An Anti-Sanctions Alliance Is Taking Shape

Russia’s eleven-year experience in effectively countering Western unilateral coercive measures (UCMs)—unprecedented in their scale and scope—has attracted keen interest from friendly states, including those already subject to such restrictions.

At the interstate level, Russia is consistently developing an anti-sanctions regulatory framework with its foreign partners in order, firstly, to legally enshrine a list of joint actions to counter unilateral sanctions. Secondly, to pave the way for the development and adoption of an international legally binding instrument aimed at jointly countering UCMs.

The heads of state and government of member countries of international associations in which Russia participates, such as BRICS, have consistently condemned unilateral sanctions, thereby demonstrating support for an anti-sanctions alliance. The Declaration adopted in Rio de Janeiro on July 6, 2025, following the 17th BRICS Summit condemns the imposition of UCMs, which have far-reaching negative consequences for human rights, including the rights to development, health, and food security, for the entire population of the affected states, disproportionately affecting the poor and vulnerable, deepening the digital divide, and exacerbating environmental problems.

It is specifically emphasised that BRICS states will not impose or support sanctions that are not approved by the UN Security Council and that are contrary to international law, thereby precluding the possibility of enforcing “secondary” Western sanctions. The UN General Assembly regularly adopts decisions condemning UCMs, reflecting the will of a broad coalition of states.

The process of forming an anti-sanctions alliance is not simply a technical response to unilateral restrictions, but also carries a destructive charge for the West’s so-called rules-based order.

More and more states, including those not subject to sanctions, are recognising the harmfulness of coercive measures, including “secondary” ones, against their citizens and companies.

Naturally, the need is now ripe to develop an international, legally binding instrument aimed at jointly countering unilateral restrictions. It would be entirely logical for the future document to receive support from the UN General Assembly, where, as experience shows, key anti-sanctions decisions receive broad support.

Russia’s eleven-year experience in effectively countering Western unilateral coercive measures (UCMs)—unprecedented in their scale and scope—has attracted keen interest from friendly states, including those already subject to such restrictions.

The negative impact of Western sanctions on Russia has been mitigated by ensuring fiscal stability, pursuing a responsible monetary policy, maintaining low public debt, and painstakingly building a resilient financial infrastructure. This infrastructure now guarantees the uninterrupted flow of payments, both domestically and internationally.

In response to the “sanctions tsunami” that occurred in 2022, the government of the Russian Federation and the Bank of Russia took the necessary measures to stabilise the banking system’s liabilities, strengthen the balance of payments and the ruble exchange rate, and ensure the effective operation of financial institutions. Capital restrictions were introduced, reducing pressure on the balance of payments. The stabilisation of financial markets has created the foundation for structural economic restructuring.

Interstate Anti-Sanctions Cooperation

Ivan Timofeev:
Russia and China in the Era of Trade Wars and Sanctions

At the interstate level, Russia is consistently developing an anti-sanctions regulatory framework with its foreign partners in order, firstly, to legally enshrine a list of joint actions to counter unilateral sanctions. Secondly, to pave the way for the development and adoption of an international legally binding instrument aimed at jointly countering UCMs.

One of the first bilateral documents in this area was the Declaration by the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran on the Ways and Means to Counter, Mitigate and Redress the Adverse Impacts of Unilateral Coercive Measures (hereinafter referred to as the Declaration), signed in Moscow on December 5, 2023. As Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov noted, “This is important for pooling the efforts of the international community to overcome the illegal sanctions with which the US and its allies have replaced diplomacy.”

Among the key principles in the document, in particular, it is noted that the adoption of a UCM by any state is illegal, contradicts the Charter of the United Nations and international law, and will entail international liability.

Unilateral coercive measures, including those of an extraterritorial nature, carried out by a third state, group, or association of states in violation of the UN Charter and international law, must neither be recognised nor accepted.

In the event of economic or financial damage resulting from the adoption of a UCM, the state that, through its actions or the extraterritorial application of its national laws, caused such losses to the affected state, individuals, and legal entities bears primary responsibility for compensation and reparation.

The Declaration specifically emphasises that states should develop a “roadmap” for reducing the dependence of international trade on certain national currencies, which can be used as a tool for implementing UCMs or to maintain a particular state’s monetary hegemony in the global economy.

Indicative of the implementation of the Russian-Iranian agreements was the Russian President Vladimir Putin’s assessment on January 17, 2025, following talks with Iranian President Mahmoud Pezeshkian, that by 2024, the share of transactions in Russian rubles and Iranian rials exceeded 95 percent of all bilateral trade transactions. “Notably, our countries have almost completely transitioned to using national currencies in mutual settlements. Efforts are being made to establish sustainable lending and banking interaction channels and to align our national payment systems,” Vladimir Putin said.

Besides Iran, anti-sanctions declarations were signed with Belarus, Zimbabwe, Cuba, and Nicaragua.

The Memorandum of Understanding between the Russian Federation and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on Cooperation in Countering Unilateral Coercive Measures, signed on June 25, 2024, deserves special attention. Its implementation will be carried out within the framework of a joint ad hoc group. The memorandum provides for the development of an international, legally binding instrument aimed at jointly countering UCMs. Key areas include:

• promoting and disseminating information related to UCMs, including through the publication of documents, information materials, and bulletins in specialised journals, as well as organising forums, seminars, conferences, and joint presentations at the national and international levels;
• sharing experiences and best practices in countering UCMs, developing joint strategies to mitigate their consequences, and developing a coordinated position on countering UCMs at international venues;
• encouraging the participation of experts in events such as congresses, conferences, forums, master classes, courses, and seminars to more thoroughly study the negative consequences of the use of UCMs and the challenges they create.

Regarding Russia’s anti-sanctions cooperation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Article 16 of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, which entered into force on December 4, 2024, is noteworthy.

The document emphasises that, if any third party imposes UCMs against one of the parties, both countries will take practical efforts to mitigate risks and eliminate or minimise the direct and indirect impact of such measures on mutual economic ties, individuals or legal entities of the parties, or their property.

Russia and the DPRK are also taking steps to limit the dissemination of information that could be used by third countries to impose and escalate sanctions.

Anti-Sanctions Work Within International Organisations

Ivan Timofeev:
Escalation of EU Energy Sanctions: The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Packages

The heads of state and government of member countries of international associations in which Russia participates, such as BRICS, have consistently condemned unilateral sanctions, thereby demonstrating support for an anti-sanctions alliance. The Declaration adopted in Rio de Janeiro on July 6, 2025, following the 17^th BRICS Summit condemns the imposition of UCMs, which have far-reaching negative consequences for human rights, including the rights to development, health, and food security, for the entire population of the affected states, disproportionately affecting the poor and vulnerable, deepening the digital divide, and exacerbating environmental problems.

It is specifically emphasised that BRICS states will not impose or support sanctions that are not approved by the UN Security Council and that are contrary to international law, thereby precluding the possibility of enforcing “secondary” Western sanctions. The UN General Assembly regularly adopts decisions condemning UCMs, reflecting the will of a broad coalition of states.

The resolution “Human Rights and Unilateral Coercive Measures” was adopted on December 17, 2024 [1] The UN General Assembly calls upon all states to cease the adoption or implementation of any unilateral measures, particularly coercive measures, which are not in accordance with international law, international humanitarian law, the Charter of the United Nations and the norms and principles governing peaceful relations among States, with all their ensuing extraterritorial consequences, that create obstacles to trade relations between States, thereby impeding the full enjoyment of the rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments, particularly the right of individuals and peoples to development.

The resolution “Unilateral economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries” [2] urges the international community to take immediate and effective measures to put an end to the practice of applying unilateral economic, financial or trade measures that are not sanctioned by the relevant UN organs, are inconsistent with the principles of international law or the provisions of the UN Charter, or that run counter to the fundamental principles of the multilateral trading system and affect, among others, but not exclusively, developing countries. It calls on the international community to condemn and reject such measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries, which create obstacles to the full achievement of economic and social development.

Clearly, the process of forming an anti-sanctions alliance is not simply a technical response to unilateral restrictions, but also carries a destructive charge for the West’s so-called rules-based order.

More and more states, including those not subject to sanctions, are recognising the harmfulness of coercive measures, including “secondary” ones, against their citizens and companies.

Naturally, the need is now ripe to develop an international, legally binding instrument aimed at jointly countering unilateral restrictions. It would be entirely logical for the future document to receive support from the UN General Assembly, where, as experience shows, key anti-sanctions decisions receive broad support.

First published in the Valdai Discussion Club.

1. Of the 193 UN member states, 131 voted in favour, 55 voted against, and seven countries were not present for the vote.

2. Adopted on 19 December, 2023. Of the 193 UN Member States, 128 voted in favour, 8 abstained and 43 voted against. Fourteen countries were not present for the vote.