... state the opposite.
In the near future, perhaps even before 2021, the Transnistria situation will be influenced by the success or failure of the Moldovan reforms, the revision of the unofficial agreement between the Moldovan and Transnistrian elite, Transnistria’s relations with Romania and Russia’s eagerness to maintain the status quo both economically and in terms of its presence in the unrecognized territory. The latter factor is debatable: Russia and Moldova are already discussing the possibility of withdrawing Russian ammunition from ...
... identity and the country’s foreign policy. The right-wing opposition tends to interpret the possibility of resolving the Transnistrian conflict through a multilateral compromise as Moldova deviating from the pro-EU vector and the country’s surrender to Russia. The flames of this alarmist position are also being fed from abroad, particularly from Romania.
In other words, inducing Chisinau to adopt a settlement plan for Transnistria that would grant Tiraspol any significant powers would be akin to making Kiev grant autonomy to Donbass. The situation is bound to worsen with the upcoming parliamentary election in February 2019, which will likely be used by the right-wing ...
... cent in the first half of 2015
[27]
. Exports were down 20per cent, and imports 25per cent, on 2014. Half of the goods from the Transnistrian region are sold on the right bank of the Dniester in Moldova. At the same time, the export of products from Transnistria to Romania is nearly double the amount of exports to the Russian market. In March 2015, the PMR introduced a special procedure for paying wages and pensions in the amount of 70per cent of the due and payable sums (the rest is considered to be arrears). The withdrawal of big Russian business from Transnistria ...
