Preparations for NATO's actions are usually accompanied by high expectations. Unfortunately, these expectations, at least in relation to Russia, are most often not met. This was the case recently with the development of a new NATO Strategic Concept which, in spite of the preliminary consultations with Russian experts, did not go beyond the traditional NATO's postulates.
Unfortunately, the new and unexpected ideas, that could dramatically change the relationship between Moscow and Brussels, prepared for the last Summit, which was held in Chicago from 20 to 21 May 2012, were not presented. However, this forum complied with its main task of stating (after confirming) the position of NATO on a wide, constantly expanding range of problems. Such a summit is needed to garner primary support for the provisions in the documents declared by the parties, first of all by members of the alliance.
Today, NATO is a very peculiar institution. Considered by the majority of Russian experts and politicians as a “cold war anachronism”, the alliance, however, is trying to reject itself from the ideology, focus and tenets of the old era. The result is an organization that is in search of a new mission. The components of this process are to go beyond the traditional area of responsibility, the testing of new forms of activity and search applications for available opportunities. Simply put, over the past few decades, we have observed a search to justify the "existence" of NATO to taxpayers and leaders of Western countries.
Chicago Summit: repetitive
The breadth of NATO activity suggests that this organization is going to solve many global and regional issues. But can it solve so many problems well? Experience and NATO's previous activity shows it cannot.
There was no exception in the Chicago summit, which once again declared the interest and involvement of NATO in solving problems in a wide range of geographic and problematic topics. Among them (presumably, countries and regions in order of NATO’s priority): Afghanistan, the Balkans, and Libya. Literally a few lines mentioned Iraq and Syria as NATO looks at them with "growing concern".
Among the approaches and issues a special emphasis on the promotion of the principles of partnership, a policy of expansion and involvement in the "orbit of NATO's" new countries that are far beyond the borders of the alliance (Libya is among these states). Major problems and challenges to security are recognized as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, instability in energy supply, and cyber threats. The factors that may affect NATO actions appear to be changes in the environment, climate change, health risks, etc. It seems that NATO is seeking to take on all the new features to justify its existence and to be "needed" in the global community In particular, in the maintenance of international security.
Incidentally, this feature is also manifested in the Chicago papers referred to in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. For some time NATO has taken on the challenge of further reductions in conventional forces on the continent, although initially, all negotiations were conducted under the auspices of the OSCE.
The trend towards "empowering" NATO’s "global functions" was noted with concern not long ago in the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2010). However, the active expansion of the range of NATO’s activity today is a reality that cannot be ignored. But the unanswered question remains: is it possible to use the potential of NATO for "good" or it will become a source of new tensions and conflicts?
With undoubted potential for military intervention, even in conflicts remote from Europe, NATO demonstrates a clear lack of experience in post-crisis settlement. This has been already noticed in Brussels, which has tried to think through a scheme suitable to achieve such an objective mechanism. If this continues, substitution of the UN functions will cause frustration and criticism from a number of countries, including Russia.
NATO is still lacking a clear approach to conflict resolution, such as in Libya or Syria. Operating in Libya under the auspices of the UN Security Council Resolution 1973, NATO has overstepped the permissible scope by actually going to overthrow the Libyan regime. Regardless of the nature of the evaluation of this and several other regimes - a violation of international law can only lead to a serious deterioration of the situation and the emergence of intractable differences between the leading countries in the world.
Many will remember the NATO's actions in the former Yugoslavia and in Iraq which were devoid of any legal basis (at least initially). The existing practice creates the temptation to repeat the power scenario in one form or another, for example, with respect to Syria.
Opposition to the main challenges and threats. Russia's Role
The major security challenges and threats, which have already become standard, were voiced at the Chicago Summit. The aforementioned summit declares the determination of NATO to actively participate in combating them. It is clear that opposition to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, as well as other challenges and threats is a task that requires joint action. The effectiveness of these actions depends on the feasibility of the declared goals. For objectivity's sake it should be recognized that the proliferation of WMD and terrorism not only remain relevant threats, but their level is not reduced, and in some cases is even increasing.
However, the commitment to nuclear deterrence, once again declared at the summit (one of the accepted papers is called “Review of the policy of deterrence and defence”), cannot bring the alliance closer to resolving these problems. Terrorists do not reside in a separate special state, towards which armed action can be directed. In addition, thus far nuclear deterrence does not work against the major regimes representing a threat to international security today with the proliferation of nuclear weapons (Iran, North Korea). In this regard, the vast majority of Russian politicians and experts are of the firm belief that, in fact, nuclear deterrence is supported by NATO against Russia today in the same way as before against the USSR.
Another "old" negative factor, which has caused extreme irritation to Russia for decades and literally undermines its relations with NATO and the West in general, is the alliance's eastward expansion. The summit did not say anything comforting for Moscow on this important issue. Moreover, in the final declaration of the summit, provisions to support the further rapprochement of NATO to Georgia and Ukraine were written.
With respect to Tbilisi those were confirmed at the Bucharest NATO summit in 2008 with the obligation of taking Georgia into the alliance. In this regard, completely absurd demands to Moscow have been recorded i.e. to "take back the recognition of the independent states of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia."
As for Ukraine, in Chicago it was stated that NATO "is ready to continue to develop cooperation" with the country. While the expansion of Ukraine into NATO was not considered. But the inclusion of Georgia into NATO (which itself is close to the absurd, considering the geographical position of this country) in the future is possible, especially with a further deterioration in relations between Moscow and Brussels. It is quite a real prospect that in the foreseeable future, the republics of Macedonia and Montenegro will be considered for inclusion in the alliance.
The new stimuli for the NATO-Russia relations, which are added to the "old" negative factors, are the plans for a European missile defence. As expected, the summit announced that alliance has achieved "intermediate operational readiness" in the field of missile defence. At the same time it was stated that such a system was able to provide "full protection and security for the entire population of NATO member countries" (unfounded hopes for a "full protection" has been convincingly proved by scientists in the days of U.S. President Ronald Reagan, who proposed the so-called Strategic Defence Initiative.)
True, a range of co-operations is proposed to Russia in this context. But without solid guarantees of not being directed against the Russian nuclear weapons, these proposals are unacceptable to Moscow. Statements that the missile defence of NATO is not directed against Russia and does not undermine the Russian potential of strategic nuclear deterrent, are not enough for Moscow.
The Chicago summit did not only fail to solve basic problems in the NATO-Russia relations, but also exacerbated some of them. Unfortunately, as with the policy of NATO expansion, in response to the concerns of Russia in Brussels, as a rule, there is no search for possible compromises, but multiplication of the declarations that assure that the NATO’s activity do not threaten Russia.
Without close cooperation with Russia, NATO will not be able to effectively solve many pressing security issues. At best it is possible to create visibility around their solutions, whilst sometimes seriously damaging the relationship with Moscow. We desperately need one another, and a vivid example of this is the increasing cooperation on Afghanistan.
After all, a partnership is not only a declaration, but also it requires being attentive to the arguments of partners and their integration into the policy. Without this even full implementation of the Chicago decisions and all subsequent NATO summits could not lead to a sustainable strengthening of security in Europe and the world.