... almost open nuclear game, but in different forms and with different objectives. Both Russia and the United States are well aware of the presence of the nuclear weapons factor in this conflict. Russia's main objective is to deter the United States and NATO from directly intervening in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The U.S., on the other hand, tends to believe that Russia will not or dare not use nuclear weapons and can therefore boldly provide military support to Ukraine. Both sides are at loggerheads,...
.... It is unclear, Mr. von der Schulenburg suggests, what positive outcome can be achieved through an escalation, and it is certain that it will not bring peace to Europe.
The conflict has evolved into what he believes is a struggle between Russia and NATO, with nuclear weapons becoming a critical factor in military planning. It is impossible to predict the limitations of such a “decisive battle,” beyond which a nuclear escalation might occur. In persisting with all-out warfare, European leaders,...
On October 18, 2022, a regular online international expert dialog on Russia-NATO relations was held, bringing together experts, former diplomats and military, public leaders from Russia, the USA, and European NATO member-states
On October 18, 2022, a regular online international expert dialog on Russia-NATO relations was held,...
Working paper № 69 / 2022
Working paper № 69 / 2022
The working paper explores the factors that predetermined the Western switch from divergence to convergence in the 2020s along with the key features of the commenced consolidation within the ranks of the Collective West. Is current Western unity incidental or strategic? Is it transient or long-standing? How much do the interests of the major power centers of the Collective West diverge? How likely is this unity to extend to subsequent engagement...
... participation, this is no longer an option. While security guarantees were previously seen as an alternative to Ukraine’s accession to NATO, these are now perceived as a temporary measure only, to be in place until Kiev finally emerges as a full-fledged member ... ... three other operating nuclear power plants. For sure, it would be even better if it didn’t come to that.
Aleksey Arbatov:
The Ukrainian Crisis and Strategic Stability
Second, such a precedent would be of great value even beyond the framework of the Russian-Ukrainian ...
... European Leadership Network, and the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Russian International Affairs Council has been participating in Riga Dialogue summit since 2015. This conference addressed the issues of the future of relations between Russia and NATO, the fate of the OSCE and other pan-European institutions, EU anti-Russian sanctions, and possible scenarios for the end of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Andrey Kortunov, RIAC Director General, spoke at the meeting.
On September 13, 2022, after a summer break, a regular online international expert dialog on Russia-NATO relations resumed its work, bringing together experts, former diplomats and military, public leaders from Russia, the USA, and European NATO member-states.
On September 13, 2022, after a summer break, a regular online international expert dialog ...
On July 21, 2022, a regular online international expert dialog on Russia-NATO relations took place, bringing together experts, former diplomats and military, public leaders from Russia, the USA, and European NATO member-states
On July 21, 2022, a regular online international expert dialog on Russia-NATO relations took place,...
... violation of promises given to the Soviet leadership in 1989–1990, NATO expanded eastward and included Ukraine into its possible future members. It is no accident that the confrontation ultimately found its epicenter in Ukraine that wanted to accede to NATO and abandoned the Minsk agreements on settling the conflicts in the Donbass and Lugansk regions. With the Ukrainian crisis, military and strategic innovations entered the realm of practical policies, of very real, not just abstract, planning of military operations with a view to their possible “horizontal” and “vertical” escalation.
In October 2016,...
... many pundits are unaware of what triggered the current disorder. For example, in 2004, I took the risk of predicting to myself that the addition of ten new members to the EU, including atavistically Russophobic Poland and the Baltic statelets, also NATO members, would lead to a lack of EU foreign policy cohesion, and to institutional instability. And so it has, but many of our so-called western analysts appear oblivious to even this recent history (let alone of earlier history), preferring to concentrate ...
