... on the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement in late 2021, European Council President Charles Michel and French President Emmanuel Macron twice
called
Russian leader Vladimir Putin in a bid to find common ground between EU interests and the Sochi-Moscow Russia-Azerbaijan-Armenia negotiating format.
Andrey Petrov:
Peace in South Caucasus: What Awaits Russia in Armenia?
The beginning of Russia’s military operation in Ukraine overhauled this balance. First of all, the positions of Russia and the West have become ...
... International Transport Corridor Means for Iran
One of the beneficiaries of the change in the balance of power in the South Caucasus following the 2020 war is Turkey. It has
legitimized
its military presence in the region,
signed
a strategic document with Azerbaijan and successfully
promoted
its "3+3" negotiation format, which was accepted by the key centers of power—Russia and Iran. In other words, the expansion of Turkey's political, diplomatic and military presence in the South Caucasus allows Ankara to impact and sometimes even set the agenda in the region.
The emergence of a new actor such as India may have implications ...
... close ties—as regards the relationship with Azerbaijan, which won the Karabakh war not only for itself but also for the entire region, it is already possible to speak with confidence about the outlook for allied interaction in the new historical era.
Russian-Azerbaijani baggage
How does Azerbaijan enter the new historical era of South Caucasus from the perspective of Russia’s interests? First of all, this country is friendly towards Russia; moreover, it is a reliable and problem-free ally. Second, it is ...
On October 10, 2023, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and the Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center, Azerbaijan) held a joint closed online workshop on security issues in the South Caucasus in the context of interaction of regional players
On October 10, 2023, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and the Center of Analysis of International ...
... of the so-called “Zangezur corridor”, which had been in “dormant mode” until 2020, but after the change of the military-political status quo reemerged once again, is far from being settled.
Meanwhile, all these issues, alongside the Armenian-Azerbaijani problem, affect the interests of other parties. Russia is extremely interested in unblocking transport communications and a peace treaty through its decisive mediation. But Turkey (which today feels itself a beneficiary in the Caucasus) benefits from the “corridor logic”, which will connect not ...
... Nakhchivan) through Iran. Mr. Abdollahian also promised President Aliyev that all those responsible for the tragedy in the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran would be punished. It is quite likely that we will see significant moves towards the warming of Iranian-Azerbaijani relations in the very near future. What’s more, Russia is very much
interested
in reconciliation between the parties, and so it can act as a mediator in resolving bilateral contradictions.
With all that, the implementation of the North-South international transportation corridor may not only lead ...
... confrontation with Baku, as exemplified by the
declaration of allied interaction
of February 22, 2022.
Many may wonder why Azerbaijan is directly challenging Moscow’s strategic interests. The only logical answer appears to be the conviction on the part of Azerbaijan’s ruling elite that Russia will lose badly in its current confrontation with the West in Ukraine. As Azerbaijan’s newly emerging Western partners continue pursuing additional volumes of gas and oil, they are also undoubtedly working to influence Baku, by emphasizing what ...
... obligations. The current crisis has sharply increased demand for Azerbaijani oil. The country will receive significant income. At the same time, Azerbaijan remains a partner of the US, UK, EU and other Western players. The Ukrainian crisis could also divert Russia’s attention away from the Karabakh issue. Azerbaijan is unlikely to abuse such a switch, but both Baku and Ankara are closely monitoring the situation.
Robert Quinn Carolan:
Neck and Neck: Ankara and Moscow in the New ‘Race for Africa’
Armenia also receives its bonuses from the conflict. ...
... Russia and Azerbaijan, but also resolve some security issues in the South Caucasus. In particular, during the event, experts from Russia and Azerbaijan discussed the prospects for the construction of transport corridors running through the territories of Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Iran and Turkey, that could become new economic arteries for the region.
In addition, the experts came to the conclusion that the implementation of joint logistics projects in the region can become the basis for the rapprochement ...
... and difficulties seem to stem from weak institutions, with an enforced political repetition compulsion [
4
] by elites and citizens alike, rather than from external threat(s) [
5
]. Nonetheless, the external threat is presented as the main one (e.g. Russia in Georgia and Turkey/Azerbaijan in Armenia), while the problems seem to be mostly domestic, having a lot to do with corruption or difficulties to accept the change of borders in the post-Soviet order.
Towards the effective implementation of a Blue Ocean strategy in the South ...
