..., which Georgian pro-Western players used as a rebuke of the Georgian Church and its congregation. The Georgian Church and a large part of the country’s population reminded everyone that they would not change traditions for the sake of the West or Russia. Georgia had become part of the Western world before Ukraine and did not need to revise traditions for this. The situation with Russia is equally deplorable. It is squeezed out by all legal and illegal methods, including the prohibition of speaking Russian ...
... blocking Azerbaijan’s maximalist aspirations.
Jens Stoltenberg’s visit to Baku, Yerevan and Tbilisi in March 2024 was quite revealing in this regard. Brussels believes now is the time for geopolitical homogenization of the region. The crisis in Russian-Armenian relations, Georgia’s desire to monetize its status as a NATO “aspirant” as soon as possible, the bolstered cooperation between Baku and Ankara (NATO’s second largest army) – all these factors work to promote the West’s agenda. However, the mosaic in ...
... understand how Georgia manages to combine a pro-Western course with its defiance of anti-Russian injunctions by the U.S. and the EU (which commands nothing but respect, according to
Sergey Lavrov
), it is necessary to recall the dynamics transpiring in the Russia-Georgia-West triangle on the eve of February 24, 2022.
The modern Georgian state has existed for little more than 10 years. On October 1, 2012, the “Georgian Dream” party, closely associated with the billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, won the parliamentary ...
... an influx of human capital, and with it a possible economic effect. At the same time, Armenia remains a vulnerable country. Excessive international turbulence and fluctuating commodity prices are not in its interests.
Part of the migration flow from Russia has also rushed to Georgia. Tbilisi has distanced itself from the sanctions war, not wanting to suffer losses in the Russian market. The country remains oriented towards the West, but clearly does not want to aggravate relations with Moscow. Georgia’s key interest is ...
... and difficulties seem to stem from weak institutions, with an enforced political repetition compulsion [
4
] by elites and citizens alike, rather than from external threat(s) [
5
]. Nonetheless, the external threat is presented as the main one (e.g. Russia in Georgia and Turkey/Azerbaijan in Armenia), while the problems seem to be mostly domestic, having a lot to do with corruption or difficulties to accept the change of borders in the post-Soviet order.
Towards the effective implementation of a Blue Ocean ...
... western turn is nothing new. The
recent news
that the country plans to apply for full membership should not come as a surprise (
EURACTIV
2021). The EU is already Georgia’s main trading partner and its relations with the EU far surmount those with Russia. Georgia’s accension would limit Russia’s influence in the region but not pose an existential threat. NATO, on the other hand, does. It is in this context that Abkhazia plays such a vital role to Russia. As writes, Paul Antonopoulos “The ambition ...
On May 12, 2020, International Crisis Group held an online expert meeting on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on conflict situations in the post-Soviet space, the possibilities of international cooperation in combating coronavirus and preventing humanitarian emergencies in armed conflict zones.
On May 12, 2020, International Crisis Group held an online expert meeting on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on conflict situations in the post-Soviet space, the possibilities of international cooperation...
... prefaced with the fact that the region’s borders are not clearly fixed. Generally speaking, when discussing the situation in the region, politicians and experts tend to refer not only to the six countries that have a coastline on the Black Sea (Bulgaria, Georgia, Russia, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine) but also to neighbouring states. It is, thus, no coincidence that the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) founded 28 years ago (if we consider the Bosphorus Statement its constituent declaration) ...
... deep today.
Forecast: The Region Will Remain Divided
In the long and medium-term, the Trans-Caucasus will remain a divided region. The “three countries — three different strategies” principle will remain. Armenia will attempt to remain an ally of Russia, while Georgia will try to stay an ally of the “collective West in general” without forgetting to diversify its foreign political ties. Both Erevan and Tbilisi will have internal and external restrictions. Moscow will hardly welcome Erevan expanding its ...
... passionate radicals find no outlet for their energy at home and are willing to take part in military gambles in a neighbouring state. Take, for instance, Moldova, where the outcome of the people’s political choice depends on who supports the candidate, Russia or Europe. In Georgia, success in domestic politics also largely depends on the elite’s foreign political preferences. Buffer countries have chosen a zero-sum game strategy, betting on one player only and thus putting themselves in a more vulnerable position. If ...
