... features. But perhaps the most unexpected development has been that Tehran’s retaliation has been directed not so much at Israel and the United States as at the Gulf monarchies. This has shown itself in missile strikes, drone attacks against the infrastructure,... ...
It is already possible to assume what trends are highly likely to intensify in the near future for the Arab Gulf monarchies—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and, to a lesser extent, Oman.
Dmitriy Trenin:
Iran Prevails: Initial Assessments ...
... Gulf states. This distance (with the exception of the UAE) began to widen with the onset of the 2023 Gaza war and is likely to continue increasing in light of the consequences of escalation with Iran.
It appears that for states perceiving threats from Israel, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, this war has intensified the search for deterrence mechanisms within a bloc-based framework. Despite Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s attempt to frame this group of countries as an “axis,” there is, for now, no move toward establishing ...
... had 52 days of thunder and lightning like they’d never seen before. It was a fast, fierce, decisive, and extremely successful use of military power. Not that we wanted it, but they were hitting ships. They were shooting at you. They were shooting at Saudi Arabia. We weren’t.”
***
The prospects for the further development of the Yemeni conflict remain unpredictable. The link between the Yemeni conflict and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict persists, with Yemen’s crisis evolving into a format of direct confrontation between Sana’a and Israel.
The new center of war, sparked by Israel’s attack on Iran on June 13, 2025, and the ensuing twelve-day conflict that ended with ...
Nobody wanted to fight
When the Israeli–Palestinian conflict escalated dramatically in early October 2023, many observers jumped to a grim conclusion that, from then onward, the Middle East was hurtling at an ever-increasing speed toward another major regional conflict. The military ...
... including in the economy, long before diplomatic relations were established.
Negotiations on normalizing Saudi-Israeli relations, before being suspended after October 7, moved far ahead and proceeded as it were on three tracks: between the U.S. and Israel, Saudi Arabia and Israel, and the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. A package framework was negotiated, containing important political and economic conditions for the Saudis such as security guarantees and strategic cooperation, including the supply of modern weapons,...
... (should the organization withstand the onslaught of Israeli Defense Forces) is making a bid for leadership in the Palestinian house.
HAMAS’s latest actions suggest that the movement can afford not to depend on its Arab neighbors. The UAE, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia (the latter wishes to preserve the possibility of establishing public relations with Israel as part of a deal with the US) are downright treacherous to HAMAS followers, given what is going on in Palestine. Furthermore, Arab regimes securing their own security through separatist agreements with Israel and the United States are accused ...
... documents from the Arab side.
The U.S. president’s trip to the Middle East was the occasion for the public announcement of a revised foreign policy in its regional dimension. Biden thought it was symbolic that he was the first U.S. president to come to Saudi Arabia from Israel and the first to visit the region at a time when the U.S. has no military personnel engaged in military operations there. Thereafter, the U.S. emphasized intensive diplomacy with the caveat that the use of force is seen as a last resort when all ...
... the whole world order. The tension between the ruling elites and citizens will reshape regional political geography.
With conflicting principles of superpowers, the Middle East will undergo a high risk of conflict in spheres of influence between Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey and other rising regional powers which seek to play a pivotal role in local and global affairs, attempting to shape the multipolar world.
The persistence of conflicts and the absence of real effective political and economic reforms will ...
... together. Also vectors of power are strong from Iran with Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and potentially Bahrain and Qatar. And vectors of power a very strong from Turkey into northern Syria and northern Iraq. The USA works military especially through Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, but with cooperation also in Iraq and with Kurds in Iraq and Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. Russia works together with especially Turkey, Iran and Syria. These power vectors may change in connection with internal issues in ...
According to the new findings of the ongoing research project, Asian investors continue to increase direct investments in the EAEU. During the monitoring period (2008–2016), FDI stock originating from 12 Asian countries (China, Japan, Turkey, India, Israel, Mongolia, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran, Singapore, and Vietnam) has increased from $32 billion in 2008 to $75.6 billion in the beginning of 2017.
China continues to expand its economic presence in EAEU countries and other CIS states, retaining its leadership among ...
