the Department of Defense, he noted that the USSR’s development of a new class of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMS) with multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVS) would undermine stability in the strategic sphere.

In order to preserve stability, Nitze suggested first off to pay particular attention to heavy ICBMS during negotiations and, second, to exclude cruise missiles from negotiations as a means of compensating against Soviet superiority with regard to ICBMs. Beginning in 1981, the Reagan Administration proposed the Nitze concept of strategic stability to the USSR as the basis for negotiations.

Under the Russian interpretation, “strategic stability” represents a set of conditions to reduce the risk of an outbreak of a nuclear war. Until the mid-1980s, the Soviet leadership criticized strategic stability as a “bourgeois theory”. The Kremlin feared that the United States wanted to achieve unilateral advantages through the reduction of heavy MIRVED ICBMS.

The Soviet leadership, headed by Gorbachev (1985-1991), wanted to maintain the regime of strategic dialogue with Washington. At the Wyoming meeting on 22-23 September, 1989, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR E.A. Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker worked out four principles for arms control negotiations:

• Separate negotiations on offensive and defensive strategic arms (i.e. MD and SOA);
• Increased attention to the problem of reducing heavy ICBMS (MIRVED ICBMS) as a “destabilizing” type of SOA;
• Acceptance of the existence of “breakout potential” (reduction of warheads through storage, instead of their destruction);
• Exclusion the cruise missiles (i.e. non-nuclear high-precision weapons).

The logic of the Wyoming compromise laid the foundation for the Russian-U.S START-I (1991), START-II (1993) and SOR (2002) Treaties. By 2009, the situation had changed. Twice – in Helsinki (April 20, 2009) and Amsterdam (June 20, 2009) – Russian President Medvedev stated that Russia would engage in SOA negotiation only on the condition that the Wyoming compromise be revised. The New START, signed on April 8, 2010 (the Prague Treaty), not only envisaged the reduction of SNF ceilings to 1550 units on each side but also established new rules for strategic dialogue:

• Preserving the right of Russia and the USA to “breakout potential”:
• Taking into account the BMD issue within the structure of strategic parity;
• Exclusion of non-nuclear high-precision weapons from negotiations;
• Absence of limits on MIRVS;
• Abstinence from priority negotiations on the reduction of heavy ICBMS;
• Relaxing the system of mutual inspections.

However, the conditions of the “Prague compromise” remain fragile. The Parties have interpreted the Preamble of the New START on interdependence of strategic defensive and offensive arms quite differently. The MFA of Russia considers an obligation of the United States to introduce limitations on the number of deployed BMD systems. The U.S. sees in it nothing more than parameters for future negotiations on arms limitations. On November 23, 2011, President Medvedev declared that Russia could potentially withdraw from the New START in the event of rapid build-up of the U.S. BMD system. Therefore, the ability (or inability) of Moscow and Washington to agree on mutually beneficial revisions to the Prague compromise will remain the central item on the agenda for Russia-U.S. relations for the period until 2020.

2.2 Problem of Nuclear Non-Proliferation

The problem of nuclear non-proliferation remains a conflict area for Russia-U.S. relations. Formally, Moscow and Washington have jointly called for strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In reality, a set of contradictions has evolved between Russia and the U.S. in connection with different policies towards outsider states in the international non-proliferation system.

Over the last twenty years, the U.S. has developed a counter-proliferation strategy. This implies preventive seizure of weapons of mass destruction from “dangerous” regimes (those perceived by Washington as dangerous) and the prevention of these weapons from falling into the hands of transnational criminal and terrorist networks. The current American policy of counter-proliferation includes five courses of action:

• A “buy-out” of a nuclear program from a potentially dangerous state;
• Establishing control over nuclear facilities of “problematic” countries;
• Partial recognition of nuclear status of a violator in exchange for his compliance with a number of international agreements;
• Threats of force and delivering (as a last resort) incapacitating strikes against nuclear or proto-nuclear facilities of “dangerous regimes”;
• Toughening international control over closed nuclear fuel cycles (CNFC);

The counter-proliferation strategy requires a partial revision of the terms of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Under the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), any non-nuclear state has the right for peaceful use of atomic energy. On February 11, 2004, President George W. Bush proposed the project of NPT reform with the following aims: (1) to introduce a prohibition on supplies of CNFC technologies to countries, which had not acquired them before the 1st of January, 2004; (2) to compel countries that might withdraw from the NPT to return CNFC technologies to IAEA; (3) to adopt an international code of conduct in the sphere of peaceful use of atomic energy and (4) to raise the status of the World Nuclear Association as a potential controller of the fissionable materials market. Since 2009, the Obama Administration has defended these proposals in the framework of “nuclear-free world” or “Global Zero” project. They are consonant to the “Baruch Plan” (1946), which intended to put all CNFC components, including the production of uranium ore under the control of the UN Atomic Energy Commission.

Over the last fifteen years, U.S. Administrations have established several precedents for counter-proliferation strategy implementation:

1. Iraq: conducting a military operation under the pretext of seizing the WMD from a “potentially dangerous” regime;
2. Iran: demands to terminate the uranium enrichment program;
3. DPRK: the demand to disable the nuclear facilities under IAEA control and/or the “Five Powers Commission;
4. Pakistan: the demand to admit American representatives to the management of this country’s nuclear potential;
5. India: partial recognition of its nuclear status in exchange for of its civilian nuclear facilities opening by Delhi to the IAEA [2].

Russia, on the contrary, has a more cautious attitude to counter-proliferation policy. The Russian public does not understand why the U.S. allows France and Germany to conduct independent commercial activities with “problem” countries while denying these rights to Russia.

The Russian side suspects that under the cover of non-proliferation rhetoric to strengthen the NPT, the United States is squeezing out competition from promising nuclear markets. Moscow seriously fears that the precedents listed above have created the groundwork for applying the counter-proliferation strategy to Russia and China. For the period until 2020, there remains a threat of a status conflict connected with Moscow’s desire to increase its role in the international non-proliferation system on the one hand, and the unwillingness of Washington to agree with a revision of the existing order on the other.

2.3 The Problem of Reforming the International Law System

Over the last twenty years a certain tendency in the U.S. policy has taken shape with regards to reforming the system of International Law. The previous system, created after World War II, took into account the prevalence of the five great powers (the USA, USSR, Great Britain, France and China) and at least two superpowers with approximately equal military potentials (the USA and USSR). The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR in 1991 did not lead to any serious shifts at the international legal level. The existing World Order functions on the basis of the institutions of the Yalta-Potsdam system. Therefore, the assertion of American leadership requires the U.S. to carry out the policy of reforming the World Order structure.

In order to implement these initiatives, the United States has conducted a multi-track policy:

• Initiated the discussion at the international level of the problem of inefficient UN activity, especially, the UN Security Council;
• Created a number of precedents of activity of other organizations, institutions or “clubs”, (first of all NATO or G8) without the sanction of the UNSC;
• Encouraged the legal prosecution of the leaders of sovereign countries;
• Organized precedents to revisit some norms of the international humanitarian Law of the 20th century (for example, non-application to Taliban of the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War).

In so doing, the United States utilizes a number of mechanisms that strongly affect Russian interests. The first one is the desire to diminish the role of the UN Security Council as a key institution responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. The second one is speculation at the international level about Stalinism and the results of World War II. (This provides a pretext for delegitimizing UN activities). The third one is a politicization of the topic of corruption. Most data on corruption of the elites of other countries regularly presented by American and British mass media have not been substantiated. Rather, they create a political and psychological environment that makes leaders of sovereign states feel uneasy. The problem of reforming International Law will be one of the most conflict-prone areas of Russia-U.S. relations.

2.4 Problems of Energy Security

Issues related to energy security remain potentially a conflict prone area in Russia-U.S. relations. The concept of “energy security” was developed in the U.S. after the first “energy shock” of 1973. It envisaged (1) a diversification of the sources of energy supplies, (2) development of alternative energy sectors (primarily nuclear energy), (3) measures to ensure a free and unimpeded access to energy sources, (4) and the admissibility of the use of force to protect energy interests. In 1975, this understanding of energy security became part of the G7 program.

The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) of 1994 was intended to bind exporters of the energy products (first of all – Russia) into a package of agreements. But the integration of Russia into the G7 then changed the situation. Since 2005, Moscow has raised the issue of reforming the understanding of energy security by better accounting for the interests of exporters. At the G8 Summit in Saint Petersburg (15-17 July, 2006), Russia managed to achieve the inclusion of a new understanding of energy security into official documents that would ensure security throughout the cycle of production, transportation and distribution of energy products.

Since then, Washington has been developing and testing in practice various means to counter the Russian “energy weapon”: from its support to Ukraine and Belarus in their energy conflicts with Russia to encouraging Turkmenistan’s policy of creating a system of hydrocarbons exports that would bypass the Russian Federation.

During the 1970s, British-American companies (the so-called “seven sisters”) ranked first in the energy market. In the 2000s, they yielded their dominant position to the state-led corporations of Russia, China, the Persian Gulf States, India, Indonesia and Brazil. This explains the attempts of the American business to gamble for the divestment of their competitors. In the energy sector, Russia and the U.S. either have positive experience of cooperation. The joint projects (Sakhalin-1, Sakhalin-2, and the Northern Bridge) have turned to be unviable. So far, Russian and American energy business have no experience in reaching compromises.

“The British factor” serves as additional source of tension. Until the mid-1980s, the U.K. was a leading energy producer in Western Europe. However, the drop in volumes of hydrocarbon production in the North Sea beginning in 1986 strengthened the role of energy supplies from the USSR/Russia. In turn, the leading role started to shift to Germany as a key transit hub for Russian hydrocarbon supplies. This trend has provoked countermeasures from London. British diplomats have tried to use Central and Eastern European countries so as to weaken the Russian-German energy interaction. This policy enjoys thorough support from Washington.

3 Regional trends in the Development of Russia-U.S. Relations

The situation at the regional level remains potentially prone to conflict. Russia and the U.S. still have strong differences at the regional level and many of them are the direct legacy of the Cold War. It is precisely in the regions where the risk of Russia-U.S military clash may aggravate by the early 2020s. However, there are also a number of stabilizing developments at the regional level that can create conditions for Russia-U.S. constructive engagement.

3.1 Europe

The biggest disagreements between Russia and the U.S. relate to Europe. As a political and military bloc, based on a strong American presence in Europe and U.S. security guaranties to its European allies, NATO remains a leading organization of Europe outside Russia.

However, between Russia and NATO, an “arc of instability” is emerging, defined as an area in dispute from Murmansk to Nagorno-Karabakh and marked by frozen or latent ethno-political conflicts. Over the last 50 years, two approaches have competed about the proper way to ensure security in the Euro-Atlantic area. The first, the Atlantic approach, has focused on the importance of maintaining U.S. security guarantees to NATO allies. Second, the Euro-Atlantic approach recognizes U.S. leadership in Europe but has tended to limit Washington’s freedom of action through mutually binding agreements. Elites from the U.S., UK, Netherlands, Denmark and Norway have defended the priorities of Atlanticism. The countries of continental Western Europe (primarily France and the Federal Republic of Germany) have promoted the Euro-Atlantic approach. Since the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union has focused on cooperating with Euro-Atlanticism, a strategy continued also by the Russian Federation. The European Security Treaty and the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, designed as mechanisms of unofficial dialogue, have been the key Russian initiatives on this front at the turn of 2000s and 2010s [3]. Moscow wishes to limit Washington through a package of agreements that are intended to (1) restrict the free choice of Washington on issues of the use of force, (2) establish a mechanism for joint discussion of European security issues by Russia and NATO, and (3) establish a system of obligations by Russia and NATO in the event of a conflict with third party countries.

Washington fears that through such agreements Moscow will try to undermine U.S. guarantees to Western European countries and, eventually, the entire NATO mechanism. By early 2010s, the Euro-Atlanticism crisis rose to surface. A renaissance of transatlantic relations began in earnest in Europe.

First, France under President Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012) abandoned the concept of Gaullism as the basis for foreign policy. The return of France to the NATO military organization (2009), the signing of UK-France Summit declaration (2010), the Libyan war (2011) and the UK-France communiqué on Syria (2012) proved that Paris was learning the part of a younger partner to the U.S. and UK.

Second, the project of “European defense identity” launched in 1996 faded into the background. In the summer of 1996, the WEU was disbanded. The plan was to replace it with the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), but so far, EU countries have failed to properly coordinate the structure of the European peacekeeping forces. Instead, the UK-France agreements of 2010 have become a real military foundation of the EU.

Third, the political landscape in the EU has changed. After the Libyan war of 2011, the leading role in the EU has switched from the Franco-German to the Franco-British tandem, which has stronger ties to Washington than the CSDP project. The new distribution of forces in Europe outside Russia has reinforced the potential for conflict potential in Russia-U.S. relations. The following factors have contributed to this situation:

• Attempts of the U.S. to become involved in the settlement of military and political conflicts in the post-Soviet region;
• Continuing expansion of the NATO sphere of responsibility;
• Deployment of BMD systems by the U.S. in Europe outside Russia;
• Absence of dialogue mechanisms between Russia and NATO on the reductions of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW);
• Absence of an adequate substitute for the CFE Treaty;
• Inclusion of British nuclear potential in the U.S. nuclear planning system;
• Unwillingness of UK and France to join the Soviet-American Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) of 1987;
• Persistence of potential for conflict in relations of Russia with Central and Eastern European countries, brought about by historical legacies.

Up until 2020, tensions between Russia and the U.S. will grow as the result of three factors. When France abandoned the policy of Gaullism, the Russians lost an influential intermediary in Russia-U.S. relations - a role traditionally played by Paris. Russia’s disappointment in the OSCE as a platform for negotiating process has grown ever stronger. Furthermore, the U.S. has not abandoned the project of expanding NATO farther into the post-Soviet area. The failure of negotiations on the European Security Treaty (EST) has shown that Russia and the U.S. have not yet managed to work out new rules of engagement in Europe.

3.2. Central Asia

Russia-U.S. relations in Central Asia are based on the intersection of two seemingly contradicting trends. Russia supports the NATO counter-terror operation in Afghanistan and is providing it with material and technical support (however, the Kremlin regularly criticizes NATO for insufficient efforts against drug production in Afghanistan). At the same time, Moscow fears that Washington will build independent relations with the Central Asian republics and undermine the mechanisms of the SCO and CSTO.

This situation is complicated by the absence of mutual recognition by NATO and CSTO, leading to actual rivalry between the two blocs in the region. The new outlook of Washington on Central Asia was outlined in the National Security Strategy of the U.S. of 2002 (NSC-2002). This document postulated three underlying principles for U.S. policy in Central Asia. First, for the foreseeable future, Washington intends to preserve its presence in Central Asia. Second, the presence of military infrastructure in Central Asia allows the U.S. to address a complex of military and political tasks: from combatting transnational terrorism to limiting Russia’s reach and “containing” China. Third, neither the Tashkent Treaty nor the SCO prevent the U.S. from building its own system of relations with the Central Asian states.

This system may be consistent with or be quite different from the interests of Russia and China.

Attempts by the Republicans to carry out the “rapid democratization” of the Central Asia states have turned out to be unsuccessful. The Obama Administration learned the mistakes of its predecessors. At the NATO Lisbon summit on 20-21 November 2010, the decision was made to withdraw the military contingent of NATO in 2014. The American position was indirectly strengthened by an agreement signed on 27 September, 2010 between China and Russia to cooperate in combating terrorism, separatism and extremism. Tashkent, Dushanbe and Ashkhabad perceived this as a dramatic reinforcement of Russian and Chinese positions in the region. Each looked towards the USA as a counterbalance to Russia and China.

Following the Central Asian tour by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in October 2011, Washington has conducted its policy in the region on the following tracks:

• Negotiations with Central Asian countries on continued partnership in light of forthcoming pullout of NATO troops from Afghanistan;
• Consultations with Central Asian countries on the possibility of preserving the American presence in the region after 2014;
• Support to Turkmenistan’s energy policy for constructing new gas pipeline systems towards the south and east;
• Engaging Uzbekistan in the negotiating process on Afghanistan separately from Tashkent’s SCO partners;
• Granting the U.S. a status of SCO dialogue partner;
• Assistance in increasing the number of SCO participants (for example by the accession of Turkey or India to this organization).

Again as in 2002-2003, the United States is trying to build a complex of independent political and military (and ideally, energy) ties with the Central Asian states. Such a policy is intended to erode a special character of the SCO as a first regional security organization without American participation.

Over the next decade, the greatest fears of Russia in Central Asia will probably be caused by the risk of repeating “2002 scenario”. In the spring of 2002, the Bush Administration began probing the possibility of accession to SCO or obtaining the status of an associated member. These proposals by the White House brought the SCO to the brink of crisis. Uzbekistan supported the American aims. China argued against Washington’s involvement in SCO. Only by placing the issue of American membership to the side were the SCO countries able to adopt the Charter of this organization at the Saint Petersburg Summit on July 7, 2002.

Moscow’s influence at present is smaller than in the early 2000s. The. Bush Administration invested in inducing a crisis in the SCO and replacing Central Asian elites. This generated distrust towards U.S. policy in Central Asia. The Obama Administration has acted more cautiously. The motto of “regime change” has been withdrawn and postponed “until better times”. In return, the U.S. is now claiming the role of a “critical counterweight” to the growing influence of Russia and China. This increases its chances to build partnership relations with the countries of Central Asia.

3.3. Pacific region

By 2020, the Asia-Pacific region and in a wider sense international relations in the Pacific will play an increasing important role in Russia-U.S. interaction. The Sino-American face-off is the center pivot of this region. From mid-2010, the United States has switched to a renewed “China containment” policy:

• Revival of the ANZUS military union established in 1951 (U.S., Australia and New Zealand);
• Building new U.S. presence in Indochina, primarily through a military partnership with Vietnam and strengthening American control over the Malacca Strait;
• Expanding U.S. military partnership with India;
• Building a new association – the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) called upon among other goals to erode the special character of relations within the ASEAN.

Russia policy towards this region continues to be ambivalent. The strategic partnership of Russia with China in the format of the “Big Treaty” signed in 2001 remains the basis of Russia’s policy. Prime Minister Putin’s visit to Beijing on 10-11 October, 2011, confirmed the intent of the two Parties to expand its format. At the same time, Moscow seeks to offset the disproportionate influence of Chinese business in the Russian Far East. For this purpose, Russia periodically initiates negotiations on expanding economic ties with Japan, South Korea, ASEAN countries and the USA.

The Obama Administration has in the past tried to weaken the Russia-China strategic partnership. Throughout 2009 the United States proposed to China a concept of “the group of two” as a privileged partnership. In 2010, experts from the Brookings Institution developed a concept of a “Northern Alternative to ASEAN”: a hypothetical organization to include the USA, Canada, South Korea and possibly Japan.

Washington has the space missile sphere in reserve. After the revival of the ANZUS bloc in November 2010, Canberra and Wellington intensified their contacts with Roscosmos regarding potential partnership in space technologies. The Russia-Japan Agreement of 1993 on partnership in peaceful research and exploration of outer space remains unworkable. In the context of growing rivalry in the APR, the partnership with these countries in the area of space missile technologies will provoke ire from Beijing.

Russia and the U.S. continue to have territorial differences. Russia has not ratified the agreement of 1990 on delimiting disputed areas in the Bering Sea. The U.S. and Japan do not recognize the status of the Sea of Okhotsk as the territorial sea of Russia. The shelf areas of the Bering Strait, where the boundary was determined by the Russian-American agreement of 1867, remain undivided. Since this latter agreement was signed long before the adoption of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, its provisions were not included.

Washington has not yet officially raised the issue of direct U.S. contacts with the Far Eastern regions. However, American experts have discussed the possibility of the Far Eastern regions of Russia participating in APEC separately from the rest of Russia, keeping in mind that the members of APEC are not states but economies. Similar projects have been proposed by American analysts with regard to the possibility of the Russian Far East independently participating in TPP or a hypothetical “Northern alternative to ASEAN”. Moscow has not forgotten the widespread nostalgia in the American expert community for the Far Eastern Republic of early 1920s.

Further complications to U.S.-Russian relations may develop around APEC. The “Bogor Goals” of 1994 provided for (1) the establishment by the year 2020 of a free trade zone in the Pacific and (2) the liberalization by the year 2010 of a system of foreign trade of industrialized APEC members. These goals have not been achieved. However Moscow strongly fears that accelerated economic integration in APEC may create problems for the federal center controlling migration flows from China and the economic activity of the Far Eastern regions of Russia.

Reallocation of authority between the federal center (Moscow) and the Far Eastern regions of Russia may emerge as a new problem for Russia-U.S. relations. The partial transfer of important federal functions to one of the cities of the Far East has the possibility of provoking discussions to reorganize the Russian Federation as a confederation.

The U.S. can promote such trends by (1) launching initiatives to further the independent accession of the Russian Far East into various associations in the Pacific and (2) attempting to begin negotiations with the Far Eastern regions of Russia on the settlement of territorial disputes. For the period until 2020, the “British scenario” of the 1940s would be the most dangerous for Russia: the U.S. developing independent relations with regions with minimal participation of the center in that process [4].

3.4. The Post-Soviet Area

Relations between Russia and the United States in the territory of the former USSR have had been very predictable. Since the end of 1993, the White House, irrespective of party in control, has wanted to:

• Support “geopolitical pluralism” in Eurasia (i.e. independence and territorial integrity of the former republics of the USSR);
• Develop independent dialogues with the republics of the former Soviet Union irrespective of the position of Moscow;
• Encourage the export of hydrocarbons through routes independent from Russia;
• Prevent the implementation of integration projects with the center in Russia.

The Obama Administration is cautious about the implementation of the “Eurasian Union” project proposed by Russia in October 2011. There are good reasons to expect that the U.S. will attempt to indirectly counter these initiatives. By 2015, key instruments to be used will be (1) support by Washington of politicians willing to distance themselves from Russia and (2) the expansion of NATO and EU interaction (with direct or indirect support by Washington) as well as politico-military interaction between the republics of the former USSR and the NATO and EU frameworks. After 2015, Washington’s policies in the post-Soviet region will be subject to reworking; much will depend on the successes or failures of the “Eurasian Union” integration project at the time.

3.5. The Arctic

With a view towards 2020, Russia-U.S. relations in the Arctic region will remain prone to conflicts. Strong policy differences exist between the two sides. Russia argues for the sectoral system of dividing the Arctic established in the 1920s. The United States calls for internationalization of the Arctic Ocean and the discontinuation of sectoral division. Russia is ready to protect and defend the Soviet Arctic sector by recognizing a part of the Lomonosov and Mendeleev underwater ridges as a continuation of the Siberian continental platform. Judging from the text of its “Arctic region policy” (2009), Washington will try to counteract that process.

The situation is complicated by three factors. Discussions on the repartition of the Arctic are being conducted between the five arctic powers, four of which are members of NATO military and political bloc; Norway, Denmark and Canada are U.S. allies under the Washington Treaty of 1949. The United States may have territorial differences with them, but, unlike differences with Russia, they have no political or military implications.

Quasi-environmental issues are regarded in Washington as an instrument helping to achieve the internationalization of the Arctic Ocean and, accordingly, the reduction of the Northern Fleet of Russia operational area. The U.S., Norway and Sweden have never recognized the exclusive rights of Russia to the northern sea route. In fact, Washington, Oslo and Stockholm view the development of “common environmental projects” as an indirect consent and openness by Russia to reconsidering the status of this transport artery.

Disputes over the Arctic are related to discussions on the prospects for development of Russian and American strategic nuclear forces (SNS), first of all, submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). The U.S. aspires to devalue the strength of the Northern Fleet of Russia, which constitutes the backbone of Russian SNF naval component. U.S. allies support Washington in this objective.

By 2020, these issues will most likely determine the development of Russia-U.S. relations in the Arctic.

The Murmansk Treaty between Russia and Norway of 2010 adds a new format to Russia-U.S. interaction in the Arctic. This document contained the following:

• Possibility of a dialogue between Russia and other Arctic countries without U.S. participation;
• Limited format of Russia’s interaction with U.S. Arctic allies (Norway, despite the repartition of disputed areas in the Barents Sea and concessions to Moscow regarding Spitsbergen, did not recognize the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as an internal transport waterway of Russia);
• Admissibility by Russia of the use of territorial cessions by the U.S. as a precedent for the settlement of Russia-U.S border disputes.

Other stabilizing factors for Russia-U.S. relations in the Arctic include the following: first, the extremely harsh climatic conditions of the Arctic Ocean and second, the existence of territorial disputes between the U.S. and Denmark and Canada. Joint Russia-U.S. projects in deep-sea drilling in the Arctic Ocean could also play a positive role.

4. Scenarios for Development of Russia-U.S. relations until 2020

Trends in Russia-U.S. relations have led to the conclusion that the model of “imposed consensus” as a basis of bilateral relations has been exhausted. This model, established in the first half of the 1990s, implied that Russia-U.S. engagement would develop on the basis of an agenda that elaborated a decisive role for the U.S. That model ran its course in 2007 and 2008.

The attempt by the Obama Administration to restore it within the framework of the ‘reset’ policy has not yielded results and was opposed by Moscow. By the end of 2012, bilateral relations, irrespective of the outcome of the presidential elections in the U.S., entered a stage where the future format of relations must be redefined. Three options are possible.

4.1. Return to “mild confrontation”

The model of “mild confrontation” implies the rollback of the results “reset” policy, a return to confrontation rhetoric, and the modernization of nuclear missile capabilities of both the Russia and the U.S., leading to a heightened risk for regional conflicts. Such a scenario is very likely, spurred by the following factors:

• Absence of mutual understanding over BMD between Russia and the U.S.;
• Failure of the negotiating process of 2009-2011 over the reform of the European security system;
• Increasing Russia-U.S. rivalry in Central Asia;
• Negative attitudes of the American establishment (irrespective of party allegiance) towards Vladimir Putin;
• Blows to bilateral relations caused by the White House’s criticism of the outcomes of parliamentary and presidential elections in Russia;
• Excessively harsh electoral rhetoric by the Republican candidate Mitt Romney.

The situation in some sense resembles the events of 2007-2008. Then, in response to the Munich speech by Putin, the U.S. created a managed crisis around Georgia in order to test the degree of the Kremlin’s readiness to carry out the “Munich warnings” in practice. A similar crisis to test the strength of Putin’s positions and his readiness to resort to the use of force may be organized in years to come. Territorial disputes between Russia and Japan, protracted military and political crisis around Georgia, attempts of regime change in Byelorussia, territorial differences in the Arctic, and the “unfreezing” of conflicts in Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh appear to be the most probable spots where these crises may emerge. The risk of regional conflicts escalating continues to grow, following on the footsteps the example of 2008.

The potential for further tensions in the strategic sphere also remains high. To a certain degree tensions are even higher than witnessed in Soviet-American relations in the 1960s and 1970s. First, Russia and the U.S. have approached critical ceilings of SNF reductions – 1550 operationally deployed warheads on each side. Further lowering of ceilings (below 1000 warheads) may make it possible for one side to deliver a disarming strike against the strategic forces of the other.

Second, over the last twenty years, Russia and the U.S. have upgraded their SNF at a much slower pace than in the 1970s and 1980s. There will be much less potential for disabling nuclear systems than what existed prior to 2009.

Third, there are much fewer opportunities to reach compromise on the issue of BMD. Washington has allocated large amounts of money to implement this project and American businesses already enjoy massive defense contracts. The U.S. has not identified any major concessions from Moscow that might be used as bargaining chips towards a potential BMD agreement.

Fourth, Russia, under threat of a rapid buildup of U.S. BMD potential, might go as far as to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987. This would lead to the reconstruction of the system of the 1980s: a standoff in Europe based on short- and intermediate-range missiles. This system would be characterized by short flight time to targets in both Russia and EU countries as well as a high probability for the outbreak of a conflict involving nuclear weapons.

The scenario of “mild confrontation” will reduce Russia-U.S. relations to the reduction of military activity and the resumption of dialogue on political and security issues. The preservation of New START and the elaboration of conflict-prevention measures will become priorities. Both Russia and the U.S. will be interested in an intermediary, which traditionally has been France.

But at present there is no such intermediary in Europe. Perhaps, British diplomats might take on this job, as the military and political independence of London from Washington expands. In this event, the value of the British track for Russia will increase incrementally.

4.2.“Stagnation Scenario”

The “Stagnation Scenario” for bilateral relations is based on the freezing of current trends. The following features come forward:

• Preservation of the system of mutual nuclear deterrence and nuclear missile parity as the basis for Russia-U.S. relations;
• Continuation of sluggish negotiations on missile defense without achieving tangible results;
• Acceleration of U.S. attempts to disrupt the Russia-China strategic partnership or (in case of failure) to reformat India’s policy towards confrontation with Moscow and Beijing;
• Indirect competition in Central Asia with demonstrative rhetoric about existing common interests in Afghanistan;
• High level of rivalry in the territory of the former USSR and in Europe (where Russia, as the USSR in the 1960s, tries to capitalize on contradictions between EU countries and the U.S.);
• Keeping demonstratively constructive contacts between the leaders of Russia and USA;
• Reducing the agenda of bilateral relations to arms control.

Also significant will be the ability of EU countries to achieve true politico-military autonomy from the U.S. The participation of Russia in negotiations on European security issues will alleviate threats felt by the Russian elite. Ignoring Russia in addressing European issues will only toughen Moscow’s stance. There is some likelihood that the two sides will try to use the “German issue” to their own ends: the problem of full restoration of Germany’s sovereignty.

Central Asia also stands to be a hotbed for tensions. Washington may try to dilute the role of SCO and CSTO through two means: first, by providing wide support to the opposition in the countries of Central Asia; second, by the U.S. integrating itself into the SCO framework. In both cases, instability may grow in the region.

This scenario will undergo serious trials in 2018-2020. New START does not provide for an intermediate timetable for SNF reductions. Theoretically, one of the sides may declare its intent not to conduct the main part of reductions in phases, and, before the start of reductions, withdraw from the New START. In such a situation, SNF will be kept at the level of 2010. This will offer advantages to either Russia or the U.S. in case of the collapse of New START.

Currently, the “stagnation scenario” looks like the most realistic option for the development of bilateral relations. Nuclear missile parity serves as a stabilizing basis for Russia-U.S. relations. In the period leading up to 2016 and 2017, Moscow and Washington will monitor the capacity of each other to deploy the BMD system and modernize SNF. After that (approximately by 2018), elites in both countries will act depending on availability or absence of nuclear missile parity.

4.3. Positive Scenario

The positive scenario is the most difficult at present to implement. Russia-U.S. relations are for the most part associated with arms control issues. Without a BMD agreement, the Russian side will not agree to sign any new SOA agreements. Therefore, Russia and the U.S. should find a way to address the most complex issues at a sub-strategic level.

Russia and the U.S. must start a dialogue on the issue of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). The sides will hardly be able to come up with real TNW reductions by the year 2020. However, the TNW negotiation package might include the following aspects. First, it is a question of clarifications to Article VII of NPT regarding legal conditions of TNW presence on the territory of third countries. It is important for Russia to resume negotiations on establishing a “nuclear-free zone” in Central and Eastern Europe. These talks were envisaged in the NATO-Russia Founding Act (1997) but are still frozen.

The TNW problem revives discussions about the issue of Germany. Since 2009, Berlin has consistently called for the withdrawal of American TNW from Europe. The withdrawal of the U.S. TNW from Germany destroys the basis of American nuclear guarantees to Berlin. This raises a question about the character of the future defense policy of the Federal Republic of Germany. The 1990 Moscow Treaty lifted all prohibitions on holding referendums on politico-military issues, on the demand for foreign troops to withdraw before a peace treaty is signed, on the development of some components of armed forces and on making foreign policy decisions without consultations with the victorious Powers. Russia and the U.S. can come back to the issue of signing a peace treaty with Berlin and restoring a fully-fledged legal nature for Germany in the military sphere.

It is important for Russia to start a dialogue with the U.S. on the issue of the U.S. BMD systems’ deployment in Europe. The crisis around the BMD’s third position site seems to have been settled by President Obama’s statement on September 17th, 2009, that there are no plans for deployment. But Washington has not denounced treaties with Poland and Czech Republic that were signed in 2008. Theoretically, nothing is preventing the next U.S. Administration from restarting this project. Moscow is concerned with U.S. projects announced in the autumn of 2009 to develop sea-based BMD systems in Europe. It is important for Moscow to obtain non-deployment guarantees for offshore regions near the Black and Baltic Seas. Following the conflict around the third BMD position site, the Russian side sees the Moscow Declaration of May 24th, 2002, as becoming devalued. It is important for Russia and the U.S. to develop a new control mechanism regarding BMD.

The Russian side is also interested in bringing onboard British issues within SOA negotiations. British strategic nuclear forces (SNF) have been included in the U.S. nuclear planning system since 1962 and theoretically can be engaged together with the U.S. SNF. The United States can develop the SNF above the limits of the New START in the framework of joint programs with the UK. The Treaty on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles (INF) deserves particular attention. Currently, the UK and France are not parties to the INF and theoretically may develop this class of weapons. Currently both sides do not possess weapons of this class. But, in the future, they can return to this issue by restarting their development program of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, and ground-launched cruise missiles (for example, to upgrade joint UK-France air-launched “Storm Shadow” cruise missiles).

Russia and the U.S. also need to work out the rules of military engagement in Europe. At present, Europe has returned to the situation of the 1960s, when the sides had no rules of the game in the military sphere. NATO military operations in the Balkans have led to the devaluation of the CSCE Stockholm document on confidence-building measures in Europe (1986). The CFE collapsed after Russia announced a moratorium on CFE compliance in 2007. Negotiations on the Russian initiative of the European Security Treaty have been frozen. The resumption of talks on conventional weapons in Europe could become an important component of the “reset” policy.

This group of problems also includes the need for Russia and the U.S. to elaborate a package of mutual obligations in the event of conflict with third countries. During the period of bipolar confrontation, similar obligations had been established in the 1973 Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear War. During the time of Gorbachev, its provisions were further expanded into the Vienna agreements on confidence building measures of 1989-1990. After 1991, Russia and USA avoided this problem as a remnant of the Cold War. The conflict around South Ossetia proved that this optimism was premature.

It is important for Russia and the U.S. to determine the negotiation strategy regarding the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). This multilateral document was signed back in 1996, but until now has not yet entered into force. Meanwhile, Russia remains the only nuclear power with most complete participation in this regime. The USA and China have not ratified the CTBT, but instead introduced national moratoria on nuclear testing. The UK and France did ratify the CTBT, but did not announce moratoria on nuclear testing. Russia is observing the moratorium on nuclear testing and has ratified the CTBT in 2000. Thus, Russia has found itself in a disadvantage when all legitimate nuclear powers began modernization programs of their nuclear arms arsenals in the second half of 2000s.

The prospects for Russia-US dialogue in other regions are less clear. However, the sides have the potential for establishing similar dialogues. In the Far East, the settlement of disputes on maritime areas should become a priority task for Russia and the U.S. In Central Asia the sides must determine the format of interaction regarding the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan and prospects for interaction between Washington and the SCO. The latter option implies the possibility of holding large-scale negotiations on issues of regional security. The drafting of a “code of conduct” in four areas should serve as a basis for the positive scenario: 1) in the event of a conflict with third countries; 2) agenda for arms control negotiations in Europe; 3) norms of dialogue between NATO and SCTO, and 4) definition of security problems in Central Asia. Implementation of these measures will provide a necessary positive agenda for relations between Moscow and Washington. Otherwise, Russia and the USA may repeat the negative experience of the 1970s when problems of arms control in Europe actually defeated the policy of Détente.

For the past two years, Russian and American media have speculated about a crisis in the ‘reset’ policy. The refusal of the United States to allow compromises on BMD, persisting frictions around Iran, Syria and Georgia, American support for territorial disputes, the condemnation by the U.S. Department of State of the outcomes of parliamentary and presidential elections in Russia, the halting of the activities of U.S. nongovernmental organizations – all these are the symptoms of a much more deeply-rooted problem. The agenda for Russia-U.S. relations has so far been limited by the arms control. The material and technical framework is not that different from Soviet-American relations in the 1980s. This is the main psychological disappointment from the last 20 years.

Three scenarios for the development of bilateral relations after 2012 emerge:

• Negative: this implies the dismantling of the “reset” and the return to “mild confrontation” between Russia and the U.S. as seen in 2007-2008;
• “Stagnation”: bilateral relations are limited by the search for compromises over arms control;
• Positive: the sides continue to seek ways to overcome difficulties that arose at BMD/SOA negotiations and develop a positive agenda of bilateral relations.

The positive scenario does not mean that Russia and the U.S. will abandon the conflict model of mutual nuclear deterrence. But in parallel, Moscow and Washington may attempt to develop stabilizing economic ties. In that sense, it is not as important for Moscow who comes to power in Washington in the 2012 elections. Both a Republican and a Democrat will seek the reduction of strategic weapons. Both a Republican and a Democrat will not settle for serious compromises on BMD or nuclear weapons in Europe. Neither a Republican nor a Democrat will recognize the priority of Russian interests in the territory of the former USSR. And, neither a Republican nor a Democrat will weaken the U.S. military presence in Europe. There will however be a difference in rhetoric and readiness to listen to the opposing side.

Notes

1. The conditions of Russia-U.S. START II signed on 3 January, 1993, contained a number of items disproportionately favor of the U.S.: the principle of a “breakout potential” and priority reduction of the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) with multiple individually targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV). The U.S. Congress ratified START II in 1996. Russia insisted on signing the New York Protocols to the START II in 1997, which introduced a distinction between tactical and strategic ABM interceptors and confirmed the validity of the 1972 ABM Treaty. In 2000, Russia ratified START II as part of a package with the New York Protocols. The U.S. Congress refused to ratify the New York Protocols fearing that Russia might use them to scale down work on antiballistic missile systems for “outside-atmosphere interception” (THAAD project). START II did not enter into force.

2. The Indian precedent has a double meaning. Under the NPT, only nuclear states have the right to freely admit IAEA inspectors to their nuclear facilities. Thus, under the Agreement on partnership in the peaceful use of atomic energy, signed on March 2, 2006, the U.S. “elevated” India to the status of a legitimate nuclear power. At the same time, a precedent was set that a “notionally legitimate” nuclear power would be obliged to open its civilian nuclear facilities to IAEA. The precedent may take another direction if the Agreement is joined by one of legitimate nuclear powers allied to the U.S., UK or France, by 2020.

3. Formally, the EASI has no official status. Its key players are the Carnegie Corporation (USA), Robert Bosch Foundation (Germany), and IMEMO RAN (Russia). However, on the eve of the Tallinn NATO Summit on April 21, 2010, the MFA of Russia welcomed the initiative. EASI experts prepare the annual report on priority problems of European security and present it at the annual Munich Conference.

4. During the American-British talks on Newfoundland Island in August 1941, American President Roosevelt (1933-1945) obtained consent from UK Prime Minister Churchill that London would agree with the dominions’ participation in the war on par with the Great Britain. The Declaration of the United Nations (January 1, 1942) was signed by the dominions on par with the metropolis.